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Abstract

My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how
perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent
plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses:


Some perceptions provide us reasons



Only belief-like states provide us reasons



No perception is belief-like

I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one
thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link
between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial
plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state
amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account
of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like (nonconceptual) character and
explains its ability to provide us reasons.
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Introduction: Perception and Nonconceptual Apprehension

Much of what we do, we do for reasons. We move to a smaller apartment because we can
no longer afford the rent on the current one, or because we realize that our work hours
have become so extensive that we no longer frequent the large living room that has now
been reduced to the status of an abandoned warehouse, or because of any of an
indefinitely many other reasons. When asked why we decided to move to a smaller
apartment, some of these considerations would figure as the reasons we would cite for
our decision. Our lives are abundant with episodes of such explicitly deliberative
decisions.
However, not all cases in which we act on the basis of reasons are ones in which we can
articulate our reasons. Alternatively, the extent to which we can articulate them, when
prodded, is quite limited. Perhaps all we can say in certain cases is that ‘it seemed like the
right thing to do at the time’. As in the example above, it seems we act on the basis of a
reason, on the basis of how things seemed to us at the time. Unlike the example above,
the reason that we are able to provide – its seeming to us the right thing to do – does not
make transparent the light by which we find performing that action, rather than any
other, reasonable. It is not particularly illuminating of my reasons to say that I chose the
smaller apartment because it seemed to me the reasonable thing to do – i.e., that for
which I had reason. We are urged to uncover what it was about how it seemed to me, if
anything, that made choosing the apartment reasonable in my light.
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Arguably, when it comes to our daily activities, this latter sort of case is the norm rather
than the exception. A sergeant leading his platoon through the streets of Mosul, Iraq,
suddenly feels uneasy. Not sure of the source of his unease, he, nonetheless, immediately
orders his soldiers to a halt. Moments later an IED (Improvised Explosive Device)
detonates in a nearby car. The soldiers are safe, seemingly by a stroke of good luck. The
sergeant cannot explain his actions other than noting that ‘something just seemed off’.
Nonetheless, the sergeant’s accuracy in making such decisions is well above chance.
Similar cases are ubiquitous and usually much more mundane. Transporting a mug of
coffee from the kitchen to the office involves many such episodes. We avoid the various
obstacles in our path, pick up the coffee mug with the appropriate hand by its handle,
return along a similar path, and place it on the table just close enough so as to grasp it
easily at some future time, but not too close so as to risk its falling off the table and
creating a huge mess, all the while simultaneously lowering ourselves comfortably into
the chair. Such snap decisions and fluent effortless actions appear to be our paradigmatic
forms of engagement with the world.
In most cases, these actions do not seem to involve any deliberation at all on our part.
Yet, it is also clear that we perform them on the basis of certain reasons that we have. We
take that path to the kitchen because it seems to us the safest and least obstructed path to
reach our destination. We pick up the coffee mug with this hand, rather than the other,
because of how the mug is oriented in relation to our body and the other objects around it.
Furthermore, when we fail at any one of these activities we hold ourselves responsible.
We berate ourselves for stubbing our toe on the table leg, for toppling the coffee mug, for
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knocking it over and spilling it on the floor. These are not things that simply happen –
they are things that we do on the basis of reasons, and, at times, do incorrectly.
While there is an articulation of the reasons for which we perform these actions, it seems
that in acting we do not normally deliberate about these reasons in a way that so
articulates them. More interestingly, it does not seem that we must be able to articulate
them in this way for us to act on the basis of those reasons. Even when prodded as to our
reasons for acting we are often at a loss for words, and are unable to produce a satisfying
explanation. Infants and ‘lower’ animals, too, seem often to act on the basis of reasons,
though they purportedly do not, and cannot, articulate those reasons in any significant
way. Should we, then, say that these cases that do not involve explicit deliberation are
ones in which we are in fact unaware of our reasons for acting? Are they cases in which
counter-intuitively we do not have reasons for acting? Or, perhaps, we should say that
these cases illustrate an availability of reasons of an often inarticulable sort –
inarticulable by us having and acting in light of these reasons. If the latter, what is it to
have such inarticulable reasons, and how to explain our acting in their light?
This question is especially significant when contrasted with those cases in which our
actions are brought about by explicit deliberation. We have available a relatively clear
understanding of what is involved in these latter cases. A paradigm of folk psychology is
that our actions are the product of a conjunction of various beliefs and desires that we
have. When I deliberate about which apartment to rent, I consider what I desire in an
apartment and consider what I believe I can afford from among what I believe is
available. I can articulate these in a way that makes transparent their rational relations,
and can therefore articulate the reasons I have for making the decision that I do. I desire
3

the most affordable apartment that is walking distance from the university and has
hardwood floors. I believe that this apartment is the most affordable apartment that is
walking distance from the university and has hardwood floors. Therefore, I proceed to
rent this apartment. Appealing to my desires and to what I believe to be the case shows
why my renting this apartment rather than another is a reasonable thing for me to do.
This is even clearer with respect to theoretical reasoning. My reason for forming the
belief that Socrates is mortal can be made transparent by citing my belief that all men are
mortal and my belief that Socrates is a man. It is presumably in virtue of my recognizing
the relation between these latter two beliefs and recognizing the validity of the transition
to the former belief that I take the latter beliefs as my reason for the former belief. In the
case of inarticulable reasons, however, such explanations are unavailable.
This dissertation is an investigation into the possibility of a certain kind of inarticulable
reasons that one nonetheless has and in light of which acts as one does. The examples I
have given above are in fact highly complex. It is reasonable to presume that the sources
of the reasons they exemplify are various and gerrymandered. The reason for which one
reaches for the coffee mug thus likely appeals to a great many factors. The various
perceptible features of the particular mug and its relation to its environment, one’s
proprioceptive and kinesthetic sense of the position of one’s body and body parts, moods,
emotions, and various goals, all seem to be relevant to one’s having the particular reason
one does, and in light of which one performs the action. The scope of this dissertation is
much narrower.

4

My focus is on perception (on vision, in particular) and how it might contribute to the
reasons in light of which perceivers undertake to perform certain actions and in light of
which they modify their various beliefs. The motivating thought is that perception is not
merely a matter of the world impinging on our senses (though its character commonly
depends on such impingements). Rather, perception is primarily a matter of initiating
perceivers into reasoned engagements with the world. My perceiving the mug and its
surroundings to be a certain way provides my reason to reach for the coffee mug with my
left, rather than right, hand. My perceiving the layout of the cluttered room provides my
reason to choose this path rather than that path. And my perceiving the brown table
before me provides my reason to believe that a brown table is before me. For it to play
this role, perception itself must provide a light by which perceivers deliberate about and
engage with their environment as they do. It must, itself, be a reason-giving state.
It is this feature of perception that the notion of ‘apprehension’ in the title of the
dissertation is meant to capture. Apprehending one’s environment is not merely the
passive having of sensory impressions, but involves an active taking of the environment
such that it potentially serves as a reason one has for one’s actions and deliberations. A
central aim of the dissertation is to articulate what perception must be like if it is to
provide a perceiver reasons for finding some action or belief reasonable, and if the
perceiver is to be able to act or form a belief for that reason.
This is not a question of how, given one’s perception of the environment, performing
certain actions or forming certain beliefs can be reasonable for one to do. Rather, it is the
question of how one’s perceiving the environment accounts for one’s finding certain
actions or beliefs reasonable, and pursues them because of thus finding them. What it is
5

reasonable for one to do and to believe, when having a perception, is dissociable and
often dissociated from what one finds to be reasonable for one to do and to believe, when
having that perception (though when all goes well, these tend to converge).
The appearance of the term ‘nonconceptual’ in the title of the dissertation (roughly)
reflects the fact that, unlike in those cases of explicit deliberative reasoning, perceivers
for whom perception provides reasons are not ipso facto in a position to articulate these
reasons in a way that makes transparent the light they take them to shed on their various
actions and beliefs. And yet they do take them to shed such light. A perceiver who knows
nothing about volcanoes might nonetheless take the perception of a volcano erupting as
providing reason for fleeing. It is the possibly inarticulable (by the perceiver) nature of
the reasons that perception provides that proves especially challenging to an account of
perception as providing reasons in the first place. It is also a challenge that has a
particularly long history within epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
It is with this challenge that the dissertation begins. In the following, opening, chapter of
the dissertation, The Reason-Giving Status of Perception, I argue that a deep conflict
arises when we attempt to reconcile the claim that perception is a reason-giving state with
certain prima facie reasonable claims about the nature of reason-giving and about the
nature of perception. A standard account of reason-giving is modeled on how beliefs, as
paradigmatic reason-giving states, seem to achieve this status. Central is the claim that
having a belief entails that the believer is in a position to articulate its contents in a way
that makes transparent, to the believer, its rational significance to the believer’s other
beliefs and desires (as the examples of explicit deliberation illustrate). However, there is
also good reason to think that perception is not like belief in that respect: Perception is
6

nonconceptual in the sense that having a perception does not entail that the perceiver can
articulate its contents in this way. The conflict can be resolved in either of three ways.
First, it can be resolved by giving up the notion that perception is a reason-giving state,
i.e., that it involves an apprehension in the sense described above. Second, it can be
resolved by denying the claims about the nonconceptual nature of perception. Finally, it
can be resolved by rethinking the notion of reason-giving. It is this third strategy that this
dissertation pursues.

7

Chapter 1: The reason-giving status of perception

1.1 Introduction: An inconsistent triad
What is the problem when considering the reason-giving status of perception? The
answer can be formulated as an inconsistent triad:
Perceptual reason – Some perceptions provide us reasons (for beliefs or actions)
Exclusivity – Only beliefs provide us reasons
Bifurcation – No perception is a belief
In this introductory chapter to the reason-giving problem of perception, I argue that a
refined version of each of these propositions has significant independent plausibility,
though they cannot be simultaneously held. Reflecting on this inconsistency illuminates
central concerns at the interface of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The
negation of any member of the triad carries characteristic costs that reveal natural
cleavages in the literature on the reason-giving role of perception. The least costly
strategy involves the rejection or modification of Exclusivity, while securing the other
two propositions. This is surprising as it is also the one least attended to (which is not to
say that it has not been attended to). Finally, I articulate a considerable challenge facing
those pursuing this final strategy – one that has not been adequately acknowledged. It is
an overarching theme of the dissertation to illuminate the nature of this challenge and to
confront it.
8

Initial plausibility for each of the propositions involved in the abovementioned triad can
be found by considering the following scenario.
Crossing the road on the way to work, you suddenly spot a car racing towards you. You
stop abruptly in your tracks and the jaunty teenagers in the car wave at you jeeringly as
they pass you by. Why did you halt? Clearly, you explain, you saw the speeding car
approaching and chose life. Perceptual reason seems vindicated.
But, simply seeing the speeding car approaching cannot provide you a reason to halt so
long as you do not believe that the speeding car is approaching. To establish a conclusion
of practical reasoning, there must be a valid argument relating premises to conclusion.
Arguments are composed solely of propositions, and you must believe a proposition true
in order for it to be your reason for establishing the conclusion. The same goes with
theoretical reasoning. Exclusivity seems vindicated.
Furthermore, you might see the speeding car approaching and not believe that a speeding
car is approaching. When you believe some proposition it has an immediate impact on
your further deliberations and actions. Beliefs are promiscuous. Not so with perception.
One may perceive a visual illusion, say, the Müller-Lyer illusion (below), and not for one
moment believe that one line is longer than the other. Furthermore, though one might
believe many things one sees, one sees many more things than one can believe. A picture
is worth a thousand words and immeasurably more. Not only is perception wondrously
rich, it is also finer grained than any of our most precise concepts. Bifurcation seems
vindicated.

9

Figure 1: The Müller-Lyer illusion
Although the above three propositions seem plausible, we clearly cannot hold them all
simultaneously.

1.2 Perceptual reasons
What could have gone wrong with the principle of Perceptual reason? It seems that the
principle, as stated, is too trivial to be challenged. Perception must play some role in
providing us reasons for holding particular beliefs and engaging the world appropriately
(I will often omit this qualification and merely speak of a mental state’s providing us
reasons). After all, much of our intentional, reason-guided, behavior is a reaction to our
immediate environment, and a primary way of making contact with our environment that
initiates such behavior, as in the example above, is perception. Perception is the input for
our reasoned engagements with the world.
However, it might be suggested that the principle obtains its triviality by glossing over a
central distinction between different ways of providing reasons – between directly and
indirectly providing us reasons (or, immediately and mediately). Perception, it might be
thought, enables reason guided activity only indirectly by first forming in us a perceptual
belief. The ensuing belief is that which provides us reasons directly. In the example,
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above, seeing the speeding car causes in you a perceptual belief that then provides you a
reason for halting. This potentially resolves the tension within the triad with which we
began.
Nonetheless, appealing to the distinction between directly and indirectly providing
reasons does not genuinely solve the problem. We can refine the principle to read:
Perceptual apprehension – Some perceptions provide us reasons directly
The notion of apprehension is meant to suggest that nothing additional, extrinsic to those
capacities already employed in having a perception, is required for one to have reasons
for one’s actions and deliberations. Clearly, the example presented above does not
support this stronger principle. Why, then, should we think it true?
Perhaps the most compelling support for Perceptual apprehension is its strong intuitive
appeal. Much of our intentional engagements with our environment seem to proceed
without the mediation of perceptual beliefs. You take this path through a messy room
because of how the room perceptually appears to you to be organized. You make
appropriate fine-tuned adjustments in light of changes in how your immediate
environment perceptually appears to you to be as you move through it. You do so fluently
and effortlessly; similarly with respect to a wide variety of skilled behaviors, playing
tennis, driving a car, drinking the morning coffee, etc.
Furthermore, it seems that perception must provide us reasons directly, for our perceptual
beliefs are themselves often held for reasons grounded in how we perceive the world as
being. You believe that a speeding car is approaching because of how the car
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perceptually appears to you. And you believe that the table before you is brown because
of how it perceptually appears to you. In such cases, an appeal to how the world
perceptually appears to you is not in the service of providing a mere causal explanation,
but an intentional, reason-based, explanation of your beliefs and actions. Perception is
very much not like being hit on the head with a mallet. You don’t merely find yourself
saddled with a belief or with an urge to act, not knowing where these came from. Rather,
perception opens you to certain normative pressures that the environment places on your
deliberations and on your other engagements with the world. That is, you take yourself to
have a reason to act as you do or to believe what you do, in part, by virtue of how the
world perceptually appears to you. This is why you cite your perception as providing
your reason for taking the path you do through the messy room or for holding the belief
that a speeding car is approaching.
It is also why we hold ourselves responsible, commendable or blame worthy, when
executing such perceptually based activities. When, on occasion, we fail in such
activities, e.g., failing to form the appropriate perceptual belief or, when crossing a messy
room, stubbing our foot on a table, we berate ourselves. When, on the other hand, while
navigating a crowded room we swerve successfully in response to the sudden looming
figure of a colleague we might even silently congratulate ourselves for the subtle move.
Thus, again, our commonsensical appeal to perception in explaining our forming certain
beliefs and performing certain actions aims at articulating not merely a causal explanation
but an intentional explanation through and through.
Though I believe we should take common sense seriously, this principle does not obtain
its plausibility merely from such phenomenological considerations. The principle is also
12

at the core of traditional epistemological concerns regarding the epistemic status of our
empirical beliefs. If our empirical beliefs are justified by virtue of appropriately related
perceptual beliefs, the further question is whether, and if so how, these latter perceptual
beliefs are justified. Giving up the notion that perception can provide the perceiver
reasons for holding particular perceptual beliefs threatens to cut the cord of justification
that runs from the world to our theorizing about it appropriately. As McDowell (1994a)
puts it, a view of perception as merely a mode of causal rather than rational contact with
the world leads to a conception of our beliefs as ‘spinning in the void’; hence, not
recognizable as genuine empirical beliefs at all. It would leave us with the particularly
challenging task of showing how, if at all, our beliefs could have any empirical content,
how the norms governing these beliefs could be more than mere coherence, 1 and how
resolution of conflicting empirical theories could come about. 2 In other words, it seems
that denying Perceptual apprehension entails that the world places no normative

1

Michael Martin voices this concern nicely: “When Philippa looks in the drawer [and sees a
gun], she acquires the belief that there is a gun in the drawer. Why should she acquire that belief
rather than any other at that time? Is there any explanation for this in terms of her other beliefs or
mental states? The beliefs she had prior to this surely cannot explain the acquisition of this
[particular] belief” (1993, p. 77). If our beliefs are simply ‘spinning in the void’ and make no
rational contact with the world, it seems that we have no other way to explain her forming this
belief except by appeal to how it rationally relates to her other beliefs. The situation is in fact
even more severe. If our beliefs are in fact ‘spinning in the void’, there is no clear sense in which
Philippa even has a belief with the empirical content there is a gun in the drawer in the first
place. Indeed, avoiding such consequences is McDowell’s (1994a) central concern.

2

This is not to say that attempts have not been made to remedy these apparent difficulties. Those
who argue against Perceptual apprehension must give some account of how considerations of
coherence can be sufficient for our beliefs to be genuinely about the world – for them to have
empirical content. Davidson is perhaps the strongest defender of coherentism, and providing a
solution to this problem is one of his primary aims (Davidson 1983).
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constraints at all on our theorizing about it, and as a consequence it is unclear how our
theorizing can be understood as being responsible to how the world is. 3
Furthermore, suppose that perception were a merely causal antecedent of our perceptual
beliefs. If that were the case, it would be mysterious how we could refrain from believing
everything that we see. 4 Perceiving the Müler-Lyer illusion would invariably result in the
false belief that one line is longer than the other. The fact that we don’t find ourselves
with such false beliefs is evidence that perception provides us reasons for the perceptual
beliefs that we eventually form. When unfamiliar with the illusion, we find such
perceptual reasons compelling, but after having being familiarized with the illusion we
now have reasons to believe the contrary; reasons that overrule those provided us by
perception. A purely causal transaction cannot be overruled by reason.
Finally, whether perception can directly supply the perceiver reasons places constraints
on how we should conceive of, and explain, the behavior of infants and those in the
animal kingdom lacking the capacities necessary for belief formation. If the capacity for
reason guided behavior depends on capacities extrinsic to those involved in perception,
then creatures lacking these capacities are incapable of such behavior. It seems gratuitous
to explain a rat’s navigation skills by appeal to its having particular empirical beliefs.
Nonetheless, the most illuminating explanation of such behavior often takes the form of
3

As McDowell puts it: "The transcendental thought is that we need to be able to see how the
spontaneity of the understanding can be constrained by the receptivity of sensibility, if we are to
be entitled to the very idea of subjective postures with objective purport. And the constraint [that
perception places on our thinking] must be rational, not merely causal, if its presence in our
picture is to vindicate a conception of the responsibility of thinking to its subject matter [i.e., the
empirical world]." (1998, pp. 364-5)
4

See Martin (1993) for much elaboration on this line of argument based on what he calls the
phenomenon of perception in disbelief.
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an intentional explanation – an explanation that appeals to the rat’s representing its
environment and ‘figuring out’ its way through a maze. 5 What form of explanation is
most appropriate in any given case of animal or infant behavior is, of course, an empirical
matter. However, the possibility of such an explanation depends crucially on our ability
to attribute to the animal a sensitivity to reasons (independently of its having perceptual
beliefs). If we are to take such explanations seriously, and there seems to be no reason at
the moment not to, we must conclude that the animal or infant is in fact responsive to
reasons. Thus, the principle under consideration governs both our understanding of the
mentality of such creatures – the extent of their epistemic relation to the world – and of
the types of explanation that would be appropriate to making sense of their behaviors. 6
Having given some support for Perceptual apprehension, let us analyze the other
propositions composing the triad.

5

On the possibility, and actuality, of the intentional explanation of animal behavior, see for
example the works of José Luis Bermúdez, and Susan Hurley. Of special interest in this regard
are Bermúdez (2003), and, in particular, his discussion of the various intentional explanations
applicable to the rat’s ‘figuring out’ a route through a maze (circa pp. 98-103). See also Hurley
(2001; 2003), who discusses several examples of animal behavior that, she argues, are best
explained by appeal to an animal’s sensitivity to reasons, in the absence of its possession of
beliefs.
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Both points, about the mentality of non-doxastic animals as well as of human beings, demand
links between perception and action that are unmediated by beliefs. Though unmediated, these
links nonetheless provide the creature in question with reasons for producing an appropriate
action. Gibson’s ecological optics has been especially influential in framing the considerations
underwriting the need for such perception-action links (Gibson 1979). Indeed, the Gibsonian
notion of an affordance seems to be constructed for just such a purpose. Perceiving an affordance
already makes manifest the responses one has reason to perform. For example, perceiving the
edibility of some object already involves an awareness of the object that recommends, provides
one reason for, its being eaten. If we follow Gibson in holding that an object’s affordances are
directly perceived, rather than inferred, we see that perception already involves an awareness of
the world that supplies us reasons in light of which certain actions are appropriate rather than
others, from our point of view.
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1.3 Beliefs and reasons
Perhaps the problem lies with the principle of Exclusivity. Since our interest in the
previous section was with perception’s providing us reasons directly, we should evaluate
what support we have for the corresponding proposition that only beliefs provide us
reasons directly. It is helpful to begin by looking at the weaker, non-exclusive, claim:
Non-exclusivity – Beliefs provide us reasons directly
The weaker formulation is not particularly controversial. It is commonly held that
providing reasons is the paradigmatic role of belief. Beliefs are the traditional denizens of
folk psychological explanation. And within folk psychology they are appealed to
precisely in order to illuminate the reasonableness of our actions. It is in light of having a
particular belief that certain ensuing behaviors are reasonable or not from the point of
view of the actor.
Given that you are a life-loving individual crossing a busy street, a fast approaching car
might be a reason for you to halt. But, explaining your halting by mere reference to the
speeding car does a disservice on two familiar counts. 7 First, you might have stopped
crossing the road even if de facto the car was not speeding (indeed, even if there was no

7

Others have pointed out the issues that arise when simply identifying facts as one’s reasons (see,
e.g., Pryor (2005), Dancy (2000), and Audi (1986a; 1986b), from whom also much of my
terminology about reasons is appropriated). In Audi’s terminology, for example, the fact itself can
be a reason for some subject S to perform some action A – the fact that a speeding car is
approaching is a reason for you to halt. But, there being such a reason is not yet to say that S has
a reason to A. It is this latter notion of reason that is important for the present discussion as it is
only reasons that S has to A that can potentially also be reasons for which S does in fact A. It is
the reason for which you stop crossing the street that we are interested in. See also, Schroeder’s
(2008) recent extensive discussion of the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ reasons
– reasons for S to A, and reasons S has to A, respectively.
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car at all). In this case, it would be odd to say that your reason for halting was the fact
that the car was speeding. At most, we would explain your halting by appeal to your
having believed that the car was speeding. Indeed, if in such circumstances you later
came to realize that no threat was present, you too would explain your halting, not by
appeal to the fact that a speeding car was approaching, but to your having falsely believed
that such a fact obtained. Second, even if the car was speeding, this fact alone, while it
may be considered as a reason for you to halt, cannot be your reason for anything so long
as you are not made appropriately aware of it; presumably, you must also believe the fact
to obtain. Without having this belief, it seems, the fact itself is, like the proverbial tree
falling in the forest, epistemically irrelevant to you. Thus, it is your having a particular
belief that supplies you with a reason to act as you do (given, of course, a background of
interests, desires, and other instrumental beliefs – e.g., given that you do not want to be
run over by a car). 8
However, merely to say that it is part of our explanatory practices to appeal to beliefs for
the sake of explicating one’s reasons in light of which one’s behaviors make sense is
clearly no explanation of how beliefs can supply such reasons. More so, it provides no
support for the claim that only beliefs can do so – i.e., no support for Exclusivity.
Clearer support for Exclusivity is obtained by considering certain commonsensical,
though controversial, suggestions linking reasons to justification. To say that X provides
8

Note that the above considerations are intended to be neutral with respect to the ontology of
reasons in at least the following respect. They are consistent with the claim that beliefs are our
reasons, with the claim that facts are our reasons so long as we believe them to obtain, and with
the claim that the contents of our beliefs constitute our reasons. There are various difficulties with
all these formulations. However, what is crucial for the purposes of this chapter is only that
having a belief makes available to the agent reasons in light of which certain further deliberations
and actions are appropriate from the agent’s perspective.
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reason for the belief that Y, is to say that X contributes to the justification of the belief
that Y. A standard way of thinking about the justification relation is as expressing the
presence of a valid deductive argument, or some other kind of inference, from a
description of the justifier to a description of what is believed to be justified. The fact that
Evan loves Mary contributes to the justification of the belief that Evan loves someone, as
there is a valid argument relating the proposition Evan loves Mary to the proposition
Evan loves someone. Thus, the fact that Evan loves Mary can be considered a reason for
believing that Evan loves someone. However, as illustrated previously, there being a
reason to believe that Evan loves someone is not yet sufficient for one’s having a reason
to so believe. One must also be appropriately aware of the fact. More so, it is one’s
awareness as of the fact that is essential, not the obtaining of the fact. It is one’s
awareness as of Evan’s loving Mary (whether or not it is true) that supplies one’s reason
for believing that Evan loves someone. Finally, for one actually to take the purported fact
that Evan loves Mary as one’s reason for believing that Evan loves someone (for the
former to be, not only a reason one has, but also the reason for which one holds the
latter) one must have the capacity to recognize the validity of the argument that underlies
this inference. The inferential relation holding between the two propositions must be
transparent to the subject. One must, then, be capable of treating the contents of one’s
awareness as a premise in an argument, and hence must possess the capacity to
conceptualize such contents. 9 Beliefs are paradigmatic conceptual states. That is, having
a belief presupposes that one possesses all of the concepts appearing in the correct
9

Similar arguments to the one presented for what was claimed to be a ‘standard way of thinking
about justification’ are developed, for example, in McDowell (1994a), Brewer (1999; 2005), and
Pryor (2005). Pryor, who ultimately wishes to deny Exclusivity*, develops a similar argument as
his foil when constructing what he calls ‘The Master Argument for Coherentism’.
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specification of its content. Having the belief that Evan loves Mary presupposes that one
possesses the concept loving, Evan, and Mary. As a result, beliefs are perfectly tailored to
provide the believer reasons. 10
The allure of this account, which we may call ‘the inferential account of reason-giving’,
is clear. Arguments are designed precisely to show us how one thing can be reasonable in
light of another. So, if I am to act a certain way or believe a certain proposition because I
find acting in that way or believing that proposition reasonable, a straightforward way of
understanding what my finding them reasonable amounts to is by appeal to my having
identified some proposition that I can treat as a premise in an argument of practical or
theoretical reasoning. According to this proposal, it is my engaging in some such
reasoning, whether consciously or not, that explains my performing that particular action
or forming that particular belief.
Are these considerations sufficient for Exclusivity? Even if one must be aware of the
(purported) fact a description of which justifies holding a given belief, why can’t any old
awareness do the trick? This question leads us to the most crucial point. What allows
beliefs to supply the believer reasons is that the believer has the capacity to treat the
content of the belief as a premise in reasoning (both theoretical and practical). Therefore,
we may leave open the possibility that other states, sharing this characteristic with
beliefs, might equally provide us reasons.
It seems, then, that we have support only for the following, weaker, version of
Exclusivity:
10

Having reasons for action follows a similar path. However, in this case the subject will have to
recognize a piece of practical reasoning – the conclusion being a description of an action.
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Exclusivity* – Only belief-like states provide us reasons directly
The reformulation indicates that it is not necessarily only beliefs that can provide us
reasons, but any state that has those characteristics in virtue of which beliefs
paradigmatically provide reasons. Namely, those states the contents of which the subject
is ipso facto in a position to treat as a premise in reasoning; states the having of which
presupposes that one possesses the concepts specifying their contents.
Let us move to the final proposition.

1.4 Perception and belief
Exclusivity* is consistent with the conjunction of Perceptual apprehension and
Bifurcation. Establishing Bifurcation will leave open whether perception, though not the
same kind of state as belief, is sufficiently similar, and is, therefore, able directly to
provide us reasons.
Have we, then, resolved the initial inconsistency? Sadly, no. The inconsistency reemerges
if the following stronger reformulation of Bifurcation is true:
Bifurcation* – No perception is belief-like
Here, as before, the claim that perception is not belief-like indicates that perception
differs from belief in relevant respects – those in virtue of which beliefs provide us
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reasons directly. 11 The suggestion would be that, unlike beliefs, having a perception does
not presuppose that one possesses the concepts appearing in the correct specification of
its content. We can say that perception is concept-independent (or, as we shall see in
future chapters, nonconceptual). As a result, having a perception does not ipso facto place
the subject in a position to treat its content as a premise in reasoning.
A central, and often cited, consideration in favor of Bifurcation* is that how perception
represents the world to us seems to be far richer and more fine-grained than we can
embrace conceptually. As Evans asks rhetorically: “Do we really understand the proposal
that we have as many color concepts as there are shades of color that we can sensibly
discriminate?”(1982, p. 229) Evans is pointing to the fact that our capacity for perceptual
discrimination far outstrips our conceptual capacities. One can discriminate between
shades of red that are one just noticeable difference (JND) apart without possessing the
concepts under which these shades fall, say the concepts red27 and red28. And one can
perceive the intricate Manhattan skyline from Brooklyn even though one does not possess
concepts that would specify its precise shape. 12 (This suggests that, unlike when having a
belief, the perceiver is not in a position to treat the contents of her perceptions as
premises in an argument that would make reasonable from the perceiver’s perspective a
certain belief or action.)

11

Of course, if Perceptual apprehension is true, then perception must be belief-like in a certain
trivial respect, in that both states provide us reasons directly, however different the explanation of
such a fact turns out to be.
12

A variation of this argument is already present in Dretske (1969). The argument has been
developed, reiterated, and elaborated by many philosophers of perception. See, for example,
Dretske (1981; 1995), Peacocke (1992; 2001a), Tye (2000), Dokic & Pacherie (2001), Kelly
(2001), Coliva (2003), and Bermúdez (2007).
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Furthermore, consider, once more, the perception of illusions. We, who are familiar with
the Müller-Lyer illusion believe that the lines are of the same length. However, we
nonetheless persist in experiencing them as differing in length. If perception were belieflike, in the relevant respects, we would expect it to be responsive to our background
beliefs in the same way as other beliefs are. Given that it is not so responsive, if
perception were belief-like our perceiving the illusion would entail our having a
persistent and irreconcilable contradiction. 13
Of course, it might still be argued that some aspects of perception, are such that we do
possess the concepts specifying their contents – i.e., that some aspects of perception are
belief-like. Perhaps we can literally see that Manhattan is across the water, or literally see
that the two objects are red once we come to possess the relevant concepts (Manhattan,
water, red, etc). We would then be in a position to treat such ‘seeings that’ as premises in
reasoning. However, this would not be sufficient for the claim that perception is belieflike, nor would it resolve the conflict with the other propositions composing the triad. We
would still remain with that aspect of perception that is not belief-like and yet is relevant
in this context as it too seems to provide us reasons in light of which we find certain
beliefs and actions reasonable; and hence, it is an aspect of perception that conflicts with
13

See Crane (1988a; 1988b) for further appeals to visual illusions in the service of securing
Bifurcation*. Sean Kelly (in conversation) suggests that this might not be particular to perception.
He argues that some beliefs might also lead to persistent and irreconcilable contradictions. For
example, a person who believes in the existence of God might hold on to that belief even in the
face of evidence to the contrary. However, this example is odd, as there seems to be no contrary
evidence to the belief in the existence of God (though, as far as I can tell, also no evidence in
favor of that belief). Perhaps, then, we can imagine a person who believes in God but is also
committed to believing only what he has strong supporting evidence for. But, the problem with
this reply is that such cases are not ubiquitous as they are in perception. Furthermore, such
beliefs, when not compartmentalized, when in fact producing persistent contradictions within a
subject’s mental life, lead to a subject that is either irrational or, at extreme cases, pathological.
But, there seems to be nothing irrational or pathological about experiencing visual illusions.
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Exclusivity*. For example, though we might not have the fine-grained concepts red27 and
red28, our perceiving the two shades provides us reason to sort them in certain ways rather
than others.
Furthermore, the appeal of this phenomenological argument is not that we cannot come
to possess all the appropriate concepts – though this too is doubtful – but that our
representing the world perceptually does not depend on our antecedently possessing these
concepts. 14 Someone working at the painting station in Home Depot surely has many
more color concepts than I do; nonetheless our color perception is the same, as are the
color discriminations we are in a position to make on its basis (unless, e.g., one of us
happens to be color blind). More importantly, our having the perceptual experiences that
we do is presumably what explains our coming to possess the appropriate (observational)
concepts; e.g., our undergoing experiences of the color red27 explain our coming to
possess the concept red27 (if ever we do). If perception is to explain observational concept
possession, it cannot be the case, on pain of circularity, that having a perception depends
on our antecedently possessing those observational concepts. Having appropriate
perceptual experiences precedes possession of appropriate observational concepts. 15 The
point then is that our representing the world perceptually does not entail that we possess
the concepts specifying the content of our perception, and hence, does not entail that we
are in a position to treat such content as a premise in reasoning.
A final consideration worth noting in favor of Bifurcation* is that its denial seems to
over-intellectualize the demands on perception. It entails that non-concept-users, infants
14

See, especially, Coliva (2003) and Bermúdez (2007).
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See, e.g., Peacocke (1992; 2001a) and Ayers (2002). Brewer responds to Ayers in his (2002).
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and disadvantaged animals, are excluded from possession of such states. This claim runs
counter to common sense, which suggests that animals incapable of beliefs, presumably
squirrels, puffins, and spider monkeys, nonetheless perceive the world. Indeed,
perception seems to be something we (more or less) share with our ‘relatives’ in the
animal kingdom, even though we differ quite markedly from them in our other, more
conceptually rich, intellectual capacities. Similarly, infants seem to perceive the world
just fine, even though their possible thoughts about it are significantly limited.16
One can, of course, deny Bifurcation* without over-intellectualizing the demands on
perception, but rather by weakening the demands on having a belief. This would be the
case, if one thought (as Armstrong, for example, does) that even mere discriminative
behavior was evidence for having acquired a belief. 17 In this way, even squirrels, puffins,
and spider monkeys, can properly be said to employ beliefs when engaging their
environment. However, by weakening these demands we not only trivialize the
distinction between perception and belief, but we also risk throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. We risk undercutting our explanation of how even beliefs, let alone
perception, can play the role of directly providing us reasons. 18 Bifurcation* is needed to

16

This argument, too, can be traced back to Evans (1982).

17

According to Armstrong (1968) we form beliefs whenever we receive information. Perception
is a way of receiving information, and hence it is the acquisition of a belief (by way of the
senses). Such a minimal account of belief, as mere acquisition of information, trivializes the issue
at hand.
18

This is so, as the notion of belief that is needed is one that places the subject in a position to
utilize its contents as a premise in reasoning. However, puffins don’t do inferences. If we take
beliefs to be nothing more than those states implicated in the discriminative behaviors of puffins,
e.g., we have abandoned our capacity to explain their implication in inferences. More will be said
of this in the chapters to come.
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provide a middle-ground between over-intellectualizing perception and underintellectualizing belief. 19

1.5 The inconsistent triad returns
The arguments presented so far are controversial and open to much further debate.
Nonetheless, they provide some support for the individual plausibility of each of the
propositions in the following newly formulated triad:
Perceptual apprehension – Some perceptions provide us reasons directly
Exclusivity* – Only belief-like states provide us reasons directly
Bifurcation* – No perception is belief-like
Though newly formed, these three propositions are still inconsistent; they cannot be
simultaneously held.
What can be done to resolve this inconsistency? The literature on the reason-giving role
of perception is largely split between those who are willing to abandon Perceptual
apprehension, to secure the other propositions, and those who fervently defend it. The
former argue that it is precisely because only belief-like states can provide us reasons
directly (Exclusivity*) and because perception differs in the relevant respects from belief

19

For strong arguments to this effect see Bermúdez (2007). The literature on the nonconceptual
content of perception provides ample arguments in favor of Bifurcation*, many of which, for
brevity sake, have not been mentioned here. For a review of these arguments and their merits see,
e.g., Bermúdez and Cahen (2008), and Toribio (2007).
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(Bifurcation*) that perception cannot provide us reasons directly. The staunchest and
most familiar supporter of this position is Davidson who argues that “nothing can count
as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.”(1983, p. 141) And, further, argues
that “the relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are
not beliefs or other propositional attitudes.”(Ibid., p. 143) Perception can, thus, be a
causal antecedent of a belief, but it cannot be a reason for a belief, since only beliefs
provide reasons and perception is not belief. 20 However, as we have seen, denying
Perceptual apprehension cuts the chain of justification, which is required if the world is
to place any normative constraints on our theorizing about it (indeed, it is Davidson’s
coherentism that McDowell characterizes as ‘spinning in the void’). 21 Furthermore, since
perception is not an epistemic mediator 22 between the world and our empirical beliefs,
20

See also Davidson (1982). Among other proponents of the view are Dretske (1995), Tye
(2000), and Evans (1982), to name but a few. The case of Evans is controversial but the following
seems to place him fully in this camp. He says: “In the case of such [concept possessing]
organisms… [judgments] are then based upon (reliably caused by) these internal states; when this
is the case we can speak of the information being ‘accessible’ to the subject, and, indeed, of the
existence of conscious experience” (Evans 1982, p. 227). Evans considers the relation between
the perceptual and conceptual systems as that of reliable causation. We should note that, in all
these cases, though we have a denial of Perceptual apprehension – a denial that perception
supplies the subject reasons directly – it need not be denied that having a perception makes one
justified in having the perceptual belief that the perception causes. So, if one is a reliabilist about
justification, as many proponents of this strategy are, one might argue that we are more often than
not justified in holding the beliefs that we do since our perceptual mechanisms are reliable causal
intermediaries between the world and our beliefs (a position made popular by Goldman (1979)).
However, this is very different from claiming that the world places a normative constraint on our
thinking, and very different from claiming that our perception provides us reasons for holding
particular beliefs or engaging our environment in certain ways. More will be said about this
presently.
21

See my fn. 1 and the text it relates to for more detail of the difficulties here.

22

Note that in using the term ‘epistemic mediator’ I am not suggesting a view of perception as a
veil between us and the world, as though what we are aware of when we perceive the world are
our perceptions. Perception is a mode of awareness of the world. When we form an empirical
belief on the basis of how the world perceptually appears to us, we are not engaging in some form
of introspection, rather, we are looking out into the world. Whether perception is an epistemic
mediator is a question of whether it represents the world as making reasonable certain judgments
and activities rather than others.
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but only a causal mediator, it entails the unintuitive proposition that the character of
perception is epistemically inert from the perceiver’s point of view. It entails that we are
perpetually mistaken in taking how the world perceptually appears to us as our reason for
forming our empirical beliefs and for our engaging with it appropriately. My perceiving
the brown table does not, after all, provide me a reason for thinking that the table is
brown, and my perceiving the layout of the room does not provide the light by which I
find a certain path through it appropriate. We are, further, perpetually mistaken in holding
ourselves responsible for our perceptually based engagements with the world – they
amount to no achievement at all on our part. Finally, in its rejection of Perceptual
apprehension this view entails that non-concept-users, animals and infants, are
completely blind to reasons. Whether that is a difficulty for the view is, as mentioned, an
empirical matter – a question of which forms of explanation turn out most adequately to
explain the behaviors of such creatures. For this reason, it is unfortunate to reject a-priori
the possible sensitivity of such creatures to reasons.
Those defending Perceptual apprehension, on the other hand, are generally motivated by
epistemological concerns – the need to ground our genuinely empirical beliefs in
perception. 23 They, therefore, typically deny Bifurcation*. If perception supplies reasons
for holding particular perceptual beliefs, then having a perception must be sufficient for
the subject to utilize the content of her perception in inference – to recognize the
inferential relation holding between the content of her perception and that for which it
supplies reason. However, we have seen that denying Bifurcation* is also costly. It leads

23

Among proponents of this view are McDowell (1994a), Brewer (1999), and Sedivy (1996), to
name but a few.
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to an over-intellectualization of what seems to be a rather primitive system – one that
both human beings and conceptually disadvantaged animals and infants (to a large extent)
share. Furthermore, since such creatures are incapable of utilizing the contents of their
perception in inference, and given Exclusivity*, they are also incapable of acting in the
light of reasons. Hence, as in the position previously discussed, it too provides an
unattractive view of animal mentality that also undercuts one of the motivations
introduced for retaining Perceptual apprehension – the possibility of belief independent
intentional explanation of animal and infant behavior. 24 Finally, such a position entails
that we must in fact possess a sufficiently rich and fine-grained repertoire of concepts as
enters into the fine-grained specification of our perception, so as to be in a position to
utilize the contents of our perception in inference. This claim is both phenomenologically
and empirically suspect. 25 And, if there are at least some aspects of perception that are
concept-independent, then those aspects of perception are, again, epistemically inert from
the perspective of the subject.
There is a third strategy that appears not to have received sufficient attention in the
literature on perception. It is also the strategy that is most profitable, as it allows us to
take seriously the central concerns of both camps just mentioned. We can retain
Perceptual apprehension, not at the price of rejecting Bifurcation*, but by rejecting, or
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McDowell, for example, is quite upfront about this consequence of his position. He claims that
“creatures without conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and—this is part of the same
package—experience of objective reality” (McDowell 1994a, p. 114) He further claims that “In
mere animals, sentience is in the service of a mode of life that is structured exclusively by
immediate biological imperatives. … [A] merely animal life is shaped by goals whose control of
the animal’s behaviour at a given moment is an immediate outcome of biological forces. A mere
animal does not weigh reasons and decide what to do” (ibid., p. 115).
25

See Raffman (1995) as well as the various papers mentioned in my fn. 12.
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modifying, Exclusivity*. In this way we can do justice to the relevant differences between
perception and belief, to the different kinds of psychological generalizations into which
they enter, and to the seeming continuity, phylogenetically and ontogenetically, of the
adult human mind with the minds of ‘lesser’ animals and infants. At the same time we
can also hold that a certain sensitivity to reasons is already afforded by those same
capacities employed in perception, thus satisfying our phenomenological intuitions,
accounting for the presence of normative constraints on empirical thought, and making
room for the intentional explanation of animal and infant behavior.
The central difficulty with this strategy is making sense of perception’s supplying one’s
reasons when one is unable to utilize the content of perception as a premise in an
argument. This is not merely a problem with the ‘standard way of thinking about
justification’, mentioned above. We can retain the notion that the justification relation
expresses the presence of an inference of sorts relating descriptions of the justifier and the
justified. We can further say that given that Sam perceives the speeding car approaching,
Sam’s belief that a speeding car is approaching, as well as Sam’s coming to a halt, are
both reasonable. Considering Sam’s background beliefs and desires, arguments of
theoretical and practical reasoning can be formulated in which a description of what Sam
perceives serves as a premise, and descriptions of his resulting beliefs and actions follow
as conclusions. The problem introduced by Bifurcation* is that, in the case of perception,
the descriptions subsumed by these arguments are not available to Sam. In other words,
the reasonableness of Sam’s actions and beliefs might be transparent from a third-person
perspective, a perspective from which such arguments can be formulated. However, since
Sam does not possess the concepts that figure in specifying these arguments’ premises,
29

Exclusivity* would suggest that he is ‘blind’ to the reasonableness of his actions and
beliefs and, a fortiori, cannot act or form a belief because of his finding them reasonable
in light of his perceptions.
Attempts that have been made at modifying Exclusivity* have focused on modifying or
replacing our conception of the justification relation. The thought is that doing so will
show how a subject’s having a certain perception justifies the subject’s holding a
particular perceptual belief or performing a certain action. 26 While there is good reason to
be sympathetic to some such modification, stopping at this point misses the mark. The
persistent problem is analogous to the one confronted when attempting to explain your
halting by appeal to the fact that a speeding car is approaching. The mere fact alone
might be considered a reason for halting. But it cannot be a reason available to you – a
reason that you have – for halting unless you are appropriately aware of it. Analogously,
your having a certain perception, say a speeding-car-type perception, may make
reasonable a certain perceptual belief or a certain action; indeed, it is often a good reason
as it often accompanies the actual presence of a speeding car in your vicinity. However, it
cannot make reasons available to you so long as you are not aware of it as such; so long
as its being a speeding-car-type perception is not transparent to you.
In other words, even if we have an account that clarifies how perception (of a certain
type) can be a de facto reason for forming a perceptual belief, by appeal to some form of
reliabilism, 27 for example, we still have no understanding of how perception can provide
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Some notable examples are Peacocke (2001a), Heck (2000), and most recently Vision (2009)
whose account will be explored more fully in the next Chapter.
27

See also my brief discussion of reliabilism in my fn. 20.
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the perceiver a reason without her being aware of its contents as a possible premise in an
argument. As McDowell puts it in arguing against Bifurcation*, and Peacocke’s (1992)
account of perceptual content in particular, perception understood as concept-independent
might figure in an explanation that shows how having a certain belief “…is as it should
be from the standpoint of rationality … [however], this is not eo ipso to give the subject’s
reasons for whatever the explanation explains” (1994a, p. 163). 28
Summing up, the most important point to note is that the reason that the inferential model
underlying Exclusivity* has such a grip on us, is not merely that it makes sense of how
one thing might be reasonable in light of another (by showing that the former follows the
other via some inference). Rather, it is the fact that it has a seemingly plausible story to
tell about what the subject’s having a reason amounts to, what it takes for the subject to
find some belief or action reasonable, and to act on the basis of thus finding it. The
subject’s having a reason is understood, on this account, as his being in a position to treat
the contents of his reason-giving awareness as a premise in reasoning. If Bifurcation* is
true, then the subject is not in such a position with respect to the contents of his
perceptions. We then have no alternative account of how having a perception might
provide the subject reasons.

28

This I believe constitutes McDowell’s central argument against proponents of
nonconceptualism about the content of perception (those supporting Bifurcation*). It is a point
has not been adequately acknowledged by those pursuing this third strategy for resolving the
inconsistent triad. Thus, the nonconceptualist might be able to show that having a particular
perception with nonconceptual content p is a good reason for the perceiver to form the belief that
p, perhaps because of a reliable relation between perceptions of the p-type and the obtaining of p.
However, this is not yet to show how having that perception can be the reason for which the
subject forms that particular belief. It is this latter possibility that must be accounted for if a
nonconceptual account of perceptual content (and hence Bifurcation*) is to be consistent with
Perceptual apprehension. This debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about the
content of perception will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Modifying or replacing our notion of the justification relation would make a difference to
how we understand the claim that one thing is reasonable in light of another, how having
a perception might make reasonable having a certain belief or performing a certain
action. But, it is a further step to account for the subject’s being in a position to find these
beliefs or actions reasonable. What is required, then, is a reformulation of how some
mental state can provide reasons for the subject – what being a reason-giving state
amounts to – even if we can antecedently explain (from some third-person perspective, or
as McDowell says, ‘from the standpoint of rationality’) why having a particular
perception makes reasonable a subject’s further deliberations and actions.
Developing such a substantive account of the availability of reasons to the subject that is
compatible with Bifurcation*, an account of nonconceptual apprehension, is a central
goal of the dissertation. At this point we have an initial understanding of what strategies
are available for thinking about the reason-giving character of perception and their
respective costs. Most importantly, we have a clearer understanding of the challenge that
needs to be overcome if we are to take seriously those considerations expressed by
Perceptual apprehension and Bifurcation*, follow the third strategy for resolving the
inconsistent triad, and dissolve the grip that Exclusivity* has on us.
In the next chapter, I analyze a recent attempt, by Gerald Vision (2009), to resolve the
conflict by pursuing this third strategy. 29 Considering this case study will illustrate the
continued relevance of the conflict at the center of this dissertation as well as the

29

Though I focus on Vision’s attempted solution, his strategy is but the most recent
representative of a class of views that we shall encounter throughout the dissertation, and that, for
reasons that will become apparent, will receive the title ‘non-epistemicist views of perception’.
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inadequacy of resolving it by simply denying the inferential model of reason-giving at the
basis of Exclusivity*.
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Chapter 2: Modifying Exclusivity* - A case study from Vision

2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that making sense of the reason-giving role of perception
involves confronting the conflict between the following three independently plausible
propositions.
Perceptual apprehension – Some perceptions provide us reasons directly
Exclusivity* – Only belief-like states provide us reasons directly
Bifurcation* – No perception is belief-like
I also argued that one way of resolving the conflict, and the one that it is the aim of this
dissertation to pursue, is to reconsider what is involved in Exclusivity* and how it might
plausibly be modified. One suggestion that I argue misses the point of the challenge is
merely to resist the claim that for a mental state directly to provide one reasons for some
belief or action is for there to be an appropriate inference relating the two states.
In this chapter I clarify the challenge by considering a recent attempt by Gerald Vision
(2009) to resolve the conflict by modifying Exclusivity*. Vision serves as an exemplar of
why merely resisting the standard, inferential, model of reason-giving is insufficient for
the task of resolving the conflict at hand.
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2.2 Vision on the problem of perception’s evidential role
In his (2009) paper, ‘Fixing Perceptual Belief’, Vision endorses a version of Bifurcation*
and of Perceptual apprehension. He argues that “non-propositional contents … must
count as the ultimate perceptual or experiential evidence for our beliefs. What we believe,
on the other hand, is propositional, or near enough” (p. 292). (Unless stated otherwise, all
page numbers in this chapter refer to Vision (2009)). Furthermore, Vision is explicit that
the relation between the non-propositional notion of perception he discusses and the
resulting perceptual belief is not merely a causal relation but an intentional one.
Perception entitles us to form the perceptual beliefs that we do.
Vision begins by arguing for the indispensability of, what he calls, objectual perception
(or objectual seeing, which he uses interchangeably) to any account of perceptual belief
fixation. Objectual perception contrasts with propositional perception. 30 The former is a
state that is accurately reported by a non-propositional noun-clause, such as ‘Sam sees the
erupting volcano’. In contrast, propositional perception is accurately reported by utilizing
a ‘that’-clause, e.g., ‘Sam sees that the volcano erupted’. Vision argues that our most
fundamental evidence for belief fixation must be a state accurately reported nonpropositionally – a state of objectual perception.
According to Vision, objectual perception is indispensable for this task for two central
reasons. First, it is presupposed by, but does not, itself, presuppose, any form of
30

For brevity and simplicity of exposition, I will only focus on the paradigmatic form of
perceptual propositionalism he discusses, though the following considerations are applicable,
mutatis mutandis, to other forms. Among the other forms of propositionalism he discusses are: S
visually experiences that p, It visually appears to S that p, S sees of x that it is F (which he calls
predicational seeing, but argues that is a form of propositionalism nonetheless), S sees O as X,
and S sees x to be F.
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propositional perception. When saying that ‘Sam sees that the volcano erupted’ nothing
indicates that the state reported is perceptual. Sam might see that the volcano erupted by,
e.g., noting the numerous fleeing natives from the village at the mountain’s base, or, as in
the recent, 2010, eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull, by seeing the airline cancelation
notices for transatlantic flights. Indeed, Sam might have no perceptual experiences at all,
perhaps he is congenitally blind, and yet he might still see, for example, that his marriage
was a big mistake. To guarantee that such a report is truly that of a
perceptual/experiential state, it must presuppose some form of objectual perception. ‘Sam
sees that the volcano erupted’ counts as a perceptual idiom only if we presuppose that
Sam sees the erupting volcano.
“Whenever a state reportable by a sentence of [propositional] form … is truly
experiential, there is an account of what it consists in which includes an objectual seeing.
This is what enables us to distinguish the episode as truly sensory.” (p. 296)

In contrast, ‘Sam sees the volcano erupting’ does not presuppose any particular form of
propositional perception. 31
A more serious consideration, he argues, for the indispensability of objectual perception
is that perceptual propositionalism, in all its forms, “…does not explain how we arrive at
believing from a contentful something more fundamental than belief, or from a different
thing which is the evidential basis for the belief.” This is so, since “…the state of seeing
that something is so and so implies that the subject takes the experience in that way, and

31

This line of argument should be familiar from Dretske – most explicitly in his (1969). Vision’s
notion of objectual perception is analogous to Dretske’s notion of non-epistemic seeing (or
‘simple seeing’ as he calls it in his (1979)), whereas Vision’s various formulations of
propositionalism are analogous to Dretske’s notion of epistemic seeing.
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taking something to be so and so is a form of believing that it is so and so” (p. 294). 32
Objectual perception is indispensable as the ‘contentful something more fundamental
than belief’ that can be ‘the evidential basis for the belief’.
Vision clearly sees the grip that the inferential model of reason-giving, underlying
Exclusivity*, has on us, and considers one of his central aims to undermine it. He argues,
that if the state relevant to belief fixation were ‘the state of seeing that the pencil is on the
table’, then, ‘since the content of the seeing … is already propositional’, that would put
‘to rest any concerns over a structural transformation of content running from that of a
perception to that of a belief’ (p. 294). However, the two considerations above show that
propositional perception cannot be the fundamental contentful something that explains
belief fixation. Therefore, “…if we are to make sense of the notion of a perceptual belief
arising from a perceptual experience, it must somehow arise from our non-propositional
objectual states.” The fundamental question then is, “…how a non-propositional state,
objectual seeing, can serve as evidence for a propositional state such as belief” (p. 301).
In other words, how can something that is not belief-like directly provide us reasons for
our beliefs?
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Note that in saying that the subject ‘…takes the experience in that way’ Vision appears to be
misspeaking. Vision is not implying that seeing that so and so requires that one be aware of one’s
experience, rather, various passages throughout his paper suggest that he means to say that one
‘takes the content of one’s experience in that way’. Vision clarifies (in correspondence) that “the
only taking I’m concerned with is a taking of the content/object of the seeing. Any such taking of
something seems to demand a propositional structure.” Furthermore, as we shall presently see, I
do not endorse Vision’s claim that ‘taking something to be so and so is a form of believing that it
is so and so’. On the contrary, my aim in this chapter is to show that there must be a form of
‘taking’ that is not belief-like. What matters, for present purposes, is that Vision takes himself to
be confronted with the same difficulty that I have detailed above. If perception were belief-like –
i.e., if Bifurcation* were false – then having a perception would not be able to explain the fixation
of belief-like states. We need a contentful something more fundamental than belief for the sake of
belief fixation. These are the considerations that lead Vision to endorse Bifurcation* and
Perceptual apprehension.
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2.2.1 Vision on the pressures of Exclusivity*
Vision entertains and discharges three seeming objections to his suggestion that objectual
perception is indispensible for any account of belief fixation. A review of these
objections is illuminating. They articulate the pressures (some of which were discussed in
the previous chapter) that Exclusivity* places on those pursuing the third strategy for
resolving the inconsistency with which we are concerned. Attending to Vision’s
treatment of these objections, then, reveals the serious difficulty involved in responding
to the question with which the previous section ended.
The first objection is that objectual perception is merely a causal antecedent of perceptual
beliefs, rather than an evidential basis for it. The claim is that for perception to be
evidence for our perceptual beliefs, a state of objectual perception must first cause in us a
propositionally specifiable perceptual state, and only this latter state can truly be evidence
for the belief. However, Vision argues that if objectual perception merely played a causal
role, it would be unclear how the world could place a normative constraint on which
perceptual beliefs we ultimately form. To make sense of the fact that (objectually) seeing
the speeding car underwrites our perceptual belief that the car is speeding, even if it does
so by first causing in us an appropriate propositionally specified perceptual state (e.g.,
seeing that the car is speeding), it must be the case that the objectual perception also
contributes its content. 33
A second objection Vision raises is that objectual perception is extensionally specified; it
allows for the substitution of co-extensive terms salva veritate. But if this is the case,
33

Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) in support of Perceptual apprehension.
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then there are ways of specifying a state of objectual perception that do not correspond to
how the subject takes things to be. When Oedipus first confronts his mother, we can
truthfully say that Oedipus sees his mother, even though it is clear that Oedipus would
object that it is his mother that he is seeing. But then, how can a state accurately
reportable by ‘Oedipus sees Oedipus’ mother’ be evidence for Oedipus to form the belief
that he is confronted with Jocasta, or the belief that he is confronted with his mother
(which he naturally would deny)? Vision’s response is most revealing.
“To get around such cases, I believe a restriction is necessary to specifications that S is at
the time, and without additional information, in a position to acknowledge what he
experienced as what. Not all reports of objectual seeing are candidates for making
transparent or explaining the relevant perceptual belief. But that does not mean that a
different kind of experiential state is needed, in particular, a non-objectual one. It only
implies that for this one central role, viz that of understanding how perceptual belief is
fixed by perception, only certain specifications of the objects of objectual seeing states
can be used. The need for restriction on how the objectual seeings are specified is not an
argument for altogether omitting this species of seeing from one’s account of belief
fixing...”(Vision, 2009, pp. 308-9)

Though there are an indefinitely many third-person specifications of any instance of
objectual seeing that do not make transparent the relation between what is seen and the
perceptual belief formed, there will be other specifications that do – namely, those the
subject is in a position to acknowledge. These are the specifications that must be
mentioned in an account of belief fixation.
Finally, Vision returns to the question with which the previous section ended. The
difficulty hangs on the claim that evidential relations only obtain between propositions.
This is so, since only something propositional can be a premise in an argument the
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conclusion of which is a proposition. But, objectual perception is non-propositional. So,
how can objectual perception be evidence for a belief the content of which is a
proposition? Vision argues that at the core of this objection lies the assumption that
evidential relations track inferential relations. We should be skeptical about such an
assumption. Rather, he says, we should broaden the notion of evidential relations beyond
the confines of logical relations. This should not be so unnerving, he says, as we
commonly appeal to non-propositional entities as evidence for propositions. For example,
the DNA sample found at the crime scene is evidence that Sam was involved in the
murder. Of course, it might be the case that whenever such entities serve as evidence we
can rephrase the bit of evidence into propositional form (e.g., Sam’s DNA was found at
the crime scene might be a proposition from which we can derive the proposition Sam
was involved in the murder). However, Vision claims that our urge to engage in such
rephrasing might be nothing more than a ‘habit or convenience’ (p. 309).
Terminological differences aside, Vision holds that our perceptions can provide the
fundamental evidence for our perceptual beliefs while at the same time fail to be belieflike, as they are states specified non-propositionally. 34 This can be achieved once we
recognize that evidential relations need not hold exclusively between states
propositionally specified. Vision’s proposal amounts to a modification of Exclusivity*,
while securing Bifurcation* and Perceptual apprehension, by denying that evidential
relations are limited by the inferential model of reason-giving.

34

Vision (in correspondence) clarifies that his aim is indeed to show how objectual perception
can (and must) make reasons for beliefs available to the perceiver.
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2.3 The propositionalist response: Objectual perception cannot provide reasons
I have argued, in Chapter 1, that this strategy is insufficient for the task at hand. In the
following I argue that objectual perception cannot provide us evidence for our perceptual
beliefs in any interesting sense. Vision’s argument is inadequate as it does not fully
appreciate the challenge that satisfying Perceptual apprehension faces and that motivates
the class of views he calls ‘propositionalism’ (according to which only if perception is a
kind of state that is accurately specified propositionally can it serve as our evidence for
belief).
We have seen in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, that merely citing the speeding car as a reason
for halting does an injustice to the explanation of your action. To explain your action it
must be the case that you are also appropriately aware of the speeding car. Given that
having a belief presupposes that one possesses the concepts involved in a correct
specification of its content, one is also, ipso facto, in a position to recognize the content
of the belief as a premise in an argument of practical reasoning. Being in such a position
explains one’s finding appropriate, or reasonable, the conclusion of that argument. Thus,
your having the belief that the car is speeding can serve as an appropriate awareness of
the speeding car that provides you a reason in light of which you find halting appropriate
– a reason for which you eventually halt.
These same considerations apply also in the case of perception and the fixation of
perceptual belief. The propositionalist reasons, broadly, as follows:
1. If perception is to provide one reasons in light of which forming a certain
perceptual belief is appropriate from one’s own point of view, one must be able to
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treat the content of one’s perception as a premise in an argument the conclusion of
which is the content of the perceptual belief.
2. Only propositions can be premises in an argument the conclusion of which is a
proposition.
3. Hence, perception must be propositional.
While not denying (2), Vision holds that having a reason (or evidence) for some
proposition need not be confined to situations in which there obtains an inference
between the purported reason and the proposition in question. Evidential relations should
be understood as constituting a broader class of relations than the logical ones. Nonpropositional entities, too, can be reasons, or evidence, for propositional ones. I am happy
to endorse such a claim. However, the crucial element in the propositionalist argument
sketched above is (1). In particular, it is the propositionalist’s focus on what it takes for
perception to be a state that can serve as evidence from the subject’s point of view for
forming a particular perceptual belief.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the inference model at the basis of Exclusivity*
provides us a way of thinking about evidential relations – about how one thing can be
evidence for another. But it also allows us to make sense of a subject’s having this
evidence. It is the latter, not merely the former, that lures the propositionalist to the
inference model and hence to Exclusivity*. That is, the appeal of the inference model
underlying Exclusivity* is that it provides an understanding of how a subject might come
to apprehend the world. The propositionalist position applies this same model to
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perception and by denying Bifurcation* provides a way of understanding how Perceptual
apprehension can be satisfied.
There is little controversy that the erupting volcano is evidence for the belief that the
volcano is erupting, or that the DNA sample is evidence for the belief that Sam was
involved in the crime. However, the crucial question is whether the subject is aware of
the erupting volcano (or of the DNA) in a way that provides evidence from her own
perspective for forming the appropriate belief. The challenge for an account of objectual
perception is to show how, forgoing the inference model and its accompanying
commitment to propositionalism, it might account for the subject’s being aware of the
erupting volcano in a way that supplies her reason to form the perceptual belief that the
volcano is erupting.
Objectual perception has no resources to meet this challenge. The fact, noted by Vision,
that the specification of objectual perception is extensional is no objection to the claim
that it can be evidence for a perceptual belief – in much the same way that the erupting
volcano itself is evidence (regardless of how it is specified) for the belief that the volcano
is erupting. And, Vision correctly points out that there will be some specification of the
object of objectual perception that makes transparent its evidential relations to the
particular perceptual beliefs for which it is evidence. But, such a claim is not sufficient to
discharge the propositionalist worry that objectual perception cannot provide the subject
evidence in light of which to think or act. For perception to provide the subject such
evidence it is insufficient that there is from a third-person perspective some description
that makes these evidential relations transparent. These evidential relations must be
transparent to the subject, i.e., from the subject’s perspective.
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A notion of perception that does not respect this first-person transparency constraint can
be little more than a causal factor in the production of the perceptual belief, albeit a factor
that can show how having that belief ‘is as it should be from the standpoint of
rationality’. 35 In general, it can be evidence for a belief in the sense that the object of the
belief, itself, or anything else that reliably (though, perhaps, not invariably) causally covaries with it, can be evidence for that belief (e.g., fleeing natives/airline cancelations).
The state of a subject’s perceptual system perhaps reliably co-varies with some worldly
state of affairs. Hence, it too can be evidence for a belief that the state of affairs in
question obtains. However, this fact alone is insufficient for it to play the evidential role
required by Perceptual apprehension – i.e., to provide the subject reasons in light of
which performing an action or forming a perceptual belief are appropriate from the
subject’s point of view.
Does Vision’s qualification, in the extensive quotation above, that we should restrict our
specifications of objectual perception to those that the subject is in a position to
acknowledge, nonetheless respect this first-person transparency constraint and resolve the
difficulty? To explain Oedipus’ forming the belief that he confronts Jocasta, Vision
claims we must specify his state of objectual perception by appeal to the singular term
‘Jocasta’ rather than ‘Oedipus’ mother’. Specified in this way, limited by what Oedipus is
willing to acknowledge is the case, the evidential relation between his objectual
perception and his resultant belief can be made transparent. However, this qualification is
of no help. Oedipus’ being ‘at the time, and without additional information, in a position
to acknowledge’ what he experiences as what, is itself in need of an explanation of the
35

McDowell (1994a, p. 163).
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same kind that we seek to provide. His being in a position to acknowledge that it is
Jocasta that he experiences just is his being in a position to form the perceptual belief
that Jocasta is before him. Objectual perception is supposed to explain how Oedipus
could come to be in a position to acknowledge what he experience as what. While the
limitation on the specification of objectual perception makes transparent to us how the
subject’s having a certain perceptual state makes reasonable the belief the subject
actually forms, it cannot explain the subject’s forming this belief on the basis of finding it
reasonable by virtue of having such perception. This is so as the limitation on how
objectual perception is to be specified does not track any ontologically significant feature
of perception; it is extrinsic to the nature of the state itself. But then it is clear that this
limitation does nothing to explain how having such a state of objectual perception
provides the subject evidence for the beliefs he forms (or how the subject is in a position
to acknowledge what he experiences as what) rather than any other, it can only show that
these beliefs are reasonable given that the subject is undergoing an objectual perceptual
state thus specified.
Furthermore, note that though evidential relations might go beyond logical relations, this
is merely to say that entities other than propositions can serve as evidence for the truth of
propositions. This claim is not particularly problematic. Still, our urge to rephrase the bit
of evidence into propositional form is not as Vision claims merely a ‘habit or
convenience.’ It is driven by the need to make these evidential relations transparent to us,
and is a precondition on that bit of evidence being evidence that we have.
Presumably, the DNA sample around the body of Mary Ann Nichols in Buck Row,
Whitechaple, London, August 31st, 1888, was evidence that Jack the Ripper is X. But,
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clearly, at the time, it was not evidence that anyone had. 36 Suppose it was seen and
collected by investigators at the time. In this case, we can, of course, say that in some
sense the investigators had evidence that could identify Jack the Ripper. However, the
sense in which they had the evidence is completely insignificant insofar as their
investigation is concerned; that is, insofar as its role in guiding their deliberations and
actions is concerned. It is only a century later that DNA samples became, not only
evidence for the identity of the culprit (which they always were), but also evidence that
someone could have for the identity of the culprit. What took so long? Apparently,
producing the body of theory, in biology and criminology, that allows us to be aware of
the evidence as evidence is not a trivial matter. Many decades went by before we had the
theoretical tools with which to rephrase the bit of evidence into the right propositional
form that would make transparent to us its evidential relations to the identity of a person.
This shows that rather than being a mere habit, our rephrasing the evidence into a form
that can enter into appropriate logical relations is what allows us to have the evidence in a
way that can serve as evidence for us to act and deliberate appropriately (in a way that,
hopefully, tracks its actual evidential relations). The obtaining of a logical relation
between descriptions of the evidence and that for which it is evidence, and, crucially, our
being aware of the evidence by means of such a description, is what explains our finding
a transitions to a certain belief or action reasonable in light of the evidence.
Contrary to Vision’s claim, the extensionality of objectual seeing does ‘mean that a
different kind of experiential state is needed, in particular, a non-objectual one’. The kind
36

A specification of the evidence that made transparent its appropriate evidential relations was
not even available from a third-person point of view. Thus, Vision is correct that a thing’s status
as evidence does not depend on the availability of such a third-person specification of that thing.
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of experiential state that is needed is one whose correct specification makes transparent
the reasons that having the state in question makes available to the subject. According to
propositionalists – who hold that the subject has reason for a perceptual belief only if she
is in a position to recognize a premise in an argument the conclusion of which is the
content of a perceptual belief – the only kind of state that could satisfy this transparency
constraint is propositional perception. Given that they too hold that perception must
supply the foundational evidence for our beliefs (i.e., Perceptual apprehension), they
deny Bifurcation*. To avoid the propositionalist claim, it is not sufficient to broaden the
class of evidential relations, and merely reject the claim that only propositions can enter
into evidential relations. Vision must also make sense of how objectual perception, as a
mode of perceptual awareness of the evidence, can provide a light by which the subject
finds some transition in thought appropriate. Objectual perception, I have argued cannot
provide such a light.
At one point, it seems that Vision is attentive to these considerations in favor of some
other kind of propositional seeing. He says:
“This does not wholly eliminate a role for seeing to be [a form of propositional
perception]. It might still be an indispensable intermediate step, because … one can only
generate perceptual belief from what one actually discriminates, while objectual seeing
permits specifications of its objects which are not ways in which the subject regards
them.”(p. 306)

As I have just argued, a sensitivity to how the subject regards the objects of perception is
crucial if there is any chance that perception allows the subject to regard these same
objects as evidence for a perceptual belief. Objectual perception is perception correctly
specified in a way that completely abstracts from any such sensitivity, it therefore cannot
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serve such evidential role. Rather, it seems that it is the intermediary propositional
perception that serves that role. But, if some form of propositional perception, perceiving
to be, is required as an intermediary between objectual perception and perceptual belief,
the role of objectual perception must be to underwrite the transition to this intermediary
form of propositional perception. What could the nature of this transition be?
We are faced with a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma considers the transition from
objectual perception to some kind of propositional perception, say, perceiving to be, as a
brute causal one. But, then, it is perception accurately specified propositionally that is
that contentful something that provides the perceiver the most fundamental evidence for
some perceptual belief. Objectual perception drops out as epistemically insignificant. The
other horn of the dilemma considers the transition from objectual perception to
perceiving to be as an intentional one. It is this horn that Vision is driven to. 37 However,
if the transition from objectual perception to perceptual belief, from something nonpropositional to something propositional, required the introduction of an intermediary
propositional something in the form of perceiving to be, how do we explain the transition
from objectual perception to perceiving to be without introducing yet another
propositionally specified intermediary? This is a vicious regress if there ever was one. At
some point in the regress objectual perception must be introduced as that fundamental
something that ‘gets our foot through the epistemic door’, so to speak. But, because
objectual perception abstracts away from any sensitivity to how the subject regards the
objects of perception, we have no reason to think that it can do so and every reason to

37

See p. 307.
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think that it cannot. 38 Thus, on either horn of the dilemma, objectual perception turns out
to be an epistemically inert factor in the mental life of the perceiver. Contrary to Vision,
the need for restriction on how the objectual seeings are specified is an argument for
altogether omitting this species of seeing from one’s account of belief fixation
(alternatively, you can keep it in, but it will simply ‘sit there’ idle). The restriction is
driven not by the need to make transparent the evidential relations between perception
and perceptual belief, but to indicate an ontologically significant feature of perception
that accounts for the transparency of these relations from the subject’s perspective.
We can avoid the dilemma altogether while denying propositionalism (that is, while
holding to Bifurcation*) if we allow that evidential relations are broader than logical ones
and, most crucially, once we develop a substantive account of perception that shows how
it could make transparent to perceivers the appropriateness of their ensuing beliefs and
actions. It is this latter ingredient that is missing on Vision’s account.
I would like to mention one final point. It might be thought that objectual perception and
propositional perception, say, perceiving to be, are merely different kinds of reports of
the same perceptual state. 39 As the quotations above indicate, this does not seem to be
how Vision regards the situation. Vision is talking about different perceptual states and
the possibility that a state accurately reported objectually might provide our fundamental
evidence for perceptual beliefs or for other perceptual states accurately reported
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See Pitson (1984) for a similar argument advanced against Dretske’s (1969) notion of nonepistemic seeing. Pitson argues that some cognitive element must already be present in perception
if we are to explain our perceptual discriminations, a cognitive element that non-epistemic seeing,
like objectual seeing, is in the business to deny.
39

Many thanks to José Luis Bermúdez for bringing this possibility to my attention.
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propositionally. However, suppose we are considering two reports of one and the same
perceptual state. If so, then, presumably, the two reports accurately specify two aspects of
that same state – one aspect accurately specified propositionally, and the other accurately
specified objectually. But then, the considerations discussed throughout this chapter are
considerations that show that it is perception’s having that aspect accurately specified
propositionally that explains the subject’s having a light by which to act and deliberate
appropriately. That aspect of perception correctly reported objectually still remains
epistemically insignificant insofar as the subject’s reasons for forming the perceptual
belief are concerned.

2.4 Summing up Vision’s challenge
Objectually perceiving the erupting volcano is epistemically irrelevant to the subject, just
as the erupting volcano itself is epistemically irrelevant to the subject so long as she is not
aware of it in a way that can provide her reasons. That is, so long as she does not, in
having the perception, ‘take’ the erupting volcano in any way, her having the perception
cannot provide her a reason for anything. Thus, if we are to pursue a strategy that admits
both Perceptual apprehension and Bifurcation* – i.e., if we are to admit that perception
provides that contentful something that provides our fundamental evidence for belief
while denying the propositionalist position – we must, contrary to Vision, admit that
‘taking something to be so and so’ is not necessarily ‘a form of believing that it is so and
so’. What’s more, we must provide a substantive account of what such non-propositional
‘taking’ amounts to. This is a considerable challenge, but one that must be undertaken if
50

we are to make sense of how perception can provide the perceiver with reasons, while at
the same time acknowledging that belief and perception differ significantly.
In the next chapter I argue that a version of the challenge we have seen in these last two
chapters is also at the center of the debate about the conceptual or nonconceptual contents
of perception; a debate that blossomed in response to Evans (1982). Given the heavy
reliance that proponents of Exclusivity* place on the conceptual nature of the content of a
reason-giving state (as a precondition on the subject’s treating it as a premise in
reasoning), this convergence of concerns should not be surprising. I argue that the
challenge developed above serves to illuminate the central challenge that
nonconceptualists face when attempting to account for the reason-giving role of
perception. Furthermore, attending to the debate about the nature of perceptual content
directly will also provide us the theoretical tools with which potentially to resolve the
original challenge.
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Chapter 3: The reason-giving problem of perception and the nonconceptual
perceptual apprehension of the world

3.1 Ambiguous figures – different aspects in view
Originally introduced in the early 19th century by the crystallographer Louis Necker, the
Necker cube (Figure 2) is now found practically in every introductory textbook on
perception as the paradigmatic ambiguous figure.

Figure 2: The Necker Cube
Looking at the Necker cube, one’s experience abruptly switches back and forth between
perceiving it as a cube whose front plane is ABCD (as facing down and to the left) and
perceiving it as a cube whose front plane is EFGH (as facing up and to the right). 40
This has struck various philosophers as reason to think that perception cannot be merely a
matter of receptivity, a passive ‘taking in’ of what is presented. Most famously, perhaps,
40

With some effort it can also be seen as a variety of other more complex figures. For example,
consider B and H as the opposite corners of a small square, projecting out of the page, the other
two corners being the intersection of BC and HG as well as AB and EH.
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Hanson (1958) argues that the perception of ambiguous figures illustrates the theoryladen character of perception. Remarking on the Necker cube, Hanson claims that when
asked ‘what is it that one sees?’ we are led to an ambiguous answer. On the one hand, one
simply sees a two-dimensional line drawing, but on the other hand, what one sees is a
cube in a particular orientation. Given that which orientation the Necker cube is
experienced as having cannot be captured merely by reference to what is being seen in
the first sense (a two-dimensional line drawing), an analysis of such experience requires
something in addition – some interpretive aspect. This is not a two step process, he
contends, first a perception and then an interpretation of that perception. Rather, the
interpretation is already part of how the figure is presented.
Hanson proceeds to argue that all perception involves the same ambiguity manifest most
clearly in the case of ambiguous figures. When a freshman and a physics professor both
look at an X-ray tube they are, in one respect, seeing the same thing – they both have an
experience of the X-ray tube. However, “the ways in which they are visually aware [of
the X-ray tube] are profoundly different” (1958, p. 15). Similarly, upon hearing a
symphony, “…we may not hear that the oboe is out of tune, though this will be painfully
obvious to the trained musician. (Who incidentally, will not hear the tones and interpret
them as being out of tune, but will simply hear the oboe to be out of tune…)” (ibid., p.
17). Though both the layman and the expert will have an experience of the out-of-tune
oboe, only the latter will experience it to be out-of-tune, or, as it is sometimes put,
experience it as out-of-tune.
It appears, then, that how one apprehends the world through perception cannot be
captured merely by mentioning what one’s perception is of. After all, the layman and the
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expert undergo different perceptions of the same object. Rather, Hanson suggests, one
must be sensitive to the perspective from which the world is apprehended, where this is
more than a merely geometrical perspective but requires us to take into account the
theoretical perspective that the particular perceiver ‘brings with him’ to the act of
perception. How one apprehends the world through perception is, at least in part, a
function of what one knows about the world.
Such a claim is a thorn in the side of philosophers of science. If all perception is theoryladen, then it seems perception cannot be a ground for resolving empirical disagreements
among different theories. One of Hanson’s (1958) familiar examples concerns Tycho and
Kepler. The former holds a geocentric theory of astronomy whereas the latter a
heliocentric one. When looking at the sun change its angle in relation to the horizon they
are both perceptually aware of the sun above and the ocean below. But, given their
different theories of planetary motion, he claims, their experiences of this scene differ
significantly. As a result, the disagreement between their respective theories cannot be
resolved by appeal to some more fundamental uninterpreted something, a theory-neutral
observation, to which both have equal access. There is no such theory-neutral observation
to appeal to. Blurring the distinction between observation and theory is, thus, risky
business for realists about science.
In large part as a reaction to this looming threat to science, various philosophers have
argued that perception must be insulated from theory – it must be independent of
whatever background beliefs one has. One example is Fodor (1984), who argues for the
necessity of at least some level of theory-neutral observation, so that “…given the same
stimulations, two organisms with the same sensory/perceptual psychology will quite
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generally observe the same things, and hence arrive at the same observational beliefs,
however much their theoretical commitments may differ” (pp. 24-5). These observational
beliefs can then adjudicate among competing theories. Similarly, Dretske (1969; 1979;
1991) argues that a central motivation for his introducing a distinction between epistemic
and non-epistemic seeing, 41 is to resist “…a mistaken conflation of perception and
conception … to preserve the distinction between sentience and sapience … to isolate
and describe a way of seeing … that is distinct from, but nonetheless fundamental to, an
organism’s higher level cognitive and conceptual activities” (1979, p.1). Such a
conflation must be resisted if there is any hope of providing a fundamental something in
light of which we can evaluate our empirical theories, and resolve empirical disputes.42
Similar concerns we have seen arise in Chapter 1, and in Chapter 2 when discussing
Vision’s arguments in support of ‘objectual perception’ as that contentful something
fundamental in light of which our perceptual beliefs can be evaluated.
Putting these historical antecedents, and the possible threat they pose to science, to the
side, there seems to be something nonetheless right about the insight that perception
ought not to be thought of as mere receptivity. Prima facie, at least insofar as we are
concerned with the familiar ambiguous figures, how one apprehends the world through
perception cannot be captured merely by mentioning what one’s perception is of. What
you perceive when looking at the Necker cube is simply a two dimensional line drawing.
However, perceiving it as such is a matter that requires training. Rather, the figure is
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Which was mentioned in previous chapters and about which more will be said in the following.
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Dretske is arguing most explicitly against those who have it that perception is essentially tied to
belief, e.g., Armstrong (1968), and Heil (1991). See also Dretske (1991). Argument to the
contrary abound of course. See, most explicitly in this context, Runzo (1982).
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immediately perceived as a three dimensional object in one of the two configurations
mentioned. Which configuration the figure is perceived as having involves a very distinct
phenomenology. A full articulation of how one apprehends the figure requires mentioning
more than merely what one apprehends.
Furthermore, which configuration the figure is perceived as having recommends, makes
appropriate or reasonable, distinct engagements with the figure. This is so both with
respect to the judgments that the perceiver would make about what she is seeing, and
with respect to the actions (including verbal reports) that the perceiver would be disposed
to perform. Perceiving the figure as facing up and to the right, for example, makes
reasonable from the perceiver’s perspective a judgment to the effect that before her
stands a cube facing up and to the right – a judgment that would be further manifest in
her verbal, and otherwise, behavior. 43
Whether or not we appeal to differences in the background theory being exploited in the
act of perception to explain the differences in phenomenology and in cognitive/epistemic
role that the different experiences involve, these differences nonetheless constitute an
explanatory burden that philosophers of every stripe must bear. 44 So that if Hanson’s
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Though both ways of perceiving the cube makes reasonable from the subject’s perspective a
certain set of judgments and engagements with the cube – namely, those relevant to its being a
cube (of whichever orientation).
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In fact, it is quite unlikely that the differences between our experiences of the Necker cube are
a function of the differential exploitation of anything close to a robust theory of the world. One
reason to think that it cannot be so arises from developmental research that shows that children of
a very young age are already sensitive to Gestalt switches (see for example, Gopnik and Rosati
2001). Yet, it would be highly suspicious to attribute to them any sophisticated theoretical
understanding of the world (a point argued for by Macpherson (2006)). As we shall see, a more
amenable proposal on similar lines takes the case of ambiguous figures to illustrate that
perception is not purely receptive but involves the exploitation of different of the perceiver’s
conceptual capacities.
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recommended strategy is deemed misguided, it is nonetheless upon us to provide some
different answer to the question: what must perception be like so as to explain such
phenomena?
Note that this is not a question about what mechanisms a cognitive scientist or a
neuropsychologist might allude to in explaining the occurrence of Gestalt shifts. This,
too, is an important and interesting question that keeps cognitive scientists busy. Rather,
it is a question about a personal-level phenomenon that requires a personal-level
explanation. How we apprehend the figure, by having a perception of it as having one of
its two standard configurations, involves a distinctive phenomenology, directs us to think
about the figure differently, and provides us reasons to act upon it differently. The
challenge facing a theory of perception regards the nature of this perceptual
apprehension, such that perception can be a mode of awareness of the world that provides
us the appropriate resources for such activities.
In the following I present another aspect of the reason-giving problem of perception with
which this dissertation began, and in relation to which ambiguous figures will serve as a
test case (Section 3.3.1).

3.2 Perceptual reason-giving and the specification of mental content
In previous chapters I argued that perception can provide reasons for the perceiver to act
and deliberate appropriately about her environment. Yet, I also argued that for the sake of
explaining a subject’s intentional actions and deliberations, we must focus not on what
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reasons there are for the subject to act or deliberate in a certain way, but on what reasons
the subject has to do so. 45 The former can figure in an explanation of why an agent’s
actions are right, justified, or in some other sense appropriate, from the standpoint of
rationality (as McDowell (1994a) puts it). But, it is only reasons that the subject has that
can figure as that in light of which the subject’s actions and further deliberations are
appropriate from her own point of view, and hence can potentially figure into the reasons
for which she acts.
Snow White bites into a poisoned apple and falls into a slumber. The reason for which
she bit the apple is, presumably, that the apple looked pleasing to her. She had a reason to
bite into the apple and she acted on the basis of that reason. But, of course, there was no
reason for her to eat the apple. The apple was poisoned by the evil queen, and so there
was no reason for Snow White, being the life loving person that she is, to bite into the
apple; indeed, there was reason for her not to do so. The aim of intentional explanation of
deliberation and action is articulating the reasons for which she acts and deliberates as she
does. Hence it aims at illuminating the reasons she has, irrespective of what reasons there
are for her to do so. 46
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As noted in previous chapters, see Audi (1986a; 1986b) as well as Schroeder (2008) for
extensive discussions of this distinction.
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As Dancy (2006) reminds us, intentional explanation, unlike causal explanation, need not be
factive. This is so, since the aim of intentional explanation is “to reveal the favorable light in
which the action presented itself to the agent. … All that is required for explanation of this sort is
that we come to see how the agent could have found something about the action that led him to
think it worthwhile.” Furthermore, “[t]here is just no pressure to insist that where an agent acts
for a reason, his reason must be something about which he is not mistaken.”(pp. 126-127)
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Just as there are cases in which an agent has a reason to act in the absence of reasons for
the agent to act, so there are cases where there are reasons for the agent to act without the
agent’s having any reasons to act.
A particularly interesting instance of the latter is the case of blindsight. Blindsight is a
phenomenon associated with lesions to the primary visual cortex, as a result of which the
patient is, by his or her own admonition, unaware of stimuli presented in a portion of the
contralesional side. Though the blindsight patient reports having no awareness of
presented stimuli, when prodded, he is nonetheless able to guess, with an accuracy well
above chance, a variety of features of the presented stimuli (e.g., orientation, direction of
motion, color). In fact, blindsight patients are even susceptible to semantic priming by
primes presented in their ‘blind’ field. 47 In such cases, a patient’s responses are, more
often than not, de facto appropriate to what is presented to him (thus, they are responses
there is reason for him to perform, given that he aims to please the experimenter).
Nonetheless, such cases are precisely ones in which the subject does not have reasons for
his behaviors. Whatever information about the world is being registered and processed is
not information made perceptually available to the patient, nor is it information that could
be made perceptually available to him. The patient’s responses are completely arbitrary
from his own point of view – they are responses he has no reason to perform. 48 It is this
feature that makes blindsight such an interesting phenomenon. In explaining the
blindsight patient’s behavior we have no hope of articulating the reasons for which he
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For a detailed examination of blindsight see Weiskrantz (1986).

48

There is no correlation between the patient’s confidence levels in his responses and his
successful performance (Ibid.).
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acts, as there are no such reasons. The question of interest is how normal, conscious,
perception is to provide reasons that the subject thereby has.
I argued, further, that a seemingly straightforward way of making sense of a subject’s
having a reason considers the subject as being in a position to treat the content of her
purported reason-giving state as a premise in an argument (henceforth, I will speak of
reason-giving states to cover only those states of the subject, the having of which, is
sufficient to provide the subject reasons, in the sense of reasons that the subject has). This
suggests that the subject must possess concepts that articulate the content of such
purported reason-giving states. Beliefs, as paradigmatic conceptual states – states the
having of which depends on possession of concepts articulating their content – are,
hence, paradigmatic reason-giving states. However, given that perception differs
dramatically from belief in that having a perception does not depend on possessing all the
concepts articulating their contents (i.e., given Bifurcation* = No perception is belieflike), the plausibility of conceiving of perception as itself a reason-giving state, in the
same sense (i.e., the plausibility of Perceptual apprehension = Some perceptions provide
us reasons directly), is in jeopardy.
To overcome this difficulty, our central concern must be to supply a substantive account
of a subject’s having a reason that does not depend on the subject’s possessing the
concepts articulating the contents of her purported reason-giving state (i.e., deny
Exclusivity* = Only belief-like states provide us reasons directly).
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Since the main difficulty confronting the attempt to include perception in the class of
reason-giving states 49 is the nonconceptual character of perception (the claim that
perception is concept-independent, so that one can undergo a perceptual experience
without possessing concepts articulating its contents), it is unsurprising that this same
difficulty has been the center of attention in the debate about the content of perception.
The problem is the central battleground between those who think that perception must
involve conceptual contents, and those denying this claim (those denying Bifurcation*,
and those defending it, respectively). Analyzing the problem as it emerges in this
literature – the traditional debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about the
content of perception – can, therefore, provide us insights into its possible resolution.
Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the central motivations against Bifurcation* are
epistemic in nature. If perception involves nonconceptual content, it is difficult to see
how one would be able to utilize such content as premises in reasoning and hence it is
unclear how perception could provide one reasons in light of which one’s engagements
are appropriate (or not) from one’s own point of view.
The traditional debate about the content of perception can shed light on the problem
formulated in the previous chapters, and, similarly, the discussion in the previous
chapters can shed light on the debate about the content of perception. In this chapter I
present what I find to be the central difficulty with the notion of nonconceptual content.
A better understanding of the problem in terms of the debate about the content of
perception will pave the way to a solution of the original difficulty identified in Chapter
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I.e., incorporating perception into the ‘realm of reason’ (McDowell 1994a).
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1. In particular, it will illuminate the real threat that eliminating Exclusivity* poses to
those attempting to hold both Bifurcation* and Perceptual apprehension. I will argue that
this threat is not merely that considering perception as nonconceptual makes obscure how
perception might be a reason-giving state in any interesting sense, because it entails that
subjects are not in a position to treat the content of their perception as premises in
reasoning. Rather, it is the more sinister threat that considering perception as
nonconceptual seems to make perception completely epistemically inert from the
perceiver’s perspective – as nothing for the subject. This more sinister threat runs counter
to both the purported epistemic/cognitive role that perception purportedly plays
(especially if holding to Perceptual apprehension) and to our commonsensical notion that
there is something it is like for us to undergo a perception with a given content,
something in light of which perception plays these roles. The fact that nonconceptualism
encounters this threat of epistemic inertia is not to say that it cannot overcome it. On the
contrary, my central aim in this chapter (and in the next) is to illuminate the nature of this
threat in such a way as would allow us to see how it can ultimately be overcome.

3.2.1 Difficulties of nonconceptual content
The notion of nonconceptual content was explicitly introduced by Evans (1982). 50 He
argues that, unlike propositional attitudes, the having of which is contingent on
possessing all the concepts mentioned in the canonical specification of their contents,

50

Though there are hints of the notion already in earlier writings. See in particular, Dretske
(1969; 1981), Burge (1977), and Stich (1978).

62

having a perception does not so depend on concept possession. 51 For one to believe that a
volcano is erupting one must have some knowledge of volcanoes and eruption. But one
need not have any such capacities to perceive a volcano erupting; presumably, even
Icelandic squirrels and puffins do the latter. One merely needs to look in the right
direction, in favorable conditions, and from a safe distance. Indeed, it is presumably in
part by experiencing volcanoes (pictures of volcanoes, and such) that we come to possess
the concept volcano. Hence, it cannot be a precondition on having such an experience
that one possesses the concepts articulating their contents. 52
Since Evans’ introduction of the notion of nonconceptual content, it has been applied
more broadly and has become the topic of controversy in epistemology, the philosophy of
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Recently, several authors have argued that the (non)conceptual content debate is ambiguous.
The claim originates in a remark made by Heck (2000), although it is already present in Stalnaker
(1998a; 1998b). Since then others have discussed various formulations of the ambiguity. See,
Speaks (2005), Byrne (2005), Tye (2006), Crowther (2006), and Heck (2007). The statement of
the notion of nonconceptual content, it is argued, has little to do with the content of the mental
state but rather only with the conditions a subject must satisfy in order to have such states. So,
while it may be the case that certain mental states, such as beliefs, are concept-dependent – in that
having beliefs depends on the possession of appropriate concepts – whereas other states, perhaps
perception, are concept-independent, this fact alone says nothing about the nature of the content
of the respective states. I will not be concerned in this chapter with such arguments, for two
reasons. First, our interest in this chapter is the traditional debate about the content of perception
and how perception might be able to provide reasons to the perceiver. For these purposes, the
supposed ambiguity is irrelevant. Second, I believe that the traditional proponents of this debate
ignored this ambiguity for good reason, since considerations of concept-(in)dependence are
precisely considerations having to do with the content of the mental state in question. That is, I
find arguments about the ambiguous notion of nonconceptual content unconvincing. See
Bermúdez (2007), Bermúdez and Cahen (2008), and Toribio (2008).
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Hence, the priority of states with nonconceptual content over states with conceptual content.
This form of argument for the nonconceptual content of perception can be found in various
places, see, e.g., Peacocke (1992), and Ayer (2002).
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mind, and cognitive science. Given the topic of the dissertation, in this chapter I focus
only on the traditional debate about the (non)conceptual content of perception. 53
The debate about the (non)conceptual content of perception can be seen as surrounding
the following set of propositions:


Perspectival constraint 54 – The canonical specification of a mental state’s content
articulates how one apprehends the world in undergoing (having, or being in) that
state



Conceptual constraint – One’s apprehension of the world is determined as a function
of one’s conceptual repertoire



Nonconceptual content (definition) – The content of a mental state is nonconceptual
iff one can undergo (have, or be in) it without possessing the concepts mentioned in
the canonical specification of its content

It is evident that the conjunction of the first two propositions implies the negation of the
possibility of states with nonconceptual content. If the canonical specification of mental
content is to articulate how one apprehends the world in having that state, and how one
apprehends the world is determined as a function of one’s conceptual capacities, it
53

In particular, I mean to address the literature on nonconceptual content that has emerged from
the work of Gareth Evans (1982). Among others, I have in mind such authors as Peacocke (1983),
McDowell (1994a), Brewer (1999), Sedivy (1996), and Noë (1999) who have, in some form or
other, denied the possibility of Nonconceptual content, and Evans (1982), Crane (1992),
Peackoce (1992), Dretske (1995), Bermúdez (1998), Heck (2000), and Tye (1995), who have
fervently defended it. For a review of the debate about nonconceptual content and its various
contemporary applications see Bermúdez and Cahen (2008).
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This proposition is adapted from Bermúdez (2009), in which he defines it as the claim that “In
specifying the content of a representational state one aims to be faithful to how the thinker or
perceiver apprehends what is being represented” (p. 461).
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follows that the canonical specification of mental content will be limited to mentioning
only concepts one possesses. This is a direct denial of the possibility of states with
nonconceptual content – mental states the canonical specification of which can mention
concepts that the subject having that state does not in fact possess. Therefore, if the
notion of nonconceptual content is to have any applicability, one of these three
propositions must go. 55

3.2.2 The Perspectival constraint and intentional explanation
Though the Perspectival constraint is controversial, traditional proponents of the debate
with which we are concerned regard it as essential. Nonconceptualists, as the name
implies, target the Conceptual constraint; insisting that at least with respect to some
mental states how the subject apprehends the world does not depend on her conceptual
repertoire. As Bermúdez (2009) says:
“Non-conceptual content, if there is such a thing, is content specifiable in a way that
respects the perspectival constraint without being constrained by the conceptual
capacities of the thinking and perceiving subject.”(p. 462)

The Perspectival constraint arises from a commitment to a particular notion of mental
content. This is a notion of content the individuation of which is essentially governed by
considerations having to do with the intentional explanation of deliberation and action.
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Note that there may be room for sub-personal ascriptions of content in which case it will not be
a requirement that the ascription is sensitive to the way the subject apprehends the world. Such
appeals to nonconceptual content at the sub-personal level are prevalent in cognitive science (see,
e.g., Bermúdez 1995). In the case of sub-personal ascriptions of content, the Perspectival
constraint is omitted and we, therefore, find less resistance to the applicability of the notion of
nonconceptual content (see, e.g., McDowell (1994a; 1994b)).
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Intentional explanation is reason-explanation. It aims to articulate the reasons for which a
subject acts or forms a belief; to illuminate that in light of which a subject finds a
particular action or belief appropriate, and on the basis of which acts. The following
principle explicates this motivation:


Personal-level reason explanation – Content attribution articulates how one
apprehends the world, in having a contentful state, such that it can serve as that in
light of which one’s actions and deliberations are reasonable from one’s own
perspective

That such a principle does in fact motivate proponents (on both sides) of the traditional
debate about perceptual content to insist on the applicability of the Perspectival
constraint is revealed by their insistence on a Fregean treatment of belief content (with
which perceptual content is either assimilated or contrasted). In considering belief
content, coarse-grained, purely truth-conditional, accounts of content are rejected. These
accounts are adequate for the sake of correctly supplying a belief’s truth-conditions.
However, in important respects, their specification is insensitive to how the believer
apprehends the world.
The point is a familiar one. Consider Oedipus’s belief that Jocasta is available for
marriage. The belief will be true if Jocasta is available for marriage, but also if Oedipus’
mother is available for marriage. After all, Jocasta just is Oedipus’ mother. 56 That which
makes Oedipus’ belief true can be specified in a variety of truth-equivalent ways,
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And identity is necessary (Kripke, 1980) has shown. Hence, all states of affairs involving
Jocasta are identical with those involving Oedipus’ mother. Similarly, the set of possible worlds
in which Jocasta is available for marriage is identical with the set of possible worlds in which
Oedipus’ mother is available for marriage.
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specifications true in all and only the same possible worlds. 57 However, it is only a
certain specification of truth-conditions that is privileged in that it fully articulates how
Oedipus apprehends the world when having the belief – how his belief represents to him
the world as being – and hence, it is a specification that illuminates the reasonableness of
his actions, from his own point of view.
Holding the Perspectival constraint as a constraint on the specification of belief content
derives from the notion that the content of a belief embodies one’s epistemic orientation
to the world – it constitutes how one ‘takes’ the world to be. How one ‘takes’ the world
to be, in having a belief, can then rationalize, from one’s own point of view, the
intentional actions and deliberations one consequentially performs.
When specifying Oedipus’ belief as the belief that Jocasta is unmarried we are marking
the fact that he thereby has reasons to engage his mother in ways that are appropriate,
from his point of view, to the truth of that proposition. Which engagements he has reasons
for clearly differ from those he would have had had he believed that his mother was
unmarried. In particular, it is unlikely that he would have had reason to marry Jocasta,
and the ensuing tragedy would have likely been averted. If the content of a belief is to
account for the intentional explanation of one’s deliberations and actions, its specification
must be sensitive to how one apprehends the world as being in having the belief – its
specification must conform to the Perspectival constraint.
Indeed, it is this sensitivity to how the subject apprehends the world as being, an
apprehension that potentially provides the subject reasons, which gives sense to our
57

In this sense it is often said that neo-Russellian and possible worlds accounts of mental content
are coarse-grained accounts of content.
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seeking a canonical specification of the belief’s content. A purely truth conditional
account of content does not yield a canonical specification of content in this same sense.
And it is for this reason that truth-conditional accounts are commonly considered
inadequate for the aims of intentional explanation.
This is not to suggest that considerations in favor of the Perspectival constraint with
respect to belief content are indefeasible. Various philosophers have argued that belief
content need not be sensitive in this way to how one apprehends the world. The
explanation of one’s intentional behaviors can be formulated by appeal to factors
extrinsic to the content of the belief in question. 58 Nonetheless, I put such alternatives to
the side. Proponents of the views with which we are concerned do find compelling the
notion that the individuation of content at the level of belief cannot proceed irrespective
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Among proponents of some form of neo-Russellian account of belief content see, for example,
Salmon (1986), Soames (1987), Salmon and Soames (1988), Perry (1980), Fodor (1987; 1990).
Among those holding a possible worlds account of belief content see, for example, Stalnaker
(1984; 1998a), and Lewis (1979; 1986). They all have some explanation of a subject’s intentional
action and deliberation that appeals to factors extrinsic to the content of the belief – a guise, a
functional role, or some such thing. Furthermore, though on such coarse-grained accounts the
specification of belief content is insensitive to the Perspectival constraint this is not to say that
certain descriptions of that content would not be preferable over others.
For example, Salmon argues (1986) that we must appeal to a guise by which the content of the
belief is presented to the subject. The content of the belief is a Russellian proposition, hence it
directly involves the object which it concerns, but the object might be presented to the subject
under a particular guise. According to Salmon it is the particular guise by which the content is
presented that explains the subject’s behavior. Nonetheless, the guise is extrinsic to the content of
the belief. On Salmon’s account, to say that Oedipus believed that Oedipus’ mother is available
for marriage would not be to state a falsehood, but merely to be misleading, in that when we
formulate a belief report we normally wish to convey not only the content of the person’s belief,
but also the guise under which the person apprehends that content.
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of how one apprehends the world; hence, a canonical specification of belief content must
be sensitive to such a perspective. 59
Thus, insisting on the applicability of the Perspectival constraint to the specification of
mental content is driven by an emphasis on the reason-giving status of the mental; on
how having a given mental state provides the subject reasons for engaging the world
appropriately. The specification of content in accordance with the Perspectival
constraint, then, aims to articulate those reasons the subject has for engaging the world
by virtue of undergoing (having or being in) a particular mental state.
If the notion of mental content in general is to articulate how the subject apprehends the
world, in specifying the content of a mental state we are, trivially, limited to mentioning
those capacities the subject has for so apprehending it. A canonical specification of the
content of a mental state will be limited to the subject’s capacity to ‘take’ the world to be
a certain way. According to conceptualists – proponents of the Conceptual constraint –
these capacities are exhaustively conceptual. If this is the case for the notion of content in
general, then it follows that mental content just is conceptual content.
However, as we have seen, when saying that the content of some state is nonconceptual
we are saying that the canonical specification of that content need not appeal only to
concepts possessed by the subject (indeed, the subject might possess no concepts at all).
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In other words, traditional proponents of the debate, mentioned in my fn. 53, above, hold a neoFregean, fine-grained, account of belief content. Furthermore, though I shall not argue for it here,
analogous questions to the ones that will concern us here about the content of perception arise for
those who ascribe to coarse-grained, merely truth-conditional, accounts of belief content. The
difference is that these questions will arise at the level of guise, in Salmon’s case, for example,
rather than at the level of content (see, e.g., Forbes’ 1987 review of Salmon’s 1986). I will return
to discuss a version of the neo-Russellian account of content in Chapter 5 when I analyze in detail
the reason-giving status of beliefs.
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Essentially, a specification of a fully nonconceptual content is from a third-person
perspective, utilizing concepts not necessarily possessed by the subject.
The crucial question then, is: In what sense does a canonical specification of
nonconceptual content capture how the subject apprehends the world? If we think, as the
conceptualist does, that all apprehension involves conceptualization, the nonconceptualist
position implies the absurdity that we can attribute to the subject a way of apprehending
the world that transcends the subject’s capacities of apprehension! Having denied the
Conceptual constraint in the case of perceptual content, how do nonconceptualists
propose to satisfy the Perspectival constraint?
It is one thing to argue for, and perhaps accept, the actuality of states with nonconceptual
content. There are familiar arguments to this effect (some of which we have seen in
Chapter 1, Section 1.4, in discussing the merits of Bifurcation*). For example, one can
appeal to arguments from the perceptual capacities of nonconceptual creatures, infants
and ‘lower’ animals, or perhaps to arguments from the priority of perception to concept
possession, or one might note the fact that our perceptual discriminations outstrip our
conceptual capacities. 60 Such arguments suggest that one can undergo an experience
without possessing the concepts utilized in the canonical specification of the content of
that experience. However, it is quite a different thing to provide a diagnosis of how,
having eliminated the Conceptual constraint, the Perspectival constraint is satisfied.
That is, supposing that having a perception is concept-independent, it is yet unclear
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Many of these arguments, in support of the nonconceptual content of perception, can be traced
back to Evans (1982).

70

a) in what sense the specification of perceptual content is sensitive to how subjects
apprehend the world, and
b) how such nonconceptual apprehension accounts for subjects’ having the reasons
that they do by virtue of undergoing a perceptual state with such content.

3.3 Nonconceptual apprehension
If, as Bermúdez says, nonconceptual content ‘…is content specifiable in a way that
respects the perspectival constraint’, the nonconceptualist must provide some substantive
account of a subject’s nonconceptually apprehending the world. Such an account is to do
justice to the original motivation underlying the Perspectival constraint; that which
motivates both sides of the debate to abandon a purely truth-conditional account of belief
content (i.e., a commitment to Personal-level reason explanation). It must illuminate how
apprehending the world in such a nonconceptual way provides the subject reasons in light
of which she finds reasonable certain engagements with the world rather than others.
As noted, it will not do merely to show how having a perception with a given
nonconceptual content provides a de facto reason for the subject to engage the world in a
certain manner – just as an erupting volcano provides a reason for nearby tourists to flee.
Rather, the tourists, themselves, must have reasons for certain engagements with the
world by virtue of having the perception (they need to be aware of the volcano in some
appropriate way for them to have a reason to flee). In this way, an appeal to perceptual
states with such contents can enter the intentional explanation of these engagements as
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providing the reason for which subjects thus engage the world (either in action, or in
which perceptual beliefs they consequentially form).
Frege cases, such as the Oedipus example above, illustrate the inadequacy of merely
truth-conditional accounts of belief content. Similarly, perceptual analogues of Frege
cases serve an analogous function. They reveal the importance of a sensitivity to how a
perceiver apprehends the world when providing the canonical specification of perceptual
content. Reflecting on such cases is also the most obvious way to illuminate the nature of
the challenge that an appeal to the Perspectival constraint is meant to resolve and the
notion of apprehension that it purportedly involves.

3.3.1 Nonconceptual apprehension of ambiguous figures – A case study
In the introductory section I discussed the case of the Necker cube. There are many other
ambiguous figures that have been discussed at length, e.g., the old/young Parisian
woman, the vase/two-faces, and Jastrow’s familiar duck/rabbit (popularized by
Wittgenstein). Though focusing on any one of these would be equally illuminating, I will
focus here on a slightly less well know (and perhaps less exciting) ambiguous figure.
This, for two reasons. First, as we shall see, it is the simplest of forms, and, as such, its
analysis allows us to sidestep certain difficulties that plague the more complex examples.
Second, and more importantly, it is the example most recently and extensively discussed
in the particular context with which we are concerned.
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I will be focusing on the Mach figure (Figure 3). 61 The figure is a simple tilted square
that at times is perceived as a-tilted-square and at times as a-regular-diamond. These
perceptions are phenomenologically distinct. Furthermore, when perceived as a-tiltedsquare the subject has reason to believe there is a square before him, whereas when
perceived as a-regular-diamond he has reason to believe there is a diamond before him.
Similarly with respect to the subject’s actions. Given two piles, one of squares another of
diamonds, the subject’s perceiving the figure as a-tilted-square, but not as a-regulardiamond, provides him reason for, and hence explains, his placing the object in the
‘square’, rather than in the ‘diamond’, pile.

Figure 3: The Mach Figure
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The original example is from Mach (1914/1996). Though it will not concern us in this chapter,
it is interesting to note that Peacocke initially introduced this example (1983) as an argument for
the claim that the way the world appears to the subject in perception cannot be fully captured by
appeal merely to its representational properties. Rather, it requires in addition an appeal to
irreducible sensational properties. The argument is as follows: when perceiving the ambiguous
figure there is a clear change in phenomenology when seeing the figure as a square vs. seeing it
as a diamond. However, there is also some aspect of the phenomenology that is consistent
throughout the aspect shift. Given that, at the time, Peacocke argued for a conceptualist account
of representational content, he argued that the change in the way things appear to the subject as
being can be explained by appeal to the different concepts employed in having the different
perceptions of the figure. The stable aspect of the experience, Peacocke argued, could not be
explained by appeal to such contents and demanded a notion of sensational properties as well.
Peacocke has, since then, altered his views on the nature of the representational contents of
perception (see, e.g., 1992). He has not, however, abandoned his commitment to the claim that
sensational properties of perception are theoretically ineliminable. E.g., in his (2001b), he says:
“If two experiences in a given modality can be the same in respect of their representational
properties, yet be subjectively different, it follows that not all their subjective properties are
representational. That is a valid form of reasoning, whether or not representational content is
wholly conceptual. … For the record, I do still hold that every perceptual experience has
sensational properties.”(p. 612) See also Peacocke (2001a; 2008).
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As in the case of the Necker Cube, merely appealing to what is represented when
specifying the content of perception, prima facie, does not do justice to the dualphenomenology involved in perceiving such figures or to the notion that the content of
perception is to explain the subject’s having perceptual reasons for one set of intentional
engagements rather than another. It does not do justice to the notion that the attribution of
content is to articulate that in light of which the subject finds reasonable a certain set of
engagements rather than another (i.e., it violates Personal-level reason explanation).
What is represented is the tilted square. But, the presence of the tilted square itself
provides equal reason for her to form the belief that she confronts a square as the belief
that she confronts a diamond. Similarly with respect to the sorting behaviors mentioned.
Presumably, what explains the subject’s differential engagement with the figure is the
fact that, in having the different perceptions, she apprehends the selfsame figure
differently. How she apprehends the figure, then, provides her reasons for a certain set of
engagements rather than another. What does this apprehension amount to?
The conceptualist is in a position to offer some substantive account of the nature of the
apprehension involved in such cases. When one perceives the object as a-regulardiamond, say, one is exploiting in perception one’s concept diamond rather than one’s
concept square. The fact that different conceptual capacities are actualized in different
instances of perceiving the figure explains their differences, both in terms of their
phenomenology and in terms of their epistemic/cognitive role – providing the subject
reasons for different engagements with the perceived object. 62
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As discussed in Section 1, above, similar insights motivate Hanson’s treatment of perception.
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Much more needs to be said about how the differential exploitation of concepts in
perception accounts for the differences mentioned between the perceptions. The picture
according to McDowell, a prominent supporter of the Conceptual constraint, is that when
a concept is exploited in an experience
“… the rational connections of the concept enter into shaping the contents of the
appearance, so that what appears to be the case is understood as fraught with implications
for the subject’s cognitive situation in the world...” (1994a, p. 32)
And, according to Brewer (2005):
“On the conceptualist account … entertaining a conceptual content is a matter of grasping
its truth condition on the basis of the way in which this is systematically determined by
the semantic values of its components and their mode of combination, which are in turn
precisely what determine its inferential relations with other such contents. Thus, a
person’s actually being in a sense experiential state with a conceptual content requires her
grasp of that content in just the way which grounds its reason-giving status.”(p. 228)

The actualization of different concepts in the two perceptions of the figure explain the
subject’s finding appropriate different sets of intentional engagements with the figure. 63
There are, of course, further questions to be asked about this purported solution. But, for
the moment we need not involve ourselves too deeply with how these questions might be
resolved. The conceptualist account of content has, at least, prima facie plausibility.
Whether or not we find it satisfactory at the moment has no bearing on whether a
satisfactory nonconceptual account of content can be formulated. And, it is the aim of this
chapter to evaluate the reason-giving challenges as they apply to the nonconceptualist
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This was also the solution originally proposed by Peacocke in his (1983). See my fn. 61, above.
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account of perceptual content as it is the overarching aim of the dissertation to show how
these challenges can be overcome. 64
Given that the nonconceptualist wants to deny the applicability of the Conceptual
constraint to perception, the purported solution above is no longer available. What
alternative notions of a subject’s apprehension of the world are available that could
explain these differences?
One, unsatisfactory, but revealing, reply might be that the relevant capacities the
differential exploitation of which explains the abovementioned differences are simply the
subject’s different representational capacities. In perceiving the Mach figure as aregular-diamond, say, the subject is exploiting a capacity to represent diamondhood
rather than tilted-squarehood. It is the differential exploitation of these capacities that
explains the phenomenal difference between the perceptions and that makes reasonable,
from the subject’s point of view, different beliefs about, and engagements with, the
figure.
However, this suggestion will not work. Being a regular-diamond and being a tiltedsquare are, presumably, the selfsame property. As a result, the capacity to represent
tilted-squarehood and the capacity to represent diamondhood collapse into the selfsame
capacity. Clearly, then, an appeal to the capacity to represent that property cannot explain
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Thus, even if the conceptualist faces a variety of difficulties, a tu quoque on behalf of the
nonconceptualist will not do here (if ever it does).
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the phenomenal differences and differences in epistemic/cognitive role between the two
perceptions. We require a difference in how the selfsame property is represented. 65
To bypass this complication, one might claim that the different perceptions involve
different capacities to represent the selfsame property – a capacity to represent things as
a-tilted-square and a capacity to represent things as a-regular-diamond. But, leaving the
explanation at this point is trivial and uninformative. The difficulty the nonconceptualist
faces is precisely that of providing a substantive account of the nature of such
representational capacities. The conceptualist agrees that the subject’s apprehension of
the figure involves the exploitation of different representational capacities on different
occasions of viewing the figure. However, she adds that these representational capacities
are conceptual capacities. An analogous substantive account of what these
representational capacities amount to is required on the part of the nonconceptualist; an
account that nonetheless retains the notion that perception directly provides the perceiver
reasons in light of which she engages the world as she does.
Michael Tye recognizes the difficulties introduced by the Mach Figure, and provides a
solution consistent with his general neo-Russellian account of nonconceptual content.
Considering Tye’s proposal helps clarify the core of the conceptualist complaint against
nonconceptualism. It also reveals how this complaint misses its target, and so reveals
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Of course, if we think that it is the same representational capacities that are involved in both
perceptions we can explain the relevant differences between the perceptions in terms extrinsic to
the content of perception. However, such an account would be problematic for the same reason
that coarse-grained accounts of belief content are problematic – it would be a violation of the
motivations underlying the Perspectival constraint. In addition it would violate an even more
fundamental insight that in the case of perception content attribution should do justice to the
phenomenology of experience. It is not clear how factors extrinsic to perceptual content could
account for differences in phenomenology.
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what it would take for a nonconceptual account of content to avoid it. In particular, there
is a natural, but misguided, way of understanding the nonconceptual position as entailing
externalism about content individuation. I argue that such externalism has no hope of
providing a substantive account of perceptual apprehension. Ultimately, it is this
tendency – to couple nonconceptualism and externalism about the individuation of
perceptual content – that must be avoided, if a substantive account of nonconceptual
perceptual apprehension is to be developed. 66
According to Tye, the differences between the two perceptions of the Mach Figure can be
accounted for by appeal to differences in which relational properties are represented as
holding of the figure when it is perceived in either of the two ways. In perceptually
representing the object one represents not only its being square, 67 but also a host of other
relational properties. He says:
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In the following I focus on Tye’s account, as his externalist commitments bring out most
clearly the source of the (misguided) tension between proponents of the (non)conceptualist debate
about perceptual content. It is worth mentioning, however, that Peacocke, who introduced the
Mach figure into this debate (see my fn. 61), discusses it in his (1992) as presenting a difficulty to
his account of perceptual content as, what he calls, ‘positioned scenario content’. Briefly, such
content is “…individuated by specifying which ways of filling out the space around the perceiver
are consistent with the representational content’s being correct” (p. 61). In both the case of
perceiving the square as a-tilted-square and the case of perceiving it as a-regular- diamond the
positioned scenario content is the same – the ways of filling out the space around the observer are
the same (they both involve having a four sided closed figure with four internal right angles at the
same distance and orientation relative to the observer’s body). However, there is nonetheless a
phenomenal difference between these two ways of representing the tilted square. Peacocke
explains the differences in how the figure is perceived by appeal to an additional layer of
nonconceptual content he calls ‘protopropositional’ content. This content “…contains an
individual or individuals, together with a property or relation. When a protoproposition is part of
the representational content of an experience, the experience represents the property or relation in
the protoproposition as holding of the individual or individuals it also contains” (p. 77). See also
Peacocke (2001a).
67

A property that, since it is identical with being a diamond, Tye agrees, a representation of
which would not be sufficient to account for the differences between the two perceptions.
Interestingly, Tye’s current position is in contrast with his earlier work (2003) in which he argued
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“If X looks square, X looks to have an inclined base. X then looks tilted. If X looks
diamond-shaped, X looks upright. So, when X looks square, X is represented as having
the property of being tilted; this property is not represented as belonging to X when X
looks diamond-shaped.”(2006, p. 527) 68

The suggestion is that differences between the perceptions are captured by differences in
which properties the figure is represented as having. However, if this is understood as the
claim that perceiving some object as a-regular-diamond, say, involves representing it as
upright, we find ourselves with the same difficulty with which we began. Given that the
subject does not possess the concepts involved in a specification of this relational
property, we have not proceeded one inch in understanding how it amounts to a
specification of the way the subject apprehends the figure.
The conceptualist might agree that the differences between the perceptions of the figure
consist in which relational properties the figure is represented as having. However, she
would add that representing the figure in these different ways amounts to the
actualization of different concepts under which these different relational properties fall
and that the subject possesses. When perceiving the figure as upright, one’s concept of
that squareness and diamondness are in fact different shape properties the perception of which
explains the different respective experiences of one and the same figure.
68

As Tye mentions in the same paper, the solution is analogous to the one given to a familiar
argument against a purely representational account of content. Briefly, the argument proceeds by
pointing out the different experiences associated with representing one and the same property in
different modalities – e.g., visually perceiving a cube is phenomenally very different from
touching a cube. Since in both modalities the same property is represented, and yet the experience
phenomenally differs greatly it cannot be the case that the way things phenomenally appear is
accounted for purely in terms of the experience’s representational properties. The familiar
response is that, though in both modalities the shape property of the ball is represented, the
difference between the experiences of the ball in different modalities is accounted for by the fact
that the different experiences represent very different other properties – most clearly, in the visual
case colors are represented as well as the shape of the ball, whereas in the tactile case it is texture
that is represented. This solution, Tye argues, generalizes to the Mach figure, but also to all cases
where it seems that we have one property represented in two or more different ways.
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being-upright is actualized. Given the nonconceptualist’s assertion that the subject need
not possess the concepts involved in a specification of this relational property in order to
undergo the appropriate experience – in order to apprehend the figure in this way – we
have not proceeded one inch in understanding how the nonconceptualist proposal
amounts to a specification of the way the subject apprehends the figure.
We require a substantive account of what it is for the subject to represent the figure as
being-upright (or as being-tilted, as the case may be). Generally, explaining one’s
perceiving some O as X by appeal to one’s representing O as Y provides no explanatory
advantage.
An elaboration, in line with Tye’s account, holds that perceiving the figure as diamond,
say, is just for the property being-upright to be represented, rather than the property
being-tilted. The fact that one undergoes a representation of the property being-upright,
rather than of the property being-tilted, makes sense of the claim that, though one may
not possess any concepts, nonetheless, the canonical specification of the content of one’s
perception is as diamond-shaped. Presumably, it is this same fact in virtue of which the
subject has a reason to engage the figure in ways appropriate, from her point of view, to
something’s being a diamond rather than a square (what I shall henceforth call squareappropriate ways).
Note further that, if this is the case, the differences between the experiences of the Mach
figure are not particularly surprising, as the experiences are, in an important sense, of
different things. Both are experiences of the same shape property but they differ with
respect to which other properties they are also experiences of. Ambiguous figures are,
80

then, not perceptual analogues of Frege cases. Their perception is not significantly more
theoretically interesting than the perception of any other figure or object with multiple
perceptible properties, e.g., a cone perceived from different orientations (when its base is
facing the observer vs. its side). 69 The intuition, which we have seen emerge in Section
3.1, that perception must be more than mere receptivity – that a full articulation of how
one apprehends the figure requires mentioning more than merely what one apprehends –
is, on this account, shown to be false.

3.3.2 Is externally individuated nonconceptual apprehension any apprehension at all?
It appears that an appeal to differences in represented properties can mark a difference
between perceiving the figure as a tilted-square and perceiving it as a regular-diamond.
However, leaving the explanation at this point amounts to the abandonment not only of
the Conceptual constraint but also of the Perspectival constraint, at least as originally
motivated (a qualification to which I return in Chapter 4). This is so, as the difference
between the representations – the difference that is purportedly significant to what the
perceiver finds reasonable to think or do – is captured by differences in facts about the
representations that the subject knows nothing about. 70 The fact that the one perception
involves a tilted-square-type representation and the second perception a regular-diamond69

See also my previous fn. 68 in relation to Tye’s explicit endorsement of this sentiment.
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Presumably, there are a multitude of other facts about our perceptual representations that we
know nothing about. For example, we are completely ignorant of the many properties of their
particular neural realizers: their identity, color, shape, quantity, location, etc. But this ignorance is
trivial, as none of these features purport to individuate the content of our representations and,
hence, none of these features purport to explain our having the reasons that we do for engaging
the world in thought and in action.
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type representation 71 is a fact that is simply not available to the nonconceptual subject. It
is, therefore, not something in light of which the subject could find reasonable some set
of engagements with the figure rather than another.
Perhaps the clearest evidence for this grim situation is that the specification of a purely
externally individuated content is extensional; it allows for the substitution of coextensive terms salva veritate. 72 I submit that in saying that a given perception involves a
tilted-square-type representation rather than a regular-diamond-type representation
(where this is explained by appeal to different represented properties) we are, in effect,
doing more than merely indicating which properties of the figure are being represented.
We are smuggling a particular description of these properties that we, as possessors of the
concepts tilted-square and regular-diamond, would be disposed to employ had we been in
the perceptual situation that our nonconceptual subject is in. In doing so we are giving the
false impression that there is nothing particularly surprising, nothing more to explain,
about how perception can supply the subject reasons to engage the world in tilted-squareappropriate ways, when undergoing a tilted-square-type representation. What better
explanation of the subject’s forming a belief that there’s a tilted-square before him than
the fact that he is undergoing a tilted-square-type representation?
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According to Millar’s “an experience in the modality of M is (F [as perceived … ])-type if and
only if it satisfies the following condition: in suitable environmental conditions an F would
produce an experience of that type in an observer who is suitably positioned and oriented, whose
sense of M is normal, and who via M is perceiving an F …”(1991, p. 29). In the following I will
often utilize Millar’s helpful typology, though, as in the current case, I will omit his qualification,
appearing in the square parenthesis, which is meant as a stand-in for a specification of the specific
conditions under which the subject perceives F.
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Recall that a similar difficulty was raised in Chapter 2 in relation to Gerald Vision’s (2009)
account of objectual perception.

82

This tendency has masked the main difficulty with extensional specifications of mental
content, and, in particular, their conflict with the Perspectival constraint. Since the
specification of content is extensional, we can replace talk of tilted-squares, regulardiamonds, and those relational properties that purportedly constitute the representational
content of perception with any other systematic notation we like. Once we do so,
sustaining the illusion that nothing more is needed becomes less compelling.
Consider an even simpler example than the Mach figure. Sam is a taxonomist who, for
whatever reason, introduces a new system of notation for all perceptible properties for
which we have concepts. His notation is systematic in that each perceptible property is
uniquely numbered. After several months of diligent work he finally has a table listing all
perceptible property-types with their corresponding number. A miniscule portion of his
table can be seen below (Figure 4).

Number
…
1284
1285
1286
…
5439
…
9893

Property
…
Bulky
Bumpy
Burgundy
…
Red
…
Square

Figure 4
Sam presents a burgundy colored ball to Samantha. He correctly remarks that, given that
Samantha is a normal subject looking at the ball in normal viewing conditions, she is
undergoing a normal perception of the ball – she perceives the ball as 1286. She is
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undergoing a 1286-type representation. Furthermore, given that it is a ball that she
perceives, and assuming all is working normally, she is not having a 9893-type
representation. All this may be perfectly true. If Samantha is given the task of sorting all
the objects on a table before her either into the ‘Red’ pile or into the ‘Square’ pile, she
will have no problem placing the burgundy ball into the correct pile. Sam will predict this
correctly.
However, in what sense does the specification Sam provides of the perception Samantha
undergoes articulate what reasons she has? Given that we possess the concepts burgundy
and red it is transparent to us that having a burgundy-experience provides a reason for
red-appropriate engagements. But, this transparency is lost once we specify the
experience in Sam’s terms (though it might nonetheless be transparent to Sam). Cucially,
such a specification is completely opaque to Samantha who’s reasons for acting as she
does we are supposedly in the business of articulating by appeal to how she perceives the
world.
This is not merely a terminological point. The fact that, according to the account
presented, the content of perception is individuated purely by reference to which
properties are represented leads to an essentially extensional specification of such
content. But this means that there is no principled reason for us, as theorists, to select one
specification of content over any co-extensive other. A specification of the content of
Samantha’s perception utilizing concepts such as burgundy, and ball, appears to us more
immediate and natural, and justifiably so, as it makes transparent what reasons she seems
to have when undergoing the perception. But, on a purely externally individuated account
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of content there is no principled reason to prefer such a specification over Sam’s coextensive one. Convenience, perhaps. 73
This brings to the fore a particularly uncomfortable consequence. If there is no principled
reason to prefer one specification of content over any of an indefinitely many other coextensive specifications, we completely loose touch with the notion that there is a
canonical specification of perceptual content in the first place. Rather, there are an
indefinitely many equally adequate specifications of content. After all, any appropriately
systematic notation, as in the example of Sam above, provides some such specification.
But it appears that such an account, then, violates the Perspectival constraint – the
canonical specification of perceptual content is not sensitive to how the subject
apprehends the world as being (at least as originally understood, by parity with
considerations governing the specification of belief content – a caveat that will be of great
significance in the next chapter).
Tye (2000) is particularly explicit about this aspect of his account. When specifying the
content of one’s perception of a red ball, we appeal to ‘the redness of a ball’, but, he
claims, we could equally well have substituted that description with ‘the ball’s
disposition to reflect light in a certain way’. Of course, it seems odd to say that this latter
description of the content of perception captures the way the world appears to one. The
ball does not look as though it is disposed to reflect light in a certain way. However, the
sense in which the ball does not ‘look as though …’ is merely the epistemic/conceptual
sense of ‘look’. This is to say that one would not come to believe, on the basis of having a
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In this regard, see my fn. 58 on the neo-Russellian account of belief content.
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perception with such content, that the ball has the disposition to reflect light in a certain
way. 74
However, it is exactly for the sake of articulating what having a perception with a
particular content provides the subject reasons to do or to believe that we have insisted on
the Perspectival constraint. The fact that perceiving the red ball provides the perceiver a
reason to believe that the ball is red but not that the ball has the disposition to reflect light
in a certain way is, therefore, relevant to the specification of perceptual content – at least
insofar as we aim to satisfy the Perspectival constraint.

3.4 General insights on nonconceptual apprehension
The point generalizes. So long as the individuation of perceptual content is based on
considerations independent of the subject’s epistemic capacities, 75 we have no hope of
providing a specification of content that articulates how the subject apprehends the world
in having the perception. We might say, with Tye, that a perceptual representation has the
content that it does in virtue of the fact that it is a token of a representation type that covaries with instances of a given property. 76 Alternatively, as, for example, Dretske
argues, we might say that the content of perception is determined by the evolutionary
74

In this he is utilizing Dretske’s (1969) distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic seeing,
or, more recently, Dretske’s (1995) phenomenal and doxastic notions of ‘look’. As Tye says:
“This admittedly sounds strange … But, as Fred Dretske has pointed out to me, the case is
parallel to that of seeing John Smith, a policeman, without seeing him to be a policeman. In
seeing John Smith, one sees a policeman; one simply fails to recognize that he is a policeman …
Likewise, I suggest, in the above case of phenomenal appearances.”(2000, pp. 55-56)
75

Or as Sedivy (1996) says, ‘considerations having nothing to do with the mind’.

76

E.g., Tye (1995; 2000). See also Fodor (1990).
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history of the perceptual system. As such, a perceptual representation has the content that
it does in virtue of its being ‘designed’ by evolutionary pressures in the organism’s
phylogenetic history to indicate the presence of particular properties. 77 However, this
makes the specification of perceptual content uncomfortably extensional. As such, we
have no principled reason to prefer one canonical specification of content over another –
hence, it is a notion of content the specification of which is not appropriately constrained
by how the subject apprehends the world as being.
More seriously, such facts about what content a given representation has are not facts
available to the subject. Insofar as the nonconceptual subject is concerned, there is no
difference between a perception of one property and a perception of another. Though the
subject may be, as a matter of fact, in different representational states, it is a difference
that from the subject’s point of view makes no difference. Hence, it is also a difference
that cannot account for differences in which reasons the subject has.
Now, certainly, the fact that one is undergoing a burgundy/1286-type representation
places a normative constraint on what it is appropriate for one to do, a constraint that
differs significantly from that which a square/9893-type representation places.
Samantha’s engaging with the burgundy ball in burgundy-appropriate ways (e.g., placing
it in the ‘red’ pile or, when prodded, reporting that she is seeing a red ball) can be seen as
reasonable from the standpoint of rationality. After all, burgundy/1286-type
representations just are those representations that purport to represent burgundy colored
things in our environment (whether this is because they reliably co-vary with the property
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E.g., Dretske (1986; 1995).
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of being burgundy, or because they have the phylogenetic function of indicating the
presence of burgundy, for example). However, it is not clear what about such a story
allows us to think of the subject herself as open to what normative constraints her having
a perception with such content places on her.
Yet, it is crucial for perception to play its purported reason-giving role that which
normative constraints are placed on one’s deliberations and actions is a matter that one is
epistemically open to. After all, it is the subject that must find reasonable some set of
actions or beliefs rather than another. It will not do to show that some such set of actions
or beliefs is reasonable. Our actions are appropriate or not in light of our perceptions and,
crucially, whether or not they are appropriate is something that we are open to and on the
basis of which we act and deliberate as we do. It is only in this way that our perceiving
the Mach figure as a tilted-square, say, can both provide a reason for us to engage it in
tilted-square appropriate ways, and that it provides a reason we have, which potentially
guides us in engaging it in these ways.
The source of this conundrum seems to be the fact that, according to the externalist
position presented by Tye, the norms governing the individuation of perceptual contents
need not be available to the subject. Perceptual content is individuated completely
externally, and requires no reference to any of the subject’s epistemic capacities. 78
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This appears to be Sedivy’s (1996) main complaint against Peacocke when she points out that
“[l]ike all content, nonconceptual content is individuated by its correctness conditions. Unlike
conceptual content, nonconceptual content is determined simply by its correctness conditions,
those conditions do not need to be understood by the thinker as well” (p. 419). Though having a
state with such contents can show how a given judgment is justified (that there are good reasons
to judge them), this is not enough for perception to provide reasons for judgments: “the believer
him or herself must have those reasons in an epistemic sense: she must be aware of them as good
reasons and must be able to make use of them as such.”(p. 427)
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Clearly, the subject does not have access to the theoretical apparatus that underlies the
individuation of the contents of her perceptions. Indeed, to demand that she must have
such access if she is to undergo the appropriate perception would be absurd. Very few of
us would have any perceptions, given that very few of us have any idea of what our
perceptions co-vary with, or what they have been evolutionarily ‘designed’ to indicate,
for example. 79 However, without having a certain understanding of the norms governing
the individuation of the contents of her perceptions, it is unclear how these contents can
be anything for her. The difference, then, between a tilted-square-type representation and
a diamond-type representation (or even between a burgundy-type representation and a
square-type representation, for that matter), is no difference at all for the subject. Since
the subject does not have access to the norms governing content individuation, she has no
access to that in virtue of which one experience differs from another, and, hence, no
access to whether they differ at all.
Similar misgivings have been directed towards Peacocke’s nonconceptual account of
perceptual content by Sedivy (1996). She says:
“Nonconceptual contents clearly do not figure in experience at the first person
perspective since at that perspective they are without use, the thinker by definition has no
capacities with respect to them. … From a theoretical perspective, we can posit that there
are nonconceptual contents that perform an explanatory role. We can also posit that such
contents are individuated completely independently of the person’s understanding. But
then does it not seem that we need to posit such contents at the nonexperiential or
subpersonal level?”(p. 428)
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It would be very mysterious if the subject had some form of access to her phylogenetic history,
could determine the systemic functions of her own states, and only in virtue of so doing, could
determine what reasons she has for action and deliberation.
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And, Dennett (1994) seems to have a similar complaint in mind regarding Dretske’s nonepistemic account of perception, when he says:
“There is no important difference--no difference that makes a difference--between things
non-epistemically seen (e.g., the thimble in front of Betsy's eyes before she twigs) and
things not seen at all (e.g., the child smirking behind Betsy's back).”(p. 511)

3.5 Conclusions and a point about terminology
I have said that a specification of nonconceptual content is essentially from a third-person
perspective. Having eliminated the Conceptual constraint, the nonconceptualist holds
that whichever concepts we, as theorists, utilize in providing a canonical specification of
content need not be possessed by the perceiver. This might tempt us to think that any of
an indefinitely many co-extensive specifications will do equally well. However, if
nonconceptualists wish to hold the Perspectival constraint, and the principle of PersonalLevel Reason Explanation gives us good reason to think they should, then these various
possible specifications of content must be constrained – perhaps not by which conceptual
capacities the subject possesses, but nonetheless by how the subject apprehends the world
as being. A purely externalist account of content cannot satisfy this constraint.
The main difficulty the nonconceptualist faces is that denying the Conceptual constraint
leaves mysterious how a specification of perceptual content is sensitive to how the
subject apprehends the world. Either the nonconceptualist must abandon the Perspectival
constraint, or supply an alternative notion of apprehension that satisfies the motivations
underlying the Perspectival constraint – to provide reasons that can potentially be those
90

for which an agent acts and deliberates. I have suggested that externalist accounts of
perceptual content, (wrongfully) favored by nonconceptualists, are inadequate for this
task – they leave us with a notion of perception that is nothing for the subject.
Finally, a central upshot of this chapter is that nonconceptualism about content is
logically independent from the more substantive claim that content is to be individuated
purely externally. The former is merely a denial of the Conceptual constraint, leaving
open whether and if so how the Perspectival constraint might be satisfied. The latter, is a
sub-class of nonconceptualist positions that I argued fails to satisfy this constraint. The
virtue of identifying this independence is that it suggests that objections to
nonconceptualism along the lines presented in this chapter, and as are expressed in the
quotations from both Sedivy and Dennett, above, are limited in scope. To the extent that
these arguments are effective it is only against an important sub-class of nonconceptualist
positions, though the challenge, from which they arise, of satisfying the Perspectival
constraint, is a general one. Therefore, an important terminological point is in order. In
the following I reserve talk of nonconceptualism to refer to the general claim that the
content of some mental state is such that one can undergo it without possessing the
concepts mentioned in the canonical specification of its contents. A different term should
be assigned to that sub-class of nonconceptualist positions targeted in this chapter. Given
that these positions hold that the individuation of perceptual content is independent of the
subject’s epistemic capacities, it is appropriate to call such positions non-epistemic
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accounts of perceptual content, and those who advocate them non-epistemicists about
perception. 80
As its title suggests, in the next chapter, The Perspectival Constraint under Fire:
Objections on Behalf of the Non-Epistemicist, I attend to several possible responses to
the worries presented in this chapter on behalf of the non-epistemicist. Ultimately, I will
argue that there might be some minimal sense of the Perspectival constraint that a
specification of perceptual content as advanced by Tye satisfies. However, I will also
argue that this minimal sense in which a specification of perceptual content is sensitive to
how the subject apprehends the world as being is not one that allows us to make sense of
the possibility that perception is a reason-giving state – a denizen of the realm of reasons.
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As should be clear at this point, the allusion to Dretske’s (1969) non-epistemic notion of
perception is no coincidence.
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Chapter 4: The Perspectival constraint under fire – Objections on behalf of
the non-epistemicist

4.1 The non-epistemicist objects: Revisiting the Perspectival constraint
The discussion in the previous chapter assumed that nonconceptualists accept the
Perspectival constraint (= the canonical specification of a mental state’s content
articulates how one apprehends the world in undergoing that state) as a general constraint
on the specification of mental content. The rationale behind the constraint was derived
from considerations applicable to the specification of belief content, accepted by both
conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content. However,
nonconceptualists hold that perception is in important respects not belief-like. The nonepistemicist might, then, object that the highly critical conclusions of the previous chapter
are the result of our unjustifiably overextending the analogy with belief. Though a
specification of perceptual content is governed by the Perspectival constraint, we should
not appropriate wholesale an understanding of this constraint from considerations
stemming from the specification of belief content. Considering the ‘important respects’ in
which perception and belief differ might urge us towards an alternative understanding of
the Perspectival constraint that is satisfied by perception. Such an alternative, tailored to
the case of perception and respecting its ‘important differences’ from belief, might then
reveal it unproblematic that co-extensive specifications of perceptual content are on equal
theoretical footing, and show why a purely externalist individuation of content is, in fact,
appropriately sensitive to how a perceiver apprehends the world.
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4.2 Developing a minimal perspective
One suggestion as to how the non-epistemicist might think about the Perspectival
constraint, tailored for the case of perception, starts from the observation that, if we are to
do justice to how perceivers experience their environment, it will not do merely to
mention what in their surroundings they are thereby aware of. One need not look as far as
ambiguous figures, as we did in the previous chapter, though they illustrate the point
nicely. Rather, it is a general and rather common observation that (with very few
exceptions) one and the same object can be the object of many different perceptiontypes 81 (e.g., a table seen from different positions/orientations, or by organisms endowed
with sufficiently dissimilar sensory systems), and contrariwise, different objects (e.g.,
twins) can be the objects of the same perception-type.
Furthermore, as Searle (1990; 1992) puts it, perception, like other mental states,
necessarily has aspectual shape; it involves representing objects under certain aspects. 82
According to Dretske (1995), this follows from the fact that our perception of objects is
parasitic on our perception of a variety of their perceptible properties. He says:
“Experiences are of objects, yes, but one cannot experience an object without
experiencing it under some aspect. This follows immediately from the fact that the
experienced object is simply that object, if there is one, whose determinable properties
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Where perception here is typified by phenomenological indiscriminability.
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“Aspectual shape is most obvious in the case of conscious perceptions: think of seeing a car,
for example. When you see a car, it is not simply a matter of an object being registered by your
perceptual apparatus; rather, you actually have a conscious experience of the object from a certain
point of view and with certain features. You see the car as having a certain shape, as having a
certain color, etc. And what is true of conscious perceptions is true of intentional states
generally.”(Searle 1992, p. 157). The notion of aspectual shape was originally introduced in
Searle (1990).
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the sensory system represents. One cannot, therefore, see, smell, or taste an object
without experiencing it as having determinate properties.”(p. 31, emphasis added)

Mentioning the aspects under which an object is represented is, then, ineliminable from a
full specification of perceptual content. 83
A specification of perceptual content that captures those aspects under which perceivers
represent objects in their environment is a specification of perceptual content satisfying
the Perspectival constraint, properly understood. It is a sensitivity to how the perceiver
apprehends an object as being. Furthermore, such sensitivity provides a straightforward
sense in which a specification of perceptual content is not fully extensional. The
perception of objects is necessarily a perception of them as being certain ways rather than
others – as having certain properties rather than others.
Consider the following illustration. If two perceivers simultaneously view the same
Rubik’s Cube, their perceptions of the cube will differ depending on their perspectives
(Figure 5). If they also differ with respect to the nature of their sensory apparatus, their
83

In fact, Dretske’s position is stronger than this. The way things look to a subject, in the
phenomenological sense (in contrast with what they look to be, i.e., the doxastic sense of ‘look’),
is exhausted by those properties of the object the presence of which it is the systemic function of
the organism’s sensory system to indicate (Dretske, 1995). So, an exhaustive specification of the
content of perception requires reference only to those properties the organism represents in virtue
of which an object is perceived. A valuable summary of Dretske’s position on the matter is
provided in the following quote from his (1999): “The phenomenology of perceptual experience
is determined by the totality of qualities one is p-aware of [i.e., property-aware of]. Object and
fact awareness contribute nothing. Phenomenally speaking, one can be aware of different objects
(e.g., twins) while having exactly the same (type of) experience. Likewise, different people (or
the same person at different times) can be having the same experience while being aware of quite
different facts: one person is aware that the flower he sees is a geranium, the other is aware of the
same flower – it looks the same to him – but he is not aware that it is a geranium. Same object
and property awareness, different fact awareness. Object awareness has to do, not with the
qualities of one’s experience, but the causal relations of the experience to objects in the world.
Fact awareness has to do, not with the qualities of one’s experience, but the kind of knowledge
these experiences give rise to.”(p. 108) Tye follows Dretske on these issues (see in particular, Tye
1995; 2000).
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respective perceptions will differ even more dramatically (suppose one is a human being
whereas the other is a common mole, say). 84 These factors enter into determining which
properties of the cube the cube is represented to them as having. Since these factors may
differ, so may their perceptions.

Figure 5: Rubik’s Cube
Though in specifying the content of perception we need not be limited to mentioning only
concepts possessed by the perceiver (as per nonconceptualism), the Perspectival
constraint does urge a sensitivity to certain perceiver-specific factors, namely, the
abovementioned perspectival factors. A sensitivity to how the perceiver apprehends the
world when having a perception amounts to a sensitivity to which properties in the
environment the perceiver is perceptually sensitive to, given his/her/its perspective and
sensory apparatus, rather than to what we perceive, given our perspective, or to what a
differently equipped organism would perceive, given the particular circumstances in
which the perception is had. Which properties an organism is capable of perceiving is a
brute function of the organism’s sensory system. Which properties the organism actually
perceives is a subclass of the former and depends on the particular circumstances under
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Of course, relevant differences of this kind are not limited to cross-species comparisons.
Significant differences exist also between the sensory systems of individuals belonging to the
same species (e.g., color blind individuals).
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which the perception is had. In specifying the content of perception by appeal to those
properties perceivers perceptually represent we are simultaneously doing justice to their
perspective and to the sensory systems that are employed in perceiving their surrounding
environment.
It is worth spelling out in some more detail what this perspectivalness amounts to and
how it might enter into the explanation of a perceiver’s actions and deliberations.
Peacocke’s (1992) account of content in terms of nonconceptual positioned scenario
content is particularly well suited to provide a systematic account of this kind of
perspectivalness. It will serve us well, then, to focus for a moment on his account.
Peacocke’s notion of nonconceptual positioned scenario content is content that is
“…individuated by specifying which ways of filling out the space around the perceiver
are consistent with the representational content’s being correct” (1992, p. 61). In order to
specify this content, we first select an origin and axes corresponding to the location of the
perceiver’s body and to the modality by which the perceiver represents the environment
(in our case, vision). For each point-type, a location specified relative to the previously
determined origins and axes, we then specify whether it is occupied by a surface and, if
so, proceed to specify the surface’s various characterizing perceptible (via the appropriate
modality) properties. In the case of vision, for example, if there is a surface at a given
point-type, we specify its texture, hue, saturation, brightness, solidity, orientation, and
various other properties (ibid., p. 63). Doing so for all point-types amounts to a
specification of a set of ways the space around the perceiver could be filled. If the space
around the perceiver is, in fact, a member of the specified set, we have a case of veridical
perception.
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For simplicity and brevity of exposition let us examine the veridical perception of the
Rubik’s Cube’s labeled tiles (R and G). Assume three orthogonal axes originating at the
center of the perceiver’s head, one horizontal (x), another vertical (y), and one crossing
front to back (z). A specification of perceiver A’s perceptual representation of the cube
would involve mentioning (among many other things) the presence of red on a surface
perpendicular to the ground and to the point of origin at a point three feet away at the
center of gaze and 15 degrees below the horizon. A specification of perceiver B’s
perceptual representation would be similar in many respects, given his similar distance
and 90 degrees horizontal shift in orientation relative to the cube. 85 However, it would
also differ in many respects. In particular, it would involve mentioning the presence of
green on a surface perpendicular to the ground and to the point of origin at a point three
feet away in the center of gaze and 15 degrees below the horizon. The representational
content in each case will be correct iff there is, in fact, at the specified point-type (three
feet away at the center of gaze and 15 degrees below the horizon), a surface characterized
by the perceptible properties respectively mentioned. Furthermore, it is nonconceptual
content since the perceivers need not possess any of the concepts utilized in specifying
the contents of their perceptions. 86

85

This, of course, also assumes that both perceivers possess a normally operating sensory system
in relation to which redness and greenness are perceptible properties.
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As Peacocke says: “There is no requirement at this point that the conceptual apparatus used in
specifying a way of filling out the space be an apparatus of concepts used by the perceiver
himself. Any apparatus we want to use, however sophisticated, may be employed in fixing the
spatial type, however primitive the conceptual resources of the perceiver with whom we are
concerned. This applies both to the apparatus used in characterizing the distances and directions,
and to that employed in characterizing surfaces, features and the rest.”(1992, p. 63)
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The machinery of positioned scenario content is capable of providing the correctness
conditions of both perceivers’ perceptions in a way that respects the differences that hold
between them. It is appropriately sensitive to the perspective of each perceiver.
Furthermore, it appears fully adequate for the sake of providing an explanation of the
reasonableness of the respective actions and deliberations of each of the perceivers.
Given that perceiver A’s perception of the cube is correct just in case at the specified
relative location there is a surface characterized by the specified perceptible properties,
we have available norms by which to establish the in/appropriateness of the range of
judgments and actions that A might perform. 87 Most importantly, this will be
in/appropriateness from A’s perspective, not from B’s perspective, or from our own
perspective as external theorists engaged in specifying the content of A’s perception
(utilizing whichever conceptual apparatus we deem appropriate). Given that A is
undergoing a perception of the type specified above, a judgment of the form ‘the center
of the cube is red’, for example, would be appropriate from A’s perspective, but not from
B’s perspective. 88
The non-epistemicist can, thus, argue that an appeal to represented properties fully
accommodates all the perspectival factors relevant to determining how the world appears
to perceivers and in light of which they act and deliberate as they do. It allows us to
87

Taking into account a background of A’s various other concurrent mental states.
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As Peacocke (1992, p. 80) remarks, not only does the perception-type A has (but not the
perception-type B has) provide A a reason for said judgment, it seems it would also be a good
reason, since under normal conditions, as in the example above, the perception A has would be
correct – the center of the cube actually would be red. Note, though, that whether it provides a
good reason or not is not our concern here. The concern is how to make sense of its providing the
subject any reasons at all – what needs to be the case for perception to have reason-giving status.
The concern of this dissertation is a precondition on perception’s providing good reasons.
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articulate all the relevant differences between A’s perception of the cube and B’s
perception of the cube in a way that sheds light on the different contributions that their
respective perceptions make to the reasons they have for engaging with the cube.
Perceiver A perceives the cube’s central tile (tile R from A’s perspective) as red whereas
perceiver B perceives the cube’s central tile (tile G from B’s perspective) as green.
So, what is the problem with this sort of view? What is missing from the nonepistemicist’s account of how the Perspectival constraint is satisfied in the case of
perception?

4.2.1 Where the belief/perception analogy breaks: Degrees of intensionality
The non-epistemicist makes room for what appears to be a minimal intensionality –
whereby content is specified in terms of the aspects under which objects are represented
(or the environment more generally). In point of fact, though, such minimal intensionality
amounts to no intensionality at all. An intensional context is one in which substitution of
co-extensive terms could change the truth value of an expression. But, according to the
non-epistemicist, the only substitution in the supposedly intensional context (the property
term position) that could change the truth value of the content attribution is of terms
referring to different properties. The minimal intensionality purportedly involved in the
specification of perceptual content, therefore, reduces to an extensional specification of
content. This is what I have argued in the previous chapter is missing. For the
Perspectival constraint to be satisfied we need a canonical specification of these
properties – an articulation of how the perceiver apprehends these properties that would
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make a principled distinction among different co-extensive specifications. An adequate
specification of perceptual content must, then, be fully, and irreducibly, intensional.
It is at this point, though, that the non-epistemicist objects. Why, after all, is a
specification of how an object is apprehended not sufficient, so long as we are concerned
with the specification of perceptual content? Perhaps when specifying belief content
something more is needed, but perception is not belief. Demanding anything stronger
than this minimal, pseudo-, intensionality, when specifying perceptual content, is
precisely where the analogy with belief content does us a disservice.
In particular, the non-epistemicist might claim that in the case of belief our demand for a
finer-grained perspectivalness – involving a sensitivity to how the subject apprehends
represented properties, rather than simply a sensitivity to which properties are
represented – is fueled by the recognition that in having a belief it is possible for one to
apprehend the selfsame object and the selfsame property in a variety of different ways. In
the case of belief, the Perspectival constraint aims to articulate the particular way, in
contrast with possible others, that one apprehends an object or property.
The non-epistemicist would object that it is precisely this feature of belief that comprises
the ‘important respect’ in which it differs from perception. Though we always apprehend
objects under particular aspects (i.e., as having particular properties), there are no
different ways of perceptually apprehending a given property. Perceptual content is more
coarse-grained than belief content. 89 Having indicated (by whichever means) the
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Note the possible confusion that is involved when speaking of the grain of perceptual content.
In previous chapters I have argued that we have reason to consider the content of perception to be
finer-grained than the content of belief. This was one reason to preserve Bifurcation*. The sense
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perceptible properties in virtue of the representation of which one perceives one’s
environment, it makes no sense to insist further on a canonical specification of these
properties. 90
This is precisely the kind of response we find. Tye (2006), for example, argues that
“…it is a mistake to model our awareness of qualities on our awareness of particulars.
When we see particulars, they look various ways to us but the qualities of which we are
conscious in seeing these particulars do not look any way. Our awareness of the relevant
qualities is direct. It involves no mode of presentation” (p. 525, fn. 20).

According to Tye, the fine-grained representational capacity of beliefs makes a
specification of their content hyperintensional (see esp. Tye, 2000, p. 54). Unlike belief,
perception involves coarse-grained Russellian contents, by which he means that
perception “… (unlike representations having conceptual contents) cannot represent the
same particulars, properties, and relations arranged in the same possible object-involving
states of affairs or the same properties and relations involved in the same possible
existential states of affairs and yet differ in content” (Tye 2006, pp. 508-509). The
in which it is finer-grained is that its capacity to represent the world far outstrips the perceiver’s
capacity to conceptualize the world. Perception allows one to make finer distinctions among
perceptible properties – for example, perceptually to discriminate among shades of colors one has
no concept of. On the other hand, the claim that perceptual content is coarser-grained relative to
belief content expresses the proposition that perception, unlike belief, cannot involve different
ways of representing one and the same property. In discussing the grain of perceptual content, I
will specify which sense of the notion is being used.
90

Dretske holds a similar view. As mentioned above, he argues that perception of necessity
represents objects under some aspect rather than another. Given a properly developed sensory
system, the question of how the world is represented to the organism as being (how it
phenomenally looks to the organism, as he says in his 1995) boils down to identifying those
properties of the environment (the presence of which it is the phylogenetic function of the sensory
system to indicate) the organism is in causal contact with, and in virtue of which the environment
is perceived. Since Dretske promotes a causal/informational notion of perceptual content, it is not
surprising that we find that a specification of perceptual content is extensional. See also Fodor
(2008, esp. pp. 179-180), who likewise considers perceptual representations in informational
terms, and argues that their specification is, as a result, extensional.
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intensionality of perception, as we have seen, then, is pseudo-intensionality. 91 It is
exhausted by the fact that perception of necessity represents objects under some aspects
rather than others. In order to satisfy the Perspectival constraint in the case of perception,
the perspective that one must be sensitive to is merely the minimal perspective discussed
above.

4.3 Reclaiming the belief/perception analogy
As stated, the non-epistemicist’s objection, stemming from the purported disanalogy
between perception and belief, misses the point that the analogy with the specification of
belief content is meant to illustrate. It misunderstands the notion of a way of
apprehending the world that is of interest, both in the belief case, and by parity, in the
perceptual case. The notion of a way of apprehending the world, as it appears in the
previous few paragraphs, is a contrastive notion.
The non-epistemicist’s objection appears to be that it is only in virtue of the possibility of
different ways of apprehending the selfsame entity that it is meaningful to appeal to a
way of apprehending it in the first place. 92 It is the possibility of apprehending a certain
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Given the discussion in this section it is perhaps superfluous to introduce Tye’s notion of
hyperintensionality. The contrast is with the intensionality he claims is involved in perception.
However, we have seen that this amounts to not more than pseudo-intentionality.
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Incidentally, according to Dunlop (1984), Wittgenstein held a similar account of ‘seeing as’ in
his Philosophical Investigations. Though Wittgenstein thought that all seeing was an instance of
seeing as …, where the ‘…’ stands in for the concept the object seen in brought under, he also
held that the locution ‘see as’ was essentially contrastive. It is applicable only in those
circumstances in which there could be different ways of seeing one and the same thing. If, as Tye
insists, perception cannot represent the selfsame property in different ways, it seems that
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shape property as triangular or as trilateral (in thought) in virtue of which it is sensible
to say that one apprehends it as triangular, say. If in the case of perception there is no
possible contrast in how properties are represented, then there is no sense in saying that
one apprehends a given property P as an X rather than as a Y (where ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are coextensive); though it is perfectly sensible to do so when speaking of perceived objects.
Thus, the demand that a specification of perceptual content be sensitive to how the
subject apprehends a given property looses its hold. Given that there are no different
ways of perceptually apprehending the selfsame property, there is also no relevant
distinction that one particular specification of content rather than any co-extensive other
would serve to indicate.
However, the appeal to how one apprehends a property through perception does not
depend on there being different ways of apprehending that property – just as the appeal to
a sense, or mode of presentation, in the belief case, does not depend on there being
different modes of presentation of the selfsame entity. While it is useful to look at Frege
cases to illustrate the need for a sensitivity to how the subject apprehends the world when
specifying the contents of a belief, this need does not arise from the possibility (or
actuality) of Frege cases.
In the case of belief, we have seen that reflection on Frege cases urges us away from
purely truth-conditional accounts of content. Such accounts fail to satisfy the Perspectival
constraint because of their failure to satisfy what in the previous chapter was called the
principle of Personal-level reason explanation – the claim that content attribution
Wittgenstein would agree with him that there is no sense to demand a canonical specification of
these properties.
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articulates that in light of which one finds appropriate certain intentional engagements
with the world rather than others. Adherence to this latter principle is driven by an
emphasis on the reason-giving role of the mental. It is what gives sense to the notion of
apprehension that is of interest. One’s apprehension of the world is such as potentially to
contribute to the reasons for which one acts and deliberates as one does.
The appeal to a mode of presentation as constitutive of belief content aims to satisfy this
principle. A mode of presentation is the way one apprehends an entity, in the relevant
sense. It partially constitutes one’s epistemic orientation in relation to the world, and
serves as that in light of which one finds appropriate certain engagements with the world,
rather than others. It is these that a full specification of belief content must articulate if it
is to shed light on the reasons for which a person acts and deliberates as she does.
Though I might think about a particular shape property as triangular, or as trilateral, a
specification of the content of my thought that is sensitive to this distinction is not
required in order to disambiguate the two thoughts (though, of course, it does
disambiguate them). Rather, it is required to articulate how the particular way I am aware
of the figure contributes to my finding certain engagements with the world rather than
others appropriate. When attributing to me the belief that before me lays a triangular
figure, we are specifying an aspect of my particular epistemic orientation in relation to
the figure. It is an orientation on the basis of which, ceteris paribus, I would find
appropriate, by my own lights, a judgment to the effect that there is something triangular
before me, while at the same time possibly withhold judgment as to whether there is
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something trilateral before me. 93 Regardless of whether or not there are other possible
ways of thinking about the figure, it is a specification of content utilizing the concept
triangular, rather than any co-extensive other, that fully articulates the particular
contribution that my thinking about the figure has, from my own point of view, to my
intentional actions towards, and deliberations about, the figure.
These same considerations apply equally well to perceptual content and its specification.
So long as we are committed to the explanatory role that an appeal to content is to play,
as expressed by the principle of Personal-level reason explanation, we are also
committed to a notion of apprehension that potentially contributes to the perceiver’s
finding appropriate certain engagements with the world rather than others. Given that our
aim, throughout the dissertation, is to show how perception, though nonconceptual, might
nonetheless be a reason-giving state, it is clear we cannot abandon this commitment. The
demand expressed by the Perspectival constraint – to provide a specification of how one
apprehends a given property in perception – is the demand that such a specification sheds
light on the character of this contribution to the reasons for which a perceiver acts and
deliberates as she does. This demand is independent of whether or not there are multiple
ways of representing a given property that such a specification would also serve to
disambiguate.
In other words, if perception is to be counted as a reason-giving state, whatever
‘important respects’ distinguish perception from belief cannot be such as to negate the
applicability of the principle of Personal-level reason explanation to perception. Hence,
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This is an application of Frege’s Criterion of Identity for Senses.
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they cannot negate the requirement that a canonical specification of perceptual content
articulates the contribution that perceiving the property makes to the reasons the
perceiver thereby has. Though we have reason to suspect that the nonconceptual nature of
perception makes a difference to the character of this contribution, it is the claim that
perception makes some such contribution that underlies the need for an irreducibly
intensional specification of perceptual content.
As a result, even if we grant Tye’s claim that perception is coarser grained than belief, in
that it cannot represent the selfsame property in various different ways, it simply does not
follow that a specification of perceptual contents should not be sensitive to how a
property is, in fact, apprehended by the subject. Contrariwise, to say that we need not be
sensitive to how a subject perceptually apprehends a given property is to say that we need
not be sensitive to how the subject’s representing this property might contribute to the
subject’s reasons. I suggest that such an account is appealing only if we think that a
subject’s perception of a property does not contribute in such a way to his engagements at
all – if we deny the principle of Personal-level reason explanation in relation to
perception – if we think of perception as being epistemically inert from the perceiver’s
perspective. However, this abandons the view of perception as a reason-giving state (and,
ipso facto, abandons the principle of Perceptual apprehension from Chapter 1, i.e., the
claim that perception directly provides us reasons for our intentional engagements with
and deliberations about the world).
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4.3.1 Extending the non-epistemicist’s objection
Perhaps the previous section was somewhat too hasty in its conclusions. There is
something odd about the claim that, regardless of whether or not one can apprehend one
and the same entity in a variety of different ways, a specification of this apprehension is
to be so fine-grained as to make a principled distinction among different co-extensive
specifications. Say that S’s apprehending P as a Y makes a contribution Z1 to the reasons
S has. Furthermore, say that there is no other way W (≠ Y) for S to apprehend P such that
it makes a contribution Z2 (≠ Z1) to the reasons S has. In what sense, then, would
mentioning Y in a canonical specification of S’s apprehending P be more illuminating of
the contribution Z1, than specifying P in any other way?
In the case of belief, there are different ways that apprehending the selfsame property
might contribute to the reasons the believer thereby has. As a result, a purely extensional
specification of belief content fails to articulate fully how the subject’s having the
particular belief contributes to the reasons the subject has. The specification of belief
content must then be, as Tye says, hyperintensional (or as I say in my fn. 91, simply,
intensional).
In contrast, in the case of perception, the non-epistemicist’s claim that there are no
different ways of representing the selfsame property can be understood as the claim that
there are no different contributions that apprehending said property might make to the
reasons a perceiver thereby has. Contrary to what was argued in the previous section, the
non-epistemicist need not deny that S’s representing P (where P is a perceptible property)
contributes to the reasons S has. Nor need she deny that a specification of perceptual
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content aims to articulate the nature of this contribution. (She need not deny the principle
of Personal-level reason explanation, or the Perspectival constraint, in the case of
perceptual content.) On the contrary, the non-epistemicist simply holds that all coextensive specifications are equally illuminating of this contribution. As such, there is no
explanatory advantage in preferring some particular specification of perceptual content
over any co-extensive one. A fine-grained specification of such apprehension as I have
required is therefore explanatorily superfluous.
To make these claims somewhat more concrete, consider the following example. When
thinking about the shape of a triangle, the contributions that our thinking about it might
make to the reasons we have are various. Consider two possible contributions Z1 and Z2
(Z1 ≠ Z2). It is possible that Z1 involves a contribution to the reasons one has for judging
that there is something triangular ahead, but not a contribution to the reasons one has for
judging that there is something trilateral ahead. Z2 involves the contrary contribution.
The differences between Z1 and Z2 are, then, best captured by the intensional differences
between the concepts triangular and trilateral. This is why when one’s thinking about the
shape makes a contribution Z1 to the reasons one has, the canonical specification of the
content of the thought appeals to the former concept rather than the latter. It is the
exploitation of the concept triangular in one’s thinking about the shape of the figure that
explains why one’s thinking about the shape makes the contribution Z1 to one’s reasons.
But, whatever contribution Z3 that perceiving the shape of a triangle makes to the reasons
one has, Z3 involves an equal contribution to the reasons one has for judging that there is
something triangular ahead as it does to the reasons one has for judging that there is
something trilateral ahead. The intensional differences between the concepts triangular
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and trilateral are, then, insignificant when it comes to articulating Z3. Crucially, this is
not to say that perceptually apprehending a given property makes no contribution (Z3) to
what reasons one has for engaging with and deliberating about the object characterized
by the property. It is merely to say that whatever this contribution amounts to, it is not as
fine-grained as to involve different contributions to the reasons one has for intensionally
distinct engagements with the figure perceived (most clearly, judgments that differ in
intension only). The non-epistemicist position can then be seen as consistent with the
Perspectival constraint as initially formulated, while nonetheless entailing that all coextensive specifications of perceptual content are on the same theoretical footing.
Specifying perceptual content by appeal to the concept triangle and specifying it by
appeal to the concept trilateral are equally illuminating specifications of the contribution
that perceiving the triangle makes to the perceiver’s reasons. 94

4.3.2 Responding to the non-epistemicist’s reinforced objection
Perhaps it is implausible to demand a theoretical distinction between a specification of
perceptual content utilizing the concept triangular and one utilizing the concept trilateral.
Such a distinction implies that the one articulates the contribution that having the
94

If we are considering the specification of perceptual content on the lines of Peacocke’s
positioned scenario contents, neither concept will appear in its specification. As we have seen,
specifying the positioned scenario contents of perception is merely specifying the properties that
characterize different point-types around the perceiver. However, the same considerations just
discussed hold equally well with respect to the concepts utilized in specifying these properties.
Specifying the color property characterizing the point-type identified in our example as three feet
away at the center of gaze and 15 degrees below the horizon by appeal to the concept red is
equally illuminating as any other specification utilizing a co-extensive concept, e.g., the complex
concept having a disposition to reflect light in wayR, where wayR is just that way that red things
are disposed to reflect light.
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perception makes to the reasons the perceiver has better than the other. However, the
difficulty with the non-epistemicist position is not that it implies that some co-extensive
specifications of perceptual content might be equally adequate, but that all co-extensive
specifications of content are.
This stronger position, however, seems wrong. The previous chapter ended with the
example of Sam the taxonomist who constructs a novel systematic taxonomy for all
perceptible properties (Section 3.3.2). The aim of the example was to show that a purely
externally individuated account of perceptual content has the counterintuitive
consequence that there is no principled preference between Sam’s specification of
Samantha’s perception of a burgundy ball and a specification employing our ordinary
color concepts. In the previous section, I have suggested on behalf of the nonepistemicists that this might not detract from their view. There is nothing ‘lost in
translation’ when we move from specifying the contents of Samantha’s perception
utilizing our common sense color concepts to utilizing Sam’s taxonomy. They are equally
illuminating of the contribution that Samantha’s representing P makes to what reasons
she has (though pragmatic considerations might urge us to choose some specifications
rather than others).
The following simple example shows why this is not the case. It provides grounds for the
intuition that our common sense color concepts more adequately articulate the
contribution that Samantha’s perceiving the color of the ball makes to the reasons she has
for engaging it. It also serves to foreshadow some of the considerations that in Chapter 6
will guide the proper, epistemic, development of a nonconceptual account of content.
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Say that Andrei perceives three balls that are indistinguishable in all respects with the
exception of their color. One is red, the second orange, and the third green. Assuming all
else is normal, i.e., that Andrei is a normally functioning human being and that the
lighting conditions are adequate, it seems that by virtue of perceiving the balls he is in a
position to judge the first two as more similar to each other than each is to the third. If
asked to line them according to their similarity, he would have reason to place the
second, orange, ball in the middle position.
Let us label each of the color properties, redness, orangeness, and greenness, as P1, P2,
and P3, and the objects that they characterize, object1, object2, and object3, respectively.
Furthermore, let us label the contribution that Andrei’s perceiving each of these
properties makes to the reasons he has for engaging with and deliberating about the
object that each property characterizes Z1, Z2, and Z3, respectively. The Perspectival
constraint states that the canonical specification of the content of Andrei’s perception of
the balls aims to specify P1, P2, and P3, in a way that articulates their respective
contributions.
There is an interesting overlap between Z1, Z2, and Z3. This overlap can be exemplified
by indefinitely many examples. For example, perceiving any of P1, P2, or P3, makes the
same contribution to the reasons Andrei has to judge that a colored object is before him.
Put in the context of a game of billiard and assuming he is playing stripes, knows the
rules of the game, and wishes not to be penalized, his perceiving any of these properties
makes the same contribution to the reasons he has to avoid hitting the object it
characterizes with the cue ball. Examples of their overlap are legion.
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However, there are also important differences between Z1, Z2, and Z3. Most trivially, they
differ with respect to the reasons Andrei has for judging that there is a red ball before
him. Perhaps of greatest interest, though, is the contribution that perceiving each of these
properties makes to Andrei’s reasons for judgments of similarity and difference – say, to
a judgment that one object is more similar to another than it is to the third. Perceiving P1,
for example, contributes to the reasons Andrei has for judging that object1 is more similar
to object2, than to object3. The same holds in relation to a host of Andrei’s potential
actions. Consider a normal traffic light. Andrei’s perceiving P1 contributes to the reasons
he has to hit the brakes. Andrei’s perceiving P3 contributes to the reasons he has to
continue driving. What of his perceiving P2? It seems that the contribution that his
perceiving P2 would make to the reasons he has for hitting the brakes or continuing
driving will be more similar to Z1 than to Z2. (Given that the function of the ‘caution
light’ is to ready the driver to hit the breaks, perhaps it is no surprise that the current
universally accepted choice for this light is P2). 95 These are contrived examples and there
are an indefinitely many others that are just as easily manufactured.
To make a potentially very long story much shorter, let us leave examples aside and turn
to the central point they illustrate. Our aim is to specify P1, P2, and P3, in a way that best
articulates their respective contributions Z1, Z2, and Z3. One implausible way of
articulating Z1, for example, is by listing all the possible ways that representing P1
95

This is, of course, only a hypothesis, as very little experimentation has actually taken place in
choosing the intermediary caution light. Perhaps the point I am making is so intuitive that no one
has actually considered using a blue caution light. An interesting experiment that might lend
some support to this hypothesis would involve presenting subjects with a randomized sequence of
color displays and requesting that they indicate the presence of a red display by pressing a button.
The aim would be to compare reaction times to red displays when different colors immediately
precede it. The hypothesis would gain support if subjects have faster reaction times when
presented with the sequence orange-red than when presented with blue-red, for example.
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contributes to the potential reasons Andrei has for engaging with whichever object it
characterizes. This would clearly be an interminably long list. 96
A more plausible way of articulating Z1 is by noting the similarity and difference
relations that it bears to Z2, Z3, and, indeed, to the contributions made by the perception
of other color properties. Conveniently, our common sense color concepts track these
similarities and differences among the contributions that perceiving P1, P2, and P3, make.
The concept red is applicable to those things that when perceived make a contribution to
the perceiver’s reasons that is more similar to the contribution made by the perception of
things to which the concept orange applies, than to the contribution made by the
perception of those things to which the concept green applies. In other words, a
specification of P1 that best articulates Z1 utilizes our common sense color concept red.
It will not do, for example, to specify P1, P2, and P3, utilizing concepts from microphysics, call them microstructure R (whatever organization of matter the surface of the
ball has in virtue of which it is disposed to cause in normal observers a red-type
experience), microstructure O, and microstructure G, respectively. Though these concepts
adequately refer to the same represented properties, they do not articulate the relevant
similarities and differences that hold among Z1, Z2, and Z3, and hence, they do not
articulate the light by which Andrei finds his actions and judgments appropriate. These
concepts track different contributions that P1, P2, and P3 make to the reasons one has.
96

It is akin to attempting to specify a property by appeal to all the possible ways that it might
contribute to the behavior of the object that is characterizes. For example, the property of
weighing 5 pounds contributes to the object’s making an indent of such and such a shape in a
block of wax of such and such a consistency. It also contributes to the object’s making a slightly
different indent in a pile of sand. The list goes on indefinitely, since the contribution that a
property makes to the behavior of an object it characterizes depends on which other properties the
object has as well as its environment.

114

After all, it is fully plausible that at the micro-level P1 is more similar to P3 than to P2. As
a physicist, to specify my apprehending P1 in terms of the concept microstructure R is to
articulate how my apprehending P1 contributes to my reasons for finding object1 more
similar to object3 than to object2 (which is clearly not how Andrei apprehends the
objects). 97
Different ways of specifying these properties, utilizing different concepts to refer to them,
serve not only to pick them out (a task for which Sam’s alternative taxonomy is equally
satisfactory), but also to illuminate which dimensions of similarity and difference that
hold among these properties are relevant for our thus picking them out.
The problem that the non-epistemicist faces is that not all co-extensive specifications of
content articulate the relevant dimensions of similarity and difference that hold among
perceptible properties – those dimensions of similarity and difference that are relevant to
the guidance of the perceiver’s perceptually-based engagements with the world. The
properties themselves, P1, P2, and P3, bear indefinitely many different relations of
similarity and difference, only some of which are relevant. Of particular importance are
those similarities and differences that hold among their respective contributions to a
perceiver’s epistemic relation to the objects they characterize. It is a specification of
Andrei’s perception of object1’s color utilizing the concept red that articulates how
Andrei apprehends the color of the ball. Such specification makes transparent the
relevant similarities and differences that hold between P1, P2, and P3 – those similarities
and differences that hold between their respective contribution to the reasons Andrei has,
97

This holds to an even greater extent if we utilize Sam’s taxonomy of perceptible properties
from the previous chapter.
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and on the basis of which he deliberates and acts as he does (e.g., by utilizing the concept
red, we are specifying P1 in a way that articulates the contribution that his perceiving P1
makes to his judging object1 more similar to object2 than to object3).
Andrei need not possess the concepts red, orange, and green, to have a full and normal
experience of the balls and their respective colors. Nor does he need to possess these
concepts in order for his perception of the balls and their respective colors to contribute
to the reasons he has for deliberation and action. Nonetheless we have reason to utilize
these concepts rather than co-extensive others when specifying the content of his
perception. 98

4.4 Conclusions for non-epistemicism about perception
There are an indefinitely many co-extensive specifications of perceptual content
(indefinitely many sets of terms can be used to pick out the properties perceived). If we
respect the principle of Personal-level reason explanation then each such specification
articulates the contribution that having the perception makes to the reasons the perceiver
has. Some such specifications will be tailored to track certain similarities and differences
among perceptible properties, for example, specifications in terms of microphysical
structures. Other such specifications, for example, Sam’s arbitrary notation from the
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Of course, it is open to us to construct an artificial system of concepts that would have the same
expressive power that our common sense color concepts have, and would, hence, serve to specify
the content of Andrei’s perception equally well. However, in such a case, these concepts would
not only be co-extensive with our color concepts, but also co-intensive.
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previous chapter, will gloss over any similarities and differences that might hold among
perceptible properties.
To say that all co-extensive specifications are equally illuminating of the contribution
that perceiving a perceptible property makes to the reasons the perceiver thereby has is,
then, to say that for any given specification of content the particular similarities and
differences that it is tailored to track are epistemically insignificant insofar as the subject
is concerned. After all, a specification of the color properties utilizing our common sense
color concepts purports to be equally illuminating of the contribution that perceiving
them makes to reasons the perceiver has for engaging the objects they characterize as is a
specification that glosses over any of the properties’ similarity and difference relations.
Yet, such a claim seems absurd.
The example of Andrei, above, is not a particularly contrived one, it is commonplace. If
the non-epistemicist were correct, having a perception of the three objects would provide
Andrei equal reason to sort them in any way whatsoever, or, equivalently, no reason to
sort them in any particular way. The contribution made to the reasons he has would be
indifferent among different sortings. But then the contribution that having this perception
would make to the reasons he thereby has for engaging the objects he perceives would be
unable to account for Andrei’s sorting the objects as he does. Not only is this clearly not
the case (as is manifest in his actual behavior), but perceiving the three objects does
contribute to Andrei’s reasons to engage the objects in a specific way, one that reflects a
particular dimension of similarity and difference that holds among their perceptible
properties, rather than others. Perhaps some co-extensive specifications will be equally
adequate for articulating the nature of this contribution, but clearly not all (as the
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availability of even one co-extensive specification that is completely insensitive to any
similarities and differences among perceptible properties makes clear).
So long as we are committed to Personal-level reason explanation, a specification of
content is to articulate the contribution that having a given perception makes to the
reasons a perceiver thereby has. Sorting is the paradigmatic explanandum in the case of
perception. If perception contributes anything to the reasons a perceiver has for engaging
the world it must, at the very least, be a contribution to the reasons the perceiver has for
sorting the objects perceived in some particular way rather than another.
Since the non-epistemicist position entails that the contribution that perception makes to
the reasons a perceiver has is indifferent among different sortings, it is mysterious what
sense can be made of the thought that perception makes any contribution at all to the
reasons the perceiver has. It appears that the only way non-epistemicists can hold the
position that all co-extensive specifications of perceptual content (including Sam’s) are
equally illuminating of the contribution that having a perception with such content makes
to the reasons a perceiver has, is if they deny that having a perception with such content
makes any such contribution at all. That is, if they deny the principle of Personal-level
reason explanation and hold that perception is epistemically inert from the point of view
of the perceiver. 99 (Considering the inconsistent triad with which the dissertation began,
the non-epistemicist can then be seen as denying Perceptual apprehension – the claim
that perception provides us reasons directly.)
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As should be clear at this point in the dissertation, such an account of perceptual content, a
specification of which is indifferent among co-extensives, still contributes to our understanding
of the reasonableness (or not) of the perceiver’s engagements. I return to this point below.
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We are now in a position to say what is missing from the non-epistemicist’s account of
how the Perspectival constraint is satisfied in the case of perception. We have seen that a
minimal perspectivalness – a sensitivity to which properties a perceiver represents objects
as having, as a function of the perceiver’s perspective and sensory apparatus – gives us an
accurate specification of the correctness conditions of the perception. This, we have said,
provides norms by which to establish the in/appropriateness of a range of actions that the
perceiver might perform. Given perceiver A’s perception of the Rubik’s Cube, a
judgment of the form ‘the center of the cube is red’ is appropriate (as well as a host of
other judgments and activities). The perception had by perceiver B does not contribute to
the appropriateness of this same judgment. The difference between the contributions that
each perceiver’s perception makes to the in/appropriateness of that perceiver’s judgment
can be made transparent by certain specifications of the correctness conditions of their
respective perceptions. The former represents the surface of the center tile as red whereas
the latter represents the surface of the center tile as green.
However, if such a specification is in fact only pseudo-intensional, as is the case for the
non-epistemicist, then co-extensive specifications of these correctness conditions are
equally illuminating of the contributions made by their respective perceptions to the
reasons each perceiver has. The only way that all co-extensive specifications of these
correctness conditions can be equally illuminating is if the perceptions they serve to
specify make no such contribution. The picture then is one according to which A’s
perception of the cube makes no contribution to the reasons he has for a judgment of the
form ‘the center of the cube is red’ (though, of course, it will contribute to the reasons
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there are for the judgment, and perhaps also to the reasons why he made the
judgment). 100
Now, there is something nonetheless correct about the claim that a judgment of the form
‘the center of the cube is red’ is appropriate from A’s perspective, rather than from B’s
perspective. Given that A has a properly functioning sensory system, and given A’s
geometrical perspective in relation to the cube, A, but not B, is undergoing a state whose
correctness conditions are satisfied by the presence of a red surface at the center of the
cube. However, the discussion above indicates that such a claim involves an overly literal
and unsatisfying understanding of the notion of perspective. The perspective we are
interested in is the perspective of A’s reasons. We are looking for appropriateness not
from the standpoint of rationality, but appropriateness from the standpoint of A’s
rationality, i.e., from the standpoint of the reasons A has. A purely correctness conditions
account of perceptual content (just like a purely truth-conditional account of belief
content) can satisfy the former, but not the latter.
I believe that much confusion stems from this possible mistreatment of the notion of
perspective. Heck (2000), for example, considers a correctness conditions account of
perceptual contents, along the lines of Peacocke’s scenario contents, as sufficient for the
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The above should recall the discussion in Chapter 2 of Vision’s (2009) notion of objectual
perception as that contentful fundamental something that is to explain belief fixation. I argued
that objectual perception cannot play that role. We have seen that there are an indefinitely many
co-extensive specifications of objectual perception, only a subset of which might make
transparent the appropriateness relation between the perception and the belief formed (or action
undertaken). The objection to Vision’s position was that his account cannot explain how some
such appropriateness relation could be transparent from the perspective of the subject. At this
point, this should not be surprising as objectual perception just is a form of non-epistemicism
about perception (following Dretske, 1969).
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justification of belief. 101 He argues that the conceptualist’s central complaint against the
nonconceptualist is the latter’s denial of the Conceptual constraint. Discussing
McDowell, he says: “…if perception is to justify belief, then my enjoying a particular
perceptual experience must give me a reason to hold a certain belief; and, or so he
[McDowell] claims, only something with conceptual content can be (or provide me with)
a reason. … But we have yet to uncover any argument for this [latter] premise...”(p. 505)
However, once we recognize that a merely correctness conditions account of perceptual
content can at most reveal a sensitivity to A’s minimal perspective, we find that the real
challenge is not with the claim that only something conceptual can contribute to what
reasons A has. We can presume for the moment that such claim is false. Rather, it is the
deeper and more sincere problem that limiting ourselves to such an account of A’s
perception entails that it makes no contribution to what reasons A has. 102 In other words,
the problem is not that only something conceptual can contribute to what reasons we
have, but that something non-epistemic cannot so contribute.
In this respect, Heck, McDowell, and others engaged in this debate, are potentially
missing the most crucial point. Heck takes issue with McDowell’s insistence on the claim
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He says: “If, for example, the information carried by a given perceptual state is a scenario, a
set of ways in which the space around the observer might be arranged, as on Peacocke's view,
there will be no bar whatsoever to perceptions' standing in semantic relations with beliefs: Some
beliefs about how space is arranged will be inconsistent with its being arranged in one of the
ways the scenario includes; others, required by it; others, made probable by it; others, in the
context, could be reliably inferred from it; and so on.”(Heck, 2000, pp. 504-5)
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An important caveat is expressed by my qualification that such a result follows only if we are
‘limiting ourselves’ to such a specification. There is no reason to deny that correctness conditions
enter into a correct specification of perceptual content. But, if a specification of the content of
perception is to follow the Perspectival constraint the appeal to correctness conditions must be
supplemented. In particular, these correctness conditions must be specified in a way that is
sensitive to how the subject perceptually apprehends the world as being, how he ‘takes’ the world
to be.
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that only conceptual contents contribute to the reasons a perceiver (or thinker) has. He
correctly complains that we have seen no argument to support this exclusivity claim. But
the insistence that something nonconceptual can also contribute to a perceiver’s reasons,
is merely a description of what needs to be explained. A correctness conditions account
of perceptual content fails to provide such explanation. These correctness conditions are
established by a sensitivity to a minimal perspective, and can show that certain
judgments/actions are appropriate or not from that perspective. But this is not yet an
elucidation of appropriateness from the perspective of the perceiver reasons. McDowell,
on the other hand, misconstrues the nonconceptualist position as entailing a correctness
conditions only account of perceptual content, which is not adequately sensitive to the
relevant perspective of the perceiver – the perspective of the perceiver’s reasons. It is
conceptual or bust, according to McDowell. 103
However, as we have repeatedly seen, nothing about nonconceptualism itself entails an
account of perceptual content that stops short of providing a substantive account of a
subject’s perceptual apprehension of the world – one that does make sense of the
potential of perception to provide the perceiver reasons. Once more, we see why the
debate that has waged for the last few decades between conceptualists and
nonconceptualists about the Conceptual constraint is in fact only a proxy to the debate
about the potential satisfiablity of the Perspectival constraint. It is only if we conflate
nonconceptualism with non-epistemicism that issues regarding the Conceptual constraint
take center stage.
103

McDowell (1994a) is explicit about this. To demand a notion of perceptual content that is
short of conceptual content but nonetheless purports to be reason-giving is to fall into the Myth of
the Given. It’s either conceptual content or no content at all.
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In the next chapter I develop a general formulation of what being a reason-giving state
amounts to. As we have seen, the differences cited by nonconceptualists between belief
and perception need not have an impact on whether perception is a reason-giving state
but at most on the character of its contribution to the reasons a perceiver thereby has.
Given that, insofar as the purposes of this dissertation are concerned, the analogy
between belief and perception stands, I will proceed to develop the analogy with belief,
as the paradigmatic reason-giving state, in constructing this general formulation. Having
this formulation in hand will provide a better understanding of the allure of the
conceptualist position. But, more importantly, it will allow the construction of a notion of
nonconceptual perceptual content that is consistent with perception’s being a reasongiving state. Hence, it will allow for a notion of perception that potentially respects both
Bifurcation*, and Perceptual apprehension, as expressed in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 5: Reason-giving, belief, and concept possession

5.1 Introduction: Stepping into the realm of reason
Mount Tungurahua in central Ecuador erupts. Lava sputters out of its mouth slowly
flowing towards the villages at its base, and a mixture of smoke and hot ash rises several
miles into the air eventually to descend on an inhabited area some 40 miles in diameter.
The eruption is a highly significant event for those many thousands of life-loving
residents of the nearby town, Baños, much of which is damaged by thick layers of ash. 104
Though such an event is of momentous significance to inhabitants of the area, it does not
follow that Tungurahua’s eruption provides them reason to alter in any way their normal
daily activities. Trivially, for the people of Baños to interrupt, and appropriately alter,
their daily activities they must be appropriately aware of Tungurahua’s eruption. It will
not do that they entertain the possibility of its eruption, nor that they desire, wish, or
hope, that it erupts. 105 They must be aware of its eruption in a way that potentially makes
transparent to them its detrimental significance to the pursuit of their personal goals.
Paradigmatically, they must believe that mount Tungurahua is erupting.
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Mount Tungurahua erupted most recently in 2006, resulting in the evacuation of nearly half of
Baños’ residents, the complete destruction of several villages, as well as the premature death of
several villagers.
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Of course, this is not to say that their having any of these attitudes towards Tungurahua’s
eruption has no impact on their actions. It is merely to say that the actual eruption of Tungurahua
will have no impact on their actions, if these are the only attitudes they have towards its eruption.
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Furthermore, though having this belief potentially provides them a reason for halting
their previous activities and evacuating the area, it is not sufficient for their attempting to
do so. Whether it is evacuation that people find appropriate in light of Tungurahua’s
eruption depends on much else that they believe and desire. The early natives of the area
might have seen the eruption as a sign of a furious mountain god in need of sacrificial
appeasement. As a result, their belief that Tungurahua is erupting might have provided
them their reason for preparing the next virgin maiden for offering (and likely provided
reason for some measure of panic to every virgin maiden in the area). Furthermore, it is
clear that having this belief might provide the believer reason for many (indeed, an openended amount of) undertakings, some of which might conflict. Likely, many of those
early natives were conflicted as to what their belief that Tungurahua is erupting gives
them most reason to do, to flee or to execute an innocent maiden. Evacuation (preparing a
sacrifice, panicking, etc.) seems the appropriate thing to do only on a background of
certain further beliefs and goals, and it will seem to a particular native the appropriate
thing to do only given that the native has these further desires and beliefs. Putting to the
side such background considerations for the moment, the belief that Tungurahua is
erupting provides a light by which those who have it potentially adjust their actions their
desires, hopes, and beliefs. Beliefs, we can say, are paradigmatic reason-giving states.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to consider what a belief’s reason-giving status
amounts to, and, second, to consider what it is about beliefs in virtue of which they have
this special status. This chapter builds upon much that has been said in previous chapters.
In particular, I will develop the claim that the reason-giving status of a belief is an
expression of the fact that having a belief involves a particular kind of contribution to the
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subject’s epistemic orientation towards the world (or towards the purported object of the
belief more particularly. I will often omit this qualification and speak of one’s epistemic
orientation simpliciter). The notion of an epistemic orientation is relatively intuitive and
seemingly straightforward. However, it is a metaphor that is in need of unpacking. One’s
epistemic orientation can be understood as individuated in terms of one’s epistemic
dispositions, where these involve, at the very least, dispositions to make certain
inferences and to recognize the potential satisfiability of certain of one’s desires. The
contribution that having a given belief makes to one’s epistemic orientation can then be
understood in terms of the contribution that having the belief makes to the set of
epistemic dispositions one has.
Furthermore, I will argue that the reason-giving status of belief is a function of, and can
be explained by, the exploitation of certain of the believer’s epistemic capacities in
having the belief. The particular contribution to one’s epistemic orientation that having a
given belief makes is determined as a function of, and is explained by appeal to, which of
the conceptual capacities one possesses are exploited in one’s having the belief.
Not all accounts of concepts explain the reason-giving role of belief. It is, thus, a central
aim of this chapter to articulate what these conceptual capacities must be like if they are
to provide an appropriate explanation. In particular, I will consider the schism between
neo-Cartesian and Pragmatist accounts of concepts, 106 and argue that the former, but not
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As Fodor (2004a; 2008) characterizes it. Fodor is pointing to a long standing division in
philosophy that is most clearly expressed in Ryle’s (1949) Behaviorist reaction against Cartesian,
or Intellectualist, accounts of the mind, according to which theorizing is prior to acting – knowing
that is prior to knowing how. Ryle argued that we have no hope of accounting for the intelligence
of our actions by appeal to the antecedent intelligence of our theorizing (about how to act).
Theorizing itself is an activity that can be done intelligently or not. But, then, some prior
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the latter, is lacking in much the same ways as neo-Russellian accounts of perceptual
content (as argued in Chapters 3 and 4). Conceptual capacities according to the neoCartesian are not appropriate epistemic capacities.
Considered within the broader context of the dissertation, this chapter reflects a shift in
focus relative to its predecessors – from a largely expository and challenging perspective
to a positive, constructive, one. Recall that a central difficulty for resolving the epistemic
problem of perception, explored in Chapter 1, was the principle of Exclusivity*. The
principle states that only belief-like states can be reason-giving states. The central
rationale supporting this principle was that it is only in the case of belief-like states that
the subject having them is in a position to treat their contents as premises in an argument
of practical or theoretical reasoning. It is only belief-like states the having of which
makes reasons for action and deliberation transparent to the subject. The challenge, when
thinking about perception as significantly unlike belief, is to identify how it too can be a
reason-giving state – in the sense of making reasons available to the perceiver – without
thereby implying that the perceiver is in a position to treat its contents as premises in
reasoning. We have already seen that non-epistemic accounts of perception, appealing to
purely externally individuated contents, fall short of meeting this challenge. Nonetheless,
it was suggested that an epistemic, yet nonconceptual, account of perceptual content may
provide a notion of perception as contributing to the reasons a perceiver has, albeit a
theorizing would need to be in place so as to account for the intelligence of the theorizing itself.
Therefore, he argued, a Cartesian account of our intelligent engagements with the world forces us
either into an infinite regress, or to accept them as brute causal transactions, i.e., no intelligence at
all. Ryle’s concern is also illustrated nicely in Lewis Carroll’s (1895) parable about Achilles and
the Tortoise. A similar worry is presumably at the core of Wittgenstein’s (1953) contemplations
about rule following (see Kripke 1982). Fodor attempts a re-inversion of this picture of the mind;
to regain the Cartesian conception according to which theorizing is prior to action (see, most
explicitly, his 2008).
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contribution that may differ in kind from that which beliefs make. What is required is a
clearer understanding of what being a reason-giving state amounts to and what conditions
must be in place if a given mental state is to have such status.
The analysis undertaken in this chapter, of what a belief’s reason-giving status amounts
to and how it depends on the conceptual capacities of a given subject, is an analysis of
what a subject’s treating the content of the state as a premise in reasoning consists in. It
articulates the nature of the contribution that having a belief makes to the believer’s
reasons. It shed light on what it is in virtue of which having the belief that Tungurahua is
erupting is a mode of apprehending the world that makes transparent to people in the area
the significance of Tungurahua’s eruption to their actions and deliberations. Such an
analysis will also clarify the attractiveness of the conceptualist position about perceptual
content (the idea that perception, in relevant respects, is belief-like). 107 But, more
importantly, it will give us the means by which to develop a concept-independent notion
of reason-giving; a concept-independent notion of apprehension. Such a notion is
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Recall that in Chapters 3 and 4 the initial difficulty uncovered with the notion of
nonconceptual content was that its specification was insensitive to the conceptual capacities
possessed by the subject. However, we took it for granted that a specification of content that is
constrained by the subject’s conceptual repertoire, as is the case with the propositional attitudes,
illuminates how perception can amount to a reason-giving awareness of the world. We have
assumed, with the conceptualist about perceptual content, that exploiting a concept in
representing the world entails that the subject apprehends the world in such a way that the subject
has reasons in light of which to engage the world appropriately. With this assumption in hand,
the conceptualists appeared to have some advantage that served to challenge the
nonconceptualist, by requiring a substantive account of apprehension; a challenge that I have
argued cannot be met by purely externalist accounts of content individuation. However, it is
precisely the aim of this chapter to articulate what concepts must be like if their exploitation in
representing the world is to provide the subject reasons for engaging the world appropriately. In
other words, the aim here is to elucidate how the appeal to the exploitation of concepts in having
a mental state is supposed to provide a substantive account of apprehension; i.e., how conceptual
capacities are capacities for apprehending the world.
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required if there is to be any hope of articulating what perception must involve if it too is
to count as a reason-giving state.
Corresponding to the aforementioned goals of this chapter, the position I will argue for is
a composite of two separable claims, which I will take up in turn:
1. S’s having a belief that p makes a unique contribution, Z, to S’s epistemic
dispositions in relation to the world (it shapes S’s epistemic orientation in a
certain unique way).
2. The contribution, Z, that having a belief that p makes to S’s epistemic dispositions
is a particular function of, and is explained by appeal to, the concepts exploited in
having the belief (and, hence, possessed by S).

5.2 The reason-giving status of belief
The first claim (1) I wish to argue for is relatively straightforward. As we have seen in
previous chapters, the claim that beliefs are reason-giving states, i.e., that they make a
distinct contribution to the reasons a believer has, follows directly from their
paradigmatic role within common sense (folk) psychological explanation of deliberation
and action. Hence, that they are reason-giving states should be accepted by anyone who
takes such explanations seriously. In particular, beliefs are called upon to illuminate the
reasons for which we form (and revise) judgments about the world and for which we
initiate action towards it in a way that is sensitive to our desires and our other beliefs
(and, when all goes well, to the way the world is).
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When we attribute to Sam a belief that p we normally do so on the basis of some piece of
Sam’s overt behavior, verbal or otherwise, the reasonableness of which is best seen in
light of p. When Sam actively seeks out every town-hall meeting on healthcare reform in
the country and screams at the top of his lungs various obscenities at its proponents, it is a
safe bet that Sam believes that reform is somehow a bad thing. But, attributing to Sam
this belief does not merely provide us a rationale for his current behavior by articulating
the lights by which Sam finds such behavior appropriate. It also serves as a reliable
predictor of his future behaviors. We expect that were we to ask what he thought about
healthcare reform, he would give voice to this belief and provide an answer along the
lines of its being a bad thing for government to enact. If we were to point out to him the
various benefits of reform we expect that he would resist our argumentation, perhaps
citing further claims the belief in which provide him reason to hold the belief that reform
is bad (e.g., the claim that it would create a greater tax burden on the middle class, that it
violates an individual’s right to self-governance, or even that it is ‘un-American’). Then
again, perhaps none of these would be the case. An alternative scenario might be more
subtle. When confronted with the benefits of reform, Sam might concur, but nonetheless
be recalcitrant to enacting it, citing as his reason the need for full bipartisan support for a
reform of such significance. 108
The upshot of this short narrative is that, though attribution of particular beliefs is always
open to revision in the light of new evidence, what counts as evidence for such

108

Perhaps Sam would answer that he is in fact a strong proponent of reform but suffers from
turrets syndrome. He has no reason for shouting obscenities (though the reason why he shouts is
his having the illness). The distinctions employed here among different ‘reason’ locutions should
be familiar from the previous chapters.
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modifications are various manifestations of the subject’s epistemic dispositions. These
are most clearly his voiced assertions that we take to be sincere articulations of his
beliefs, but also the actions we assume he takes himself to have reason to perform. 109 The
guiding assumption in attributing a particular belief is that having that belief gives
particular shape to the subject’s epistemic orientation to the world. It contributes to the
epistemic dispositions the subject has. When a piece of behavior violates our expectations
as to the epistemic dispositions we take the subject to have, we are urged to modify our
belief attribution accordingly. Sam, contrary to initial appearances, does not believe that
healthcare reform is somehow a bad thing. Rather he believes that the process of leading
the reform violates certain principles involved in his conception of a just democracy. The
former belief would have provided him reason to resist the benefits of reform, which
according to the final scenario described he does not. The latter belief, on the other hand,
better explains the various actions, verbal and otherwise, that Sam manifests. Having this
latter belief would contribute to his reasons for being vocal at the town-hall meetings,
and would be consistent with the reasons he has by virtue of believing that reform has
many important benefits. 110
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I am here giving expression to the now familiar account of belief attribution most eloquently
and extensively discussed by Davidson. As he notes, such attributions are made under the
assumption that Sam is a rational agent. All attributions of folk psychological attitudes must make
some assumptions of rationality about the person to whom these attitudes are attributed as well as
assumptions about the extent to which the person is knowledgeable of the world. These
assumptions are continuously open to modification. See, e.g., Davidson (2001a; 2001b; 2001c),
as well as Dennett (1971; 1987), and Fodor (1987).
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Of course, we are not compelled to revise our initial belief attribution. The process of belief
attribution, as Davidson argues, is a holistic one, driven by principles of charity and rationality. It
might turn out that such principles favor attributing to Sam some further beliefs or desires while
retaining our initial attribution to him of the belief that reform is somehow a bad thing.
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Frege cases, which were briefly discussed in the previous chapters, provide a special
challenge for belief attribution. They introduce the threat of simultaneously attributing to
a person two contradictory beliefs. Extending such cases to the scenario above, we might
be initially tempted to say that Sam at once believes that reform is a positive thing and
believes that reform is a negative thing. But having both beliefs simultaneously would
make contradicting contributions to the reasons Sam has. He would have equal reason to
tout for reform as he would to act against it. He would have reason to do neither. De
facto, his epistemic dispositions towards reform, and his epistemic orientation to the
world in general, would be no different were he to have neither belief. Thus, whatever
motivation we might have for attributing to him these contradictory beliefs is also
motivation for attributing to him neither belief. 111 The fact that, nonetheless, we can
attribute to Sam what, on the face of it, appear to be contradictory beliefs is an indication
of the fine-grained nature of belief attribution, but more importantly it is an indication of
the fine-grained nature of the contribution that having a belief makes to the reasons one
has.
Considered abstractly, say that p and q are complete declarative sentences sharing all
their constituent terms with one exception: the singular term P in p is replaced in q with
the singular term Q, where P and Q are co-extensive. That it is possible, and is often
required, that we attribute to S the belief that p rather than the belief that q, is indication
of the fact that there exist certain differences between the contributions that each belief
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With the exception that proceeding with the former violates a central precondition on the
possibility of belief attribution – the principle of charity – it treats Sam as irrational (see
Davidson, ibid.).
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would make to S’s epistemic dispositions the manifestation of which our belief
attributions are sensitive to.
Sam’s belief that reform is a positive thing does not contradict his belief that reform is a
negative thing. Both beliefs are of, or about, the same thing or process – namely, about
healthcare reform – but in having each of these beliefs he is thinking about reform in
different ways. In the first he is thinking of reform as a modification to a broken
healthcare system, whereas in the second he is thinking of reform as a legislative/political
act. The belief that reform [as a modification to a broken healthcare system] is a positive
thing makes a different contribution to the reasons Sam has for acting, i.e., to his
epistemic dispositions, than the contribution that the belief that reform [as a
legislative/political act] is a positive thing (had he had this belief) would make to his
epistemic dispositions.
It is a sensitivity to just these differences upon which successful belief attribution rests. It
is a fine-grained sensitivity to how a belief shapes the epistemic orientation of the
believer – how it contributes to the epistemic dispositions that the perceiver has.
Furthermore, claim (1) states that this contribution is unique. That is, the belief that p and
the belief that q make contributions Z1 and Z2 (where Z1 ≠ Z2), respectively, to S’s
epistemic orientation. Indeed, if having the belief that p and having the belief that q made
the same contribution to S’s epistemic dispositions (i.e., if Z1 = Z2), there would be no
principled reason to attribute to S the belief that p rather than the belief that q. This is so
since the roles that the attribution of each belief would play in the prediction and
explanation of S’s deliberations and actions would be identical. As far as folk psychology
is concerned, and as far as we are concerned in discussing the reason-giving status of
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belief, it would be more appropriate to say that the belief that p and the belief that q are in
fact one and the same belief. 112
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between which epistemic dispositions S has
by virtue of having a given belief, and the contribution that having that belief makes to
S’s epistemic dispositions. Nothing in the above entails that having a belief that p makes
a unique contribution of epistemic dispositions to S. Rather, the claim is that having a
belief makes a unique contribution to S’s epistemic dispositions. The early natives of
Ecuador and the current residents of Baños could both have the same belief (type) that
the volcano is erupting, but, as mentioned, the contribution that having that belief makes
to their epistemic dispositions may eventuate in vastly different epistemic dispositions.
Contrariwise, two people could have different beliefs but possess the same epistemic
dispositions. It is a familiar point that S1 and S2 could differ markedly in which beliefs
and desires they have and yet possess all the same (extensionally specified) epistemic
dispositions; they might have the same total epistemic orientation to the world. As a
result, the manifestation of these dispositions would not provide a principled reason to
attribute them one set of beliefs and desires rather than another. As Quine and Davidson
point out, the totality of evidence leaves interpretation, or attribution, indeterminate. 113
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There may be reasons extrinsic to the concerns of folk psychology that might lead one to claim
that two beliefs that are identical in terms of the contributions they make to S’s epistemic
orientation are nonetheless distinct belief types. However, I am skeptical about the utility of such
a proposal.
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See Quine (e.g., 1960; 1969) and Davidson (2001a, esp. his (1973a; 1974) in that collection;
2001b, esp. his (1973b); and 2001c, esp. his (1997)). Quine, of course, was primarily concerned
with language and meaning. He argued that since there are an indefinitely many extensionally
equivalent translations (i.e., translations that account for all the behavioral evidence) there are no
meanings. Davidson was concerned with interpretation, the attribution of beliefs and its
dependence on meaning. Contrary to Quine, Davidson holds that “[i]ndeterminacy of meaning or
translation does not represent a failure to capture significant distinctions; it marks the fact that
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This could be problematic if we thought that the belief that p must provide the subject
having it a unique set of epistemic dispositions. This is not the case. The claim is that
having the belief that p makes a unique contribution to the subject’s epistemic
dispositions. Different subjects (or the same subject at different times) could have
different epistemic dispositions in virtue of having one and the same belief, involving one
and the same contribution Z. It is the contribution to one’s epistemic dispositions, not the
epistemic dispositions themselves, we care about when attributing the belief that p. 114
For illustration purposes, we can think of the relation between the contribution that
having a belief makes to a subject’s epistemic disposition and the subject’s actual
resultant epistemic dispositions as analogous to a certain way of thinking about the
relation between the contribution that having a given property makes to an object’s
dispositions and the object’s actual resultant dispositions. When we say that two objects
have the same (or exactly similar) property, say, a mass of 50kg, we are not suggesting
that the two objects thereby have the same (or exactly similar) dispositions. We are

certain apparent distinctions are not significant. If there is indeterminacy, it is because when all
the evidence is in, alternative ways of stating the facts remain.”(1974, p. 154). Or, as he says in
his (1999) reply to Quine: “…what a speaker means is what is invariant in all correct ways of
interpreting him.”(p. 81)
114

Though we attribute to Sam a given belief on the basis of the manifestation of certain
epistemic dispositions, e.g., the disposition to scream obscenities at a town-hall meeting about
healthcare, the attribution is not atomistic. It is made on the basis of additional assumptions we
have of Sam’s mental life – that he is rational and that he has mostly true (by our lights) beliefs.
We hold that insofar as possible Sam has the same beliefs and desires we do. When we attribute
to Sam a belief on the basis of his action, we attribute to him that belief the contribution of which
would provide us reason to act as he does were we to have it. The attribution of a particular belief
is made concurrently with the attribution of a whole slew of other beliefs and desires that provide
the background in relation to which the unique contribution that the belief attributed would make
to Sam’s epistemic orientation involve dispositions to act as Sam manifestly does. This is the first
step into the process of interpretation. To quote a fitting metaphor from Quine’s (1960)
discussion of the process of Radical Translation, it is a “way of catapulting oneself into the jungle
language by the momentum of the home language” (p. 70).
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suggesting that the presence of the property makes the same contribution to the object’s
dispositions. Having a mass of 50kg disposes both objects to resist an upwards force with
a contrary force of 490.3 Newton (on Earth). But, in the case of a (very thin) 40m2
triangular sheet of titanium, having a mass of 50kg disposes the object to make a very
slight triangular indentation in a wax surface, whereas in the case of a titanium ball,
having a mass of 50kg disposes the object to make a deep concave indentation in that
same wax surface. This follows from the fact that which dispositions an object has
depends also on which other properties characterize it. 115 Nonetheless, in saying that
both objects have the same (or exactly similar) property we are suggesting that the same
contribution is being made to their respective dispositions (whatever else we might be
saying as well).
Summing up, the treatment of the example above follows from taking seriously the role
that beliefs play in folk psychological explanations. We make reference to Sam’s belief
that reform is somehow a negative thing in our explanation of his actions because we take
his having this belief to contribute in particular ways to the inferences he is disposed to
draw and to the desires the satisfiability of which he is disposed to recognize. Thus, that
belief involves a contribution to the subject’s epistemic dispositions follows from a very
wide range of theories about the nature of propositional attitudes. It follows whether one
takes the truth makers of propositional attitude attributions to be appropriately tokened
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Note that the mass of the titanium ball also contributes to its disposition to make a very slight
triangular indentation in the same wax surface, only that this disposition in the case of the ball
but not in the case of the triangular titanium sheet, is blocked or defeated by the former’s shape
property. As a result, the ball will not be disposed to make a triangular indentation so long as its
shape property is unaltered.
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sentences in an internal ‘language of thought,’ as does Fodor. 116 But it also follows from
an instrumentalism about propositional attitudes that takes their truth makers to be
whatever allows for the correct interpretation of the rational behavior of certain systems,
as does Dennett in taking the intentional stance. 117 Whatever beliefs turn out to be, the
reason that an appeal to beliefs in the explanation of our rational deliberation and action
is useful is because beliefs play an essential role in contributing to our epistemic
orientation in relation to the world. Only eliminativists about propositional attitudes
would deny that having a belief does so. 118 If you don’t think that there are any beliefs
then, a fortiori, you don’t think that having them contributes to your epistemic
orientation. I have little to say against the eliminativist position except that folk
psychology seems to work just fine, and I will assume that it does throughout. 119

5.3 Concept-dependence and reason-giving
The claim that different beliefs make different unique contributions to one’s epistemic
dispositions is merely an expression of the role we take them to play in folk
psychological explanation and prediction. However, such a characterization of the
phenomena takes us towards murky waters. Talk of dispositions for deliberation and
action is notoriously unsatisfying. In particular, we need to explain what it is about these
116

See, e.g., Fodor (1975; 1978; 1985; 1987).
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See, e.g., Dennett (1987; 1991), as well as Davidson (2001b, and 2001c, esp. his (1997) in
which he rejects the notion that the indeterminacy involved in belief attribution entails an
antirealism about the propositional attitudes).

118

See, e.g., Churchland (1981; 1984).
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For a thorough, and I believe successful, reply to the eliminativist charge, see Horgan &
Woodward (1985).
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dispositions to make certain transitions in thought or to execute certain actions in virtue
of which they are epistemic dispositions. After all, being so disposed might come about
by some rare and complicated disease or by being repeatedly hit on the head with a
mallet. For these dispositions to be genuinely epistemic dispositions, and for us to make
sense of a subject’s occupying an epistemic orientation towards the world, it is not
sufficient to point to the fact that having a belief disposes one to make de facto
appropriate transitions between thoughts or to perform de facto appropriate actions. A
disposition to make a certain transition in thought is a disposition to draw an inference
(an epistemic disposition) only insofar as one has reason(s) in light of which one finds the
transition appropriate (irrespective of whether or not it is appropriate). And a disposition
to satisfy a given desire by performing a certain behavior is an epistemic disposition only
insofar as one has reason(s) in light of which one recognizes the appropriateness of the
behavior to the satisfaction of that desire. Crucially, then, we need to make sense of one’s
having reasons in light of which one is so disposed.
Thus, looking to the contribution that having a belief makes to the dispositions that one
has does not yet capture the epistemic nature of this contribution – it does not yet
elucidate the reason-giving status of beliefs. It merely provides a description of the
phenomenon in need of explanation. What is further required is a substantive account of
the capacities involved in having beliefs such as would explain their reason-giving
character and account for the particular contribution that having a belief makes to one’s
epistemic dispositions. It is these gaps that claim (2), above, aims to fill.
The claim is that the unique contribution Z that having a given belief makes to S’s
epistemic dispositions is determined as a function of, and is explained by appeal to, the
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concepts exploited (and, a fortiori, possessed by the subject) in having the belief. The
truth of this second claim plausibly depends on what we take concepts to be, what it is to
possess a concept, and how we think concepts are related to the propositional attitudes.
The space of possibilities here is enormous. However, as mentioned in the introduction, a
particularly revealing contrast within this space is, to use Fodor’s (2004a; 2008) terms,
one between neo-Cartesian and Pragmatist accounts of concepts (more will be said about
the contrast between these broad categories as they are discussed below). In evaluating
claim (2), I will focus on exemplars of each. Peacocke’s inferential role semantics (IRS)
will serve as representative of the latter, whereas Fodor’s informational semantics will
serve as representative of the former. 120 As we shall see, these two positions stand in
diametrical opposition within the space of possibilities mentioned – in what they take
concepts to be (Fregean Senses/mental particulars), in what it is to possess a concept
(satisfying certain a-priori possession conditions/having thoughts involving that concept),
120

One reason for focusing on Peacocke’s version of inferential role semantics is that Fodor
(2004a) takes Peacocke to be his main Pragmatist opponent. As a result, the debate between
Fodor and Peacocke best manifests the Cartesian/Pragmatist divide, and it is useful to follow this
debate in framing the current discussion. An additional, and more important, reason for this
choice is that Peacocke’s is perhaps the most thoroughly developed version of concepts and
inferential role semantics. Finally, it will provide us a better understanding of his account of
perceptual content and observational concepts which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that these are merely representatives of two broad
families of theories of concepts. Other proponents of some form of informational semantics are
Dretske (e.g., 1981; 1986; 1995), Millikan (e.g., 1989; 2000), and Margolis (1998), to name but a
few. Among the representatives of some form of inferential/causal/functional role semantics are
Harman (1982) and Block (1986). For representatives of a host of other theories of concepts that
do not neatly fall in either of the aforementioned categories see the various articles in Margolis &
Laurence (1999). The majority of the theories of concepts represented there (such as
definitionism, prototype, exemplar, and theory-theory) hold that there is some constituency
relation between possessing a given concept and possessing other concepts or having available
certain epistemic capacities, and in this sense they are antithetical to Fodor’s atomistic account
and in important respects similar to Peacocke’s. However, with respect to the nature of concepts,
most of the theories represented hold, as Fodor does, that concepts are mental particulars rather
than abstract objects (with exceptions, of course). As I have said, the space of possibilities is
enormous, and though I cannot argue for it here, I believe that the discussion that follows applies,
mutatis mutandis, to these other theories as well.
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and in how concepts are related to propositional attitudes (constituents of Fregean
contents/constituent vehicles of Russellian contents). Many of the heated debates raging
in the current literature on concepts and mental content can be understood in light of the
contrast between these two positions. But, most importantly, the contrast between these
two positions revolves around the central question of this chapter – whether and, if so,
how the exploitation of conceptual capacities in representing the world accounts for the
subject’s having reasons (for deliberation and action).
This is not the place to give detailed accounts of each position, nor to resolve the many
conflicts betweens them about which Peacocke remarks ‘it would be possible to spend a
lifetime’ (2004a, p. 85). Nonetheless, I will attempt to say enough so as to expose the
different ways in which we might account for the determination of the contribution that
having a given belief makes to the believer’s epistemic orientation as a function of the
concepts exploited in that belief. I will argue that both are able to provide some account
of the dependence relation between the concepts exploited and the contribution made to
one’s epistemic orientation. However, I will further argue that certain features of Fodor’s
account, and neo-Cartesianism in general, prevent it from providing an adequate
explanation of the reason-giving status of beliefs, of a belief’s making a contribution to
one’s epistemic orientation, in terms of the exploitation of one’s conceptual capacities.
The central upshot of attending to Fodor’s position is to illuminate the conditions that an
account of concepts must meet if the exploitation of such concepts is to explain a belief’s
reason-giving status; conditions that Fodor’s neo-Cartesian position fails to satisfy and
that the Pragmatist, and in particular, Peacocke’s position, accommodates.
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5.3.1 Concepts as constituents of propositional attitudes
Of course, for claim (2) even to get off the ground it must be the case that having a belief
involves the exploitation of concepts possessed by the believer. This latter claim derives
from the central role of concepts as constituents of propositional attitudes. A subject’s
undergoing a certain propositional attitude, then, presupposes that the subject possesses
all the constituents of which the attitude is composed. If one does not possess the concept
snow, one cannot believe, desire, hope, wish, or entertain the thought, that snow is white.
There are a variety of reasons why we might be drawn to the view that propositional
attitudes have concepts as constituents, and hence that having a propositional attitude
depends on the exploitation of concepts one possesses. Perhaps most widely considered
and relevant to our concerns is the apparent need to explain the productivity and
systematicity of our attitudes (endorsed by both representatives under consideration). 121
The former expresses the fact that, though we are finite creatures, we can nonetheless
think an unlimited number of different thoughts. The latter expresses the apparent
psychological generalization that one who is capable of thinking that Mary has never
been to Washington and that John is a resident of Ohio, for example, is also capable of
thinking that Mary has never been to Ohio (whether or not that thought ever crosses one’s
mind). The most straightforward explanation for both these features is the same kind of
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As Peacocke (2004a) says: “Fodor and I agree that systematicity and productivity are nonnegotiable features of conceptual content. We diverge in our views of the source of these features.
He has long regarded them as empirical matters of psychological law, and still does so, while I
hold them to be a priori features of contents composed from concepts. But whatever their source,
we agree that theories that are incompatible with this systematicity and productivity must be
rejected.”(p. 90)
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explanation provided for the productivity and systematicity of language, namely, that
thoughts have recombinable constituents – i.e., concepts. 122
Different accounts of concepts differ with respect to the sense in which concepts are the
recombinable constituents of propositional attitudes. The two representatives mentioned
in the previous section, Fodor and Peacocke, are a case in point.
Fodor argues that propositional attitudes are mental representations the constituents of
which are concepts. Concepts themselves are representational elements and hence are
psychological particulars that have content; they are the vehicles with which we represent
propositions (understood in Russellian terms), rather than the contents of our
representations. 123 To have a belief one must then possess all the concepts that are its
constituents.
According to Peacocke, concepts, rather than being mental particulars that have content,
are the constituents of the content of propositional attitudes, where these contents –
propositions – are understood as Fregean Thoughts. 124 In order to have a belief with a
certain propositional content one must possess all of the concepts that are its constituents.
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Reflection on these properties of thought has led Evans to propose his Generality Constraint
on thought: “...if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the
conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of
which he has a conception.”(1982, p. 104)
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In arguing against a Fregean account of concepts, as modes of presentation (MOPs), Fodor is
explicit about this point: “…MOPs are supposed to be the vehicles of thought, and entertaining a
MOP means using it to present to thought whatever the MOP is a mode of presentation of; it’s
thinking with the MOP, not thinking about it” (1998a, p. 18). See also Fodor (1975; 1990).
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“Concepts are constituents of those intentional contents which can be the complete, truthevaluable, contents of judgment and belief” (Peacocke, 2001a, p. 243). See also Peacocke (1992).
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If we hold some version of either of these divergent positions, then having the belief that
p rather than the belief that q is a matter of a difference in which concepts possessed by
the subject are exploited in having the belief. There is a straightforward sense, then, in
which the unique contribution Z that S’s having a belief that p makes to S’s epistemic
dispositions depends on the concepts exploited in having the belief that p. Having
different beliefs involves exploiting different concepts, and having different beliefs
makes different unique contributions (as discussed in Section 5.2). So, exploiting
different concepts entails making different unique contributions. However, this does not
yet provide the explanation that we seek. What is required is an explanation of what it is
about the exploitation of a particular concept in having a belief in virtue of which S’s
having that belief makes the unique contribution Z that it does to S’s epistemic
orientation.

5.3.2 The dependency of epistemic contribution on the exploitation of concepts
Let us turn now to consider the claim that the unique contribution Z that having a given
belief makes to S’s epistemic dispositions is determined and explained as a function of
which of the concepts that S possesses are exploited in having the belief.
Here too, as in previous chapters, Frege cases can prove useful guides. As a reminder, in
the previous chapter (Section 4.3), a formulation of Frege’s Criterion of Identity for
Senses was appealed to as illustrating how the fine-grained specification of belief content
articulates the contribution that having a given belief makes to a person’s finding certain
actions and deliberations appropriate from the person’s point of view. I argued that a
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specification of content utilizing the concept triangular articulates a different contribution
that having a belief about the shape of a triangle makes than a specification of content
utilizing the concept trilateral. For example, the former but not the latter indicates a
contribution to one’s finding appropriate a judgment involving the concept triangular,
without thereby contributing to one’s finding appropriate a similar judgment in which the
concept trilateral figures in its stead. The objective of this section, the bulk of the chapter,
is to provide an explanation of how the exploitation of a given concept in having a belief
determines this unique contribution. One of its challenges, then, is to explain how the
differential exploitation of the concepts triangle or trilateral account for the differential
contribution that beliefs involving them respectively make.
Consider a belief that represents some object O through the exploitation of the concept P
(e.g., the belief that the volcano is erupting, in which case a mountain, Tungurahua say, is
represented by having a belief exploiting the concept volcano). How does the
involvement of the concept P in S’s belief about O determine the contribution Z to S’s
epistemic orientation in relation to the world, and in relation to O in particular? How does
a belief about the mountain that represents it as a volcano contribute to the epistemic
dispositions had by a resident of Baños having that belief? The two representative
accounts I consider here provide two very different ways in which the contribution to S’s
epistemic dispositions, in having a belief, is a function of the concepts exploited in the
belief. 125 Fodor’s account considers the contribution that having a given belief makes as a
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Note that if they are to be adequate for the purposes of folk psychology they will have to be
extensionally equivalent, i.e., provide the same mapping from concepts exploited to contributions
made. This is not to say that their respective explanations of this mapping are the same. Nor is it
to say that they are on the same footing with respect to other desiderata that an appeal to concepts
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function of the a-posteriori organization of S’s other propositional attitudes (and will be
discussed extensively in the next Section 5.3.2.1). Peacocke’s account, on the other hand,
considers this contribution to be a function of the a-priori possession conditions for the
concepts employed in the belief (and will be discussed in Section 5.3.2.2). In both cases,
the accounts are highly dependent on what is involved in concept possession as a
precondition on having beliefs involving those concepts. As mentioned, I will further
argue (in Section 5.3.2.1.1) that Fodor’s account makes it difficult to see how the
exploitation of concepts explains a belief’s making the contribution that it does to the
believer’s epistemic orientation (as a result of his minimal conditions on concept
possession and his commitment to a Russellian account of content).

5.3.2.1 Fodor’s neo-Cartesianism and the notion of an epistemic liaison
According to Fodor, the essential feature of neo-Cartesian accounts of concepts (which
serves to contrast them with Pragmatist accounts) is the claim that to possess a given
concept P is simply to have the capacity to think about O’s as Ps. He says:
“What’s important about Cartesianism, for my purposes, is that it understands concept
possession nonepistemically; Cartesians hold that concept possession is an intentional
state but not an epistemic one. In particular, it’s not what you know (-how or -that) that
determines what concepts you have [as the Pragmatist would have it]; it’s what you are
able to think about. To have the concept DOG is to be able to think about dogs as such;
and conversely, to be able to think about dogs as such is to have the concept DOG. That’s

is meant to satisfy. To say that would be to say that Peacocke and Fodor’s accounts of concepts
are merely notational variants.
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all there is to concept possession, according to (my kind of) Cartesian [sic]. Polemics
aside, I do find that view plausible on the face of it.”(Fodor 2004a, p. 31)

Importantly, having the concept dog amounts to the ability to think about dogs as dogs.
As he says in a footnote to the above quotation:
“The ‘as such’ is [sic] marks the intentionality of concept possession. Since extensionally
equivalent concepts can be distinct, your being able to think about Granny’s favorite
animals doesn’t ipso facto manifest your possession of DOG; not even if dogs are your
Granny’s favorite animals. What would show that you have DOG is your thinking about
Granny’s favorite animals as dogs.”(ibid, fn. 3)

This qualification is significant as it purports to make sense of the manifest differences
between beliefs that Frege cases serve to illustrate (though, as I will argue in Section
5.3.2.1.1, it is ultimately unsuccessful). When Oedipus thinks lustful thoughts about
Jocasta his thoughts about her have as a constituent the concept Jocasta. Though the
concept Oedipus’ mother has the same content as Jocasta (on Fodor’s Russellian account
of propositions it is the individual that is their referent), they are nonetheless different
concepts. They are different ways of being related to the same individual – via different
vehicles. 126
Fodor’s account is atomistic, so that possessing a given concept does not depend on
having any other concepts (with the exception of complex concepts, e.g., red balloon).
Similarly having a belief involving a given concept does not imply that one has any
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For a discussion of the Oedipus/Jocasta predicament and what it tells us about concepts, see
Fodor (1990) esp. his Ch. 6 ‘Substitution Arguments and Individuation of Beliefs’. See also
Fodor (1987), esp. his Chapter 3, ‘Meaning Holism’, as well as his (2008).
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interesting epistemic capacities (again, with certain exceptions). 127 My having the
concept dog does not imply that I have the concept animal, nor, a fortiori, does my
having the belief that a dog is before me imply that I possess a capacity to infer that an
animal is before me. 128
However, Fodor is also committed to the claim that which belief one has makes a
contribution to the subject’s epistemic dispositions the manifestation of which it is the
role of belief attribution within folk psychology to explain and predict (though as we
shall see below, he might object to this epistemic characterization). We need to explain
why Oedipus found it reasonable to marry his mother (whether or not it was reasonable
from the reader’s ‘god-eye’ view of the situations) and to predict what he would find
reasonable to do once discovering the full extent of what he did. The way Fodor attempts
to navigate between these commitments is by insisting that we don’t get our epistemic
dispositions for free. We cannot just stipulate that if something is a dog then it is an
animal. 129 Rather, this inference is acquired a-posteriori through our various interactions
with the world. Which inferential transitions I, in having the belief that there is a dog
127

Fodor finds this to be a great benefit of his account of concepts, since it allows for the
sharabilty of concepts (types) across widely different populations and throughout history.
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In stark contrast with the views mentioned in fn. 1201, and for related reasons, as we will see,
also in contrast with Peacocke’s position. As he says: “I’m going to argue for a very strong
version of psychological atomism; one according to which what concepts you have is
conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities you have. If this is so,
then patently concepts couldn’t be epistemic capacities.”(Fodor 1998a, p. 6)
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After all, we might discover that dogs are in fact robots sent to spy on us by an alien race. If
the possession conditions of the concept dog involved possessing the concept animal, then having
discovered this disturbing fact about dogs our concept dog itself would change. This is a slippery
slope leading to a problematic holism that would entail that different people with different beliefs
about dogs do not have the same concept dog (see, especially, Fodor and Lepore1991). As
mentioned in my fn. 127, a central motivation of Fodor’s atomism is that it allows that before we
discover that dogs are robots, not animals, and after that discovery, the concept dog is one and the
same concept.
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before me, am disposed to draw, and the satisfaction of which desires I am disposed to
recognize depends on my particular acquaintance with the world. In large part, it depends
on the circumstances in which the concept dog is tokened in my thoughts.
On Fodor’s position, then, Oedipus and Tiresias can both have a belief with the same
content and involving the same concept-types, e.g., the belief that Jocasta is beautiful,
and yet differ greatly in their epistemic dispositions towards Jocasta (since the former
also has a true belief that Jocasta is Oedipus’ mother, whereas the latter does not). This is
as would be expected; having the belief that Mount Tungurahua is erupting might bring
about different epistemic dispositions in the early native Ecuadorian from those of the
current residents of Baños.
Importantly, Fodor is uncomfortable calling these capacities ‘epistemic’, and for good
reason. Dispositions to draw certain inferences and to recognize the satisfiability of
certain desires, to which having a particular belief contributes, are psychological in nature
rather than epistemological. As we have seen already in Chapter 1, having a reason to
form a particular judgment or to perform a certain action does not depend in the least on
whether or not there is a (good) reason for that judgment or action (thought if all is
working properly, the two will tend to coincide – my having a reason to believe that there
is a dog before me will tend to coincide with there actually being a dog before me). It is
the former (which is central to intentional psychology) that is our concern throughout this
dissertation not the latter (which is central to epistemology). Thus, though Fodor might
object to my usage of the term ‘epistemic’ in characterizing these capacities, this reflects
a terminological rather than a substantive disagreement. The reason for my calling them
epistemic capacities, nonetheless, is that possessing them is a precondition on knowledge
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and knowledgeable action; the condition that a subject deliberates and acts in light of
reasons the subject has (whether or not these are good reasons, i.e., whether or not the
outcome of the subject’s deliberations might count as knowledge).
It is, then, in virtue of one’s particular acquaintance with the world that one comes to take
some proposition to be related in certain ways to another. However, this need not reflect
anything about the obtaining of an actual relation between the propositions. In arguing
against meaning holism, Fodor introduces the notion of an epistemic liaison. Though he
does not elaborate on the notion, it will be useful towards analyzing and evaluating
Fodor’s position. He says:
“When an intentional system takes the semantic value of P to be relevant to the semantic
evaluation of Q, I shall say that P is an epistemic liaison of Q (for that system at that
time). Please note the relativization to agents and times. ‘Epistemic liaison’ is really a
psychological notion, not an epistemological one. That is, what counts isn’t the objective
dependencies between the semantic values of the propositions; it’s what the agent
supposes those dependencies to be.”(Fodor 1987, p. 56)

The objective relation between the propositions Jocasta is widowed and Oedipus’ mother
is widowed is mutual entailment; hence, the truth or falsity of the one guarantees the truth
or falsity of the other. Nonetheless, this is clearly not what Oedipus takes the relation
between them to be. Had the former been an epistemic liaison of the latter for him (at the
time) – that is, had he taken the truth or falsity of the proposition Jocasta is widowed to
be relevant to the evaluation of the truth or falsity of Oedipus’ mother is widowed – he
likely would not have married Jocasta (incidentally, the former is an epistemic liaison of
the latter for Tiresias). Note that the notion of epistemic liaison can be easily extended to
cover also the subject’s taking the semantic value of a proposition to be relevant to the
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possible satisfaction of a given desire (e.g., for Oedipus, at least in the opening scenes of
Sophocles’ play, the proposition Jocasta is widowed was an epistemic liaison of certain
lustful desires). Though Fodor does not do so, it is in this broad way that I will use it in
the following. 130
How, then, does the exploitation of the concept P in S’s belief about some object O, the
belief that p, determine and explain the belief’s unique contribution to S’s epistemic
orientation in relation to O? The notion of an epistemic liaison helps direct our
investigation towards a plausible (yet, ultimately unsatisfying) initial answer. It appears
that S’s having the belief that p contributes to S’s dispositions to recognize the
satisfiability of those desires and to draw inferences to those beliefs in relation to the
contents of which the proposition p serves as an epistemic liaison for S. Perhaps, then, the
contribution, Z, can be specified by appeal to the appropriate set of contents for which p
is an epistemic liaison for S, call this set {pi}.
As stated, however, this initial proposal does not yet sufficiently distinguish between
contributions made by different beliefs, nor does it explain the role that the exploitation
of particular concepts play in bringing this contribution about. Consider the belief that p
that has as its content the same Russellian proposition as the belief that q. The difference
between the two beliefs is not in their content but in the vehicles by which their content is
represented. Say, as before, that having the belief that p exploits all the same concepts as
130

As mentioned, Fodor uses the notion of epistemic liaison to argue that meaning holism must
be false. According to his rendition of meaning holism, it “… is the idea that the identity –
specifically, the intentional content – of a propositional attitude is determined by the totality of its
epistemic liaisons.”(1987, p. 56) In the example of Oedipus and Tiresias, since the epistemic
liaisons of the proposition Jocasta is widowed differs for both characters, meaning holism has the
disturbing implication that the two cannot believe the same thing when they both believe that
Jocasta is available for marriage.
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the belief that q with the exception of the concept P rather than the co-extensive concept
Q. Since in such cases the proposition p and the proposition q are one and the same
proposition, there appears to be only one set of propositions in relation to which p (or q)
serves as an epistemic liaison for S. According to the initial proposal, then, both the belief
that p and the belief that q contribute to S’s epistemic dispositions towards all the same
propositional attitudes the contents of which belong in the abovementioned set.
If this were the case, then it is not clear in what sense the two beliefs differ in their
contribution to S’s epistemic dispositions. Furthermore, it is evident that there are
countless many examples in which this initial proposal is falsified – in which having the
belief that p contributes to S’s epistemic dispositions only with respect to a (proper)
subset of those propositional attitudes. It is just such situations that Frege cases illustrate.
For Oedipus, it is possible that the Russellian proposition Jocasta is widowed is an
epistemic liaison of Jocasta is a potential mate and of it is not the case that Jocasta is a
potential mate. If his belief that Jocasta is widowed were to contribute to his disposition
to draw appropriate inferences to all those beliefs in relation to the contents of which the
proposition Jocasta is widowed is an epistemic liaison for him, Oedipus would be
disposed to draw a contradiction – to believe that Jocasta both is and is not a potential
mate. Oedipus, of course, is not in such a position. Rather, plausibly, Oedipus’ belief that
Jocasta is widowed contributes to his disposition to believe that Jocasta is a potential
mate, whereas it is his belief that Oedipus’ mother is widowed that contributes to his
disposition to believe that it is not the case that Oedipus’ mother is a potential mate.
Given that P and Q are different concepts, even if co-extensive, a possible explanation for
their differently epistemically disposing S is that in establishing a-posteriori semantic
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dependency relations between propositions – throughout the course of S’s investigations
of the world – these different concepts have been differentially exploited. We might say
that it is the exploitation of the concept Jocasta in representing the proposition Jocasta is
widowed in virtue of which it is an epistemic liaison of a certain set of propositions, say
{pi}, to which belongs the proposition Jocasta is a potential mate. But, it is the
exploitation of the concept Oedipus’ mother in representing the same proposition in
virtue of which it is an epistemic liaison of another set of propositions, say {qi}, to which
belongs the proposition it is not the case that Jocasta is a potential mate (in which case
{pi}∩{qi} ≠ Ø). As a result, for Oedipus, the proposition itself is an epistemic liaison of
any proposition x, such that x ∈ {pi}∪{qi}. Nonetheless, having a belief exploiting the
concept Jocasta contributes to Oedipus’ epistemic dispositions to draw inferences to
those beliefs and to recognize the satisfiability of those desires the contents of which are
any proposition x ∈ {pi}. Representing the same Russellian proposition by exploiting the
concept Oedipus’ mother, on the other hand, contributes to Oedipus’ epistemic
dispositions towards those attitudes the contents of which are any proposition x ∈ {qi}.
Even if this response is successful in showing that the exploitation of different concepts
in representing one and the same proposition can account for selective dispositions in
relation to contents for which the proposition is an epistemic liaison, an additional worry
arises. The worry is best exemplified by the fact that the discussion above, nonetheless,
permits situations in which {pi} = {qi}. Presumably, this is not the case for Oedipus with
respect to beliefs that have the same content but exploit the concept Jocasta rather than
the concept Oedipus’ mother, and vice versa, but perhaps it is the case for Tiresias. That
is, for Oedipus {pi} ≠ {qi}, whereas for Tiresias {pi} = {qi}. It appears that in such cases
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both beliefs make the same contribution to S’s epistemic dispositions, a situation which
would threaten the uniqueness claim. However, as we have seen in Section 5.2, though
there are situations in which an attributer would be at a loss when choosing among
competing belief attributions, this is not to say that the two beliefs make the same
contribution. Perhaps it would be difficult to attribute to Tiresias the belief that Jocasta is
beautiful rather than the belief that Oedipus’ mother is beautiful. Nonetheless, we can
still hold that the different beliefs make different unique contributions. What is crucial for
specifying the contribution that each belief makes is the fact that membership in each set,
{pi} and {qi}, is determined on the basis of the exploitation of different concepts; it is this
same fact that allows for these sets to differ. This is so, even if it so happens that the two
contributions end up converging, at some point in the subject’s life history, in the
epistemic dispositions the subject thereby has. So, if {pi} = {qi}, as in the example of
Tiresias, his being disposed to judge that Jocasta is beautiful – to endorse a proposition
that happens to belong to both {pi} and {qi} – is in virtue of its membership in one set
rather than the other, depending on which concept (Jocasta or Oedipus’ mother) was
utilized in the belief that contributed to his being so disposed.
In contrast with the initial proposal on behalf of Fodor, the above considerations show
that we cannot specify the unique contribution Z that having a belief that p makes to S’s
epistemic dispositions merely by looking to those propositions in relation to which p
happens to be an epistemic liaison for S. They cannot distinguish contributions Z1 and Z2
made by different beliefs. This is hardly surprising given that what is an epistemic liaison
for what, for S, is a purely contingent a-posteriori matter on Fodor’s account.
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However, something even more critical emerges from this discussion. A specification of
the contribution that a given belief makes to one’s epistemic dispositions is completely
divorced from the set of propositions in relation to which one is disposed when having
that belief. Rather, it is a function of how membership in that set of propositions is
established. How such membership is established is supposedly a function of which
concepts possessed by the believer are exploited in representing the world. However, we
have no account of what it is about the exploitation of a concept in having a belief about
the world that allows the believer to establish such membership – in fact, it is this that we
set out to explain. In the following subsection I elaborate on this difficulty and argue that
we are unlikely to find its resolution in Fodor’s account. I will argue that Fodor can, at
most, provide an account of the reasons why a subject makes certain appropriate
transitions in thought and engages the world in certain appropriate ways in terms of the
concepts by which the subject represents the world. However, this is unsatisfactory as an
explanation of the subject’s doing so in light of reasons that the subject has.

5.3.2.1.1 The failures of neo-Cartesianism
We have seen that it is in virtue of the exploitation of the concept P rather than Q in
having the belief that p that S takes p (or equivalently q) to be an epistemic liaison of
certain propositions rather than others, i.e., in virtue of which these propositions (rather
than others) are members of the set of propositions in relation to which S is appropriately
disposed. However, the crucial aim of this chapter is to explain what it is in virtue of
which the exploitation of a certain concept rather than another in having a belief makes
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the contribution that it does to one’s epistemic dispositions. This depends on having an
explanation of what it is in virtue of which exploiting a concept makes any contribution
at all to one’s epistemic dispositions.
The account, as presented so far, seems to be begging the exact question this chapter aims
to answer. In saying that it is in virtue of the exploitation of P in the belief that p that S
takes the proposition p to be an epistemic liaison of such and such a set of propositions
we are already assuming what we aim to explain. Our aim is to explain what a subject’s
conceptual apprehension of the world amounts to; to explain what it is about the
exploitation of P in virtue of which one is in a position to ‘take’, or ‘suppose’, anything at
all (see also my fn. 107).
How does exploitation of the concept P in the belief that p account for S’s having a
reason for endorsing or rejecting certain beliefs and for potentially satisfying or
frustrating certain desires? More generally, how does the exploitation of concepts in
having a mental state confer reason-giving status to that mental state – and in particular
one that disposes those having the mental state to make the kind of transitions in thought
and action that they do? It will not do merely to show that the exploitation of different
concepts makes different contributions to one’s epistemic dispositions – that would
merely show that an appeal to concepts as constituents of propositional attitudes
potentially provides the appropriate grain of contributions to a subject’s epistemic
dispositions as the success of folk psychological explanation requires (a claim already
established in Section 5.3.1). It will not explain how they do so.
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As we have seen, Fodor is committed to the claim that possessing a concept C is having
an ability to think about Cs as such. Having such an ability does not imply that one
knows (-that or -how) anything at all; this, he takes to be the central tenet of neoCartesianism. Furthermore, he says, “…what bestows content on mental representations
is something about their causal-cum-nomological relations to the things that fall under
them: for example, what bestows upon a mental representation the content dog is
something about its tokenings being caused by dogs.”(1998a, p. 12) This latter claim
expresses Fodor’s commitment to an informational (Russellian) account of content.
Fodor’s dual commitments are in the service of supplying a computational account of
thinking. His aim is to show how we can understand mental transformations in
computational terms, i.e., in terms of purely syntactic operations on symbols. Concepts,
as constituent representational vehicles, are such symbols. They have content, determined
by their nomic relation to their referents, as well as syntactic form. Since on Fodor’s
position co-extensive concepts are synonymous, they cannot differ with respect to their
content. Rather, they differ in their syntactic properties. The fact that co-extensive
concepts differ in this way, and are thus different symbols, is meant to explain how their
differential exploitation in a belief can make a computational difference – i.e., how they
can participate in different mental transitions. 131 Fodor, thus, provides an account that
allows us to see how a mechanism (a brain, perhaps) might carry out those transitions that
are, at a different level of description, the subject’s engaging in intentional, reason-based,
131

As Fodor says: “If beliefs (and the like) are relations to syntactically structured mental
representations, there are indeed two parameters of belief individuation, just as Frege requires:
Morning Star beliefs have the same conditions of semantic evaluation as Evening Star beliefs, but
they implicate the tokening of different syntactic objects and are therefore different beliefs with
different causal powers.”(1998a, p. 39)
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mental transitions – drawing inferences and recognizing the satisfiability of certain
desires.
However, the question we must ask is this: what is it about the exploitation of one
concept rather than a co-extensive other that makes reasonable from the subject’s
perspective one set of mental transitions rather than another – transitions that Fodor’s
computational account purports to mechanize? The difficulties that Fodor’s account faces
are similar to ones we have already confronted when considering the non-epistemic (and
in particular Tye’s neo-Russellian) account of perceptual content in Chapters 3 and 4. 132
In these previous chapters I introduced the Perspectival Constraint on the specification of
mental content. This was the claim that a canonical specification of mental content
articulates how the subject apprehends the world as being. The notion of apprehension is
that of a reason-giving awareness of the world. The Perspectival Constraint, then, holds
that a canonical specification of content aims to articulate the contribution that having a
state with such content makes to the subject’s epistemic orientation. Now, Fodor clearly
denies the Perspectival Constraint on the specification of mental content in general.
Nonetheless, for the sake of accommodating the generalizations of folk psychology he
must account for the fact that different beliefs with the same Russellian content can make
different contributions to one’s epistemic orientation. The challenge for Fodor, then, is to
account for these possible differences in some way other than by appeal to differences in
content. He does this, as we have seen, by appeal to differences in the vehicles by which
the same content can be represented. When thinking about Jocasta via the concept Jocasta
132

Indeed, it would be very surprising, and disheartening, if we arrived at a different result when
assessing the possibility of accounting for the reason-giving status of beliefs by appeal to
Russellian contents.
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one is exploiting an ability to think about an individual as Jocasta and when thinking
about her via the concept Oedipus’ mother one is exploiting an ability to think about the
same individual as Oedipus’ mother.
However, this intensional specification merely casts the illusion that these different ways
of representing an individual amount to different ways that the subject apprehends the
individual, and that might provide different reasons that the subject has for engaging the
individual. Rather, it serves to mark the one vehicle by which a given content is presented
to thought rather than another. But which vehicle is exploited in bringing an object or
property to thought is not something available to the subject and that might, therefore,
figure in the subject’s reasoning. It cannot make a difference to the reasons the subject
has and in light of which deliberates and acts.
Regardless of how Oedipus thinks about Jocasta, regardless of which concept is
employed in representing her, the point of Russellian accounts of conceptual content is
that the concept makes the same contribution to his different thoughts about her. Since on
a Russellian account of content, co-extensive concepts make the same contribution to the
thoughts into which they figure, there seems to be nothing from the thinker’s point of
view that would differentiate the thinker’s thinking the one thought rather than the other.
But, then, what sense can be made of the suggestion that the subject’s exploiting a certain
concept in thought, rather than another, supplies the subject reasons for a certain set of
engagements with the world rather than another?
Oedipus’ thinking about Jocasta provides Oedipus reasons to engage her in ways he
deems appropriate in light of the way he thinks about her. Thinking about her in a
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different way provides him a different light by which he would deem other engagements
appropriate. This is the phenomenon in need of explanation. But because on the
Russellian account both ways of thinking about her make the same contribution to
Oedipus’ thoughts, there is nothing in light of which Oedipus could deem one set of
engagement with her appropriate over another. 133
One might object that the above argument fails to take into account a central feature of
the example considered so far. There is an important difference between the concept
Jocasta and the concept Oedipus’ mother. The former is a primitive concept whereas the
latter is a syntactically complex concept. Unlike the former, possessing the latter concept
does imply that one possesses other concepts, and having a thought involving it does
imply that one possesses certain inferential capacities (e.g., one’s having the thought that
Oedipus’ mother is widowed implies that one has a capacity to infer that someone’s
mother is widowed). Perhaps it is sensitivity to such syntactic differences that explains
the subject’s having different reasons for engaging the world. 134
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This of course is not to say that corresponding to the two (or more) ways of thinking about an
individual there do not stand two (or more) vehicles of representation. On the contrary, it is
merely to say that differences in vehicles of representation cannot be what explain the different
ways that the subject thinks about an individual and in light of which engages the world
appropriately.
134

This seems to be Fodor’s position. He argues that Frege problems arise only in the case of coextensive primitive concepts. He says: “There is no Frege problem for concepts that are expressed
by complex Mentalese formulas (i.e., Mentalese formulas that have constituent structure). Since
complex concepts can differ in their constituency, they can differ in their possession conditions.
That is so whether or not the concepts are coextensive; or even necessarily coextensive.”(2008, p.
75)
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I cannot see how we might make sense of a kind of personal-level 135 sensitivity to
syntactic differences while avoiding the implausible claim that in having a thought about
the world the subject must somehow be simultaneously aware of the vehicles by which
his awareness of the world is established. 136 However, there is no need to explore this
question here, as there are sufficiently many examples of co-extensive primitive concepts
for which explanation in terms of some personal-level sensitivity to syntactic differences
will not be applicable. The concepts being trilateral and being triangular come to mind.
Both concepts refer to one and the same property. On the Russellian account of content
they contribute to thoughts that involve them one and the same content, the property
itself. Yet, one might find certain engagements with a triangle reasonable in light of
having the one thought but not in light of having the other thought. This cannot be
explained by appeal to the content of the thought or by appeal to its syntactic complexity.
Perhaps it would be argued that these are in fact two disguised complex concepts (triangular and tri-lateral). 137 But, what of the co-extensive primitive concepts Hesperus and
Phosphorus, or cilantro and coriander? 138 If you detest cilantro and yet are unaware that
cilantro and coriander are one and the same (a combination that appears to be the case
135

Presumably, on Fodor’s account there is some sub-personal mechanism the operation of which
is sensitive to such syntactic differences. But the point being made here is exactly that an appeal
to such sub-personal mechanism is inadequate for the explanatory task at hand – to explain the
availability of reasons to the subject.

136

This is not to say that we can never be aware (in some sense) of the vehicles by which we
represent the world. Whether or not we can, it is highly questionable that Oedipus does any such
thing when deciding that marrying Jocasta is a good idea.
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If our having thoughts about triangles were to require also an awareness of the vehicles by
which we represent them, shouldn’t the question of whether or not these concepts are complex or
primitive be an a-priori matter? Could there be genuine puzzlement? But, surely, there is nothing
wrong with the question: is the concept triangular a complex or primitive concept?

138

Similar (as well as other) objections revolving around the difficulty of Fodor’s account to
accommodate the different roles of co-extensive primitive concepts can be found in Rives (2009).
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with many people), what is it about your belief that the salad sitting in front of you has
cilantro in abundance – but not about your belief that it has coriander in abundance – in
light of which you find the salad inedible? We can (and should) follow Fodor in holding
that different vehicles are involved in the two beliefs. Different symbols with different
forms allow the two beliefs to be implicated in different mental transformations. But, on
the Russellian account there is nothing insofar as you are concerned that would make a
difference to the light by which you might find the salad edible or not.
This problem is nicely revealed in Fodor’s recent discussion of Frege cases (to which he
dedicates a full chapter in his 2008):
“Lois rather fancies Superman but Clark leaves her cold. Your referential semantics
can’t, all by itself, make sense of that. You also need to know that Lois has two, coreferential representations of Clark Kent(/Superman), and that each representation is
connected with its own, distinct, set of inferences and attitudes. And, if you want to
predict Lois’s behavior, predilections, inferences, etc. from the mental state that she is in
you have to know which of these representations is activated.”(p. 86)

However, since semantics is all that is available to Lois in light of which she can
deliberate and act – in particular, she has no awareness of ‘which of these [Clark
Kent(/Superman) representations is activated’ – how could Lois be in a position to find
the one set of behaviors, predilections, inferences, etc. reasonable rather than the other
when thinking about Clark Kent(/Superman)? If content is understood as Russellian, she
cannot. But since she obviously does (and, a fortiori, can), a Russellian account of
conceptual content cannot explain how a concept’s exploitation in thought provides her
reasons.
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The problem is even more severe. It is not clear how even semantics are available to Lois
as that in light of which to deliberate and to act. As mentioned in previous chapters, Frege
cases are merely illustrative of the difficulties that purely referential accounts of content
face; their actuality is not essential to those difficulties. The central difficulty is not that
such accounts carve the mental life of the subject in too coarse a grain for capturing the
folk psychological generalizations true of the subject. Suppose there were no genuine
Frege cases involving primitive co-extensive concepts. If this were the case, a purely
referential account of content could cut just as finely as required; we would have just
enough contents to go around (and Fodor’s appeal to a fine-grained account of
representational vehicles to resolve Frege cases, which I argued is unsuccessful, would
also be unnecessary). Nonetheless, the problems facing Russellian accounts of content
would persist. The central problem that purely referential accounts of content face, a
possible side-effect of which is the fineness of grain problem, is that such accounts of
content are not individuated in a way that could account for the reason-giving role of
mental states having such contents. Frege cases illustrate this failure by showing that
different mental states sharing the same Russellian contents might nonetheless make
different contributions to the reasons the subject undergoing these mental states has. The
individuation conditions of the reason-giving features of a mental state come apart from
those of the mental state’s Russellian content. If Frege cases are actual, then Russellian
accounts of content are revealed as too coarse grained. But the essential point is that a
mental state’s Russellian contents are simply not the right kind of entity that could
account for that mental state’s making the contribution it does to the reasons a subject
has.
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In Chapters 3 and 4, in discussing purely externalist accounts of perceptual content, I
suggested that the reason they are not the right kind of entity is because the norms
governing their individuation are in no way available to the subject. Russellian contents
are individuated completely externally, without reference to the subject’s understanding.
As we have seen, ‘…what bestows content on mental representations is something about
their causal-cum-nomological relations to the things that fall under them: for example,
what bestows upon a mental representation the content dog is something about its
tokenings being caused by dogs.’ But the nature of this causal relation, a nature that
determines the content of the representation, is not something to which the subject is
privy. That Lois is undergoing a thought about Superman rather than a thought about
dogs, for example, is understood as her undergoing a thought that is appropriately caused
by Superman, rather than by dogs. But such facts regarding what her thoughts are
appropriately caused by are ones to which Lois is completely blind. A difference merely
in the Russellian contents of a mental state does not then reveal a difference from the
subject’s perspective. And, if it is no difference from the subject’s perspective, a fortiori,
it cannot be a difference in light of which the subject finds certain engagements with the
world reasonable rather than others.
This result resonates with Fodor’s identification of neo-Cartesianism as the claim that
concept possession is to be understood intentionally but non-epistemically. Possessing a
concept does not imply anything about what the subject knows (-that or -how). Having a
concept is merely being able to have thoughts about the referent of the concept (via a
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particular vehicle). However, the considerations above suggest an even weaker notion of
concept possession – as non–intentional. 139
Concepts are the purported reason-giving features of thought. The account under
consideration individuates them finely enough to accommodate the generalizations of
folk psychology (i.e., there are enough of them to go around). But, they are individuated
according to norms that the subject is completely blind to (blind to the syntactic form of
the vehicle of representation, and blind to its etiology). The neo-Cartesian can account for
differences between any two thoughts, even necessarily co-extensive thoughts, by appeal
to their constituent concepts. But, such an appeal does not yet account for the subject’s
being apprised of such differences. As a result, though concepts, a la the neo-Cartesian,
might be finely individuated causes of mental activity, they cannot be reason-giving
features for that activity.
Furthermore, given that different concepts have different causal powers, having different
occasions of tokening and different forms, we can understand how different thoughts
involving different concepts can each come to be ‘connected with its own, distinct, set of
inferences and attitudes’ (as in the case of Lois and Superman/Clark Kent). As such, we
can explain how having a thought contributes to a subject’s dispositions to make certain
139

Fodor claims that whatever attitudes, feelings, emotions, etc., “….that cluster around a mode
of presentation of a concept have [nothing] to do with the content of the concept” (2008, p. 86).
In a footnote to this quotation his antagonist, Snark, asks: “Haven’t you now implicitly given up
claiming that psychological laws are intentional?”(Ibid, fn. 56) In a recent review of Fodor’s
(2008), Rupert (forthcoming) makes a similar point about Fodor’s treatment of Frege cases. He
too notes this same footnote in support. Rupert says: “...one might worry that too much
explanatory work has been shunted off to the nonintentional level. There is a risk that so much
human behavior will be explained by facts about syntax or the properties of realizers that there is
not much work left for an intentional psychology to do. Fodor seems to concede as much (86
n56), but his doing so does not square very well with the defense of folk psychology (and its
vindication by a scientific psychology) for which Fodor is well known.”
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transitions in thought and to engage in certain behaviors, by appeal to how the concepts
exploited in the thought are, as Fodor puts it, ‘engaged’ in the subject’s ‘galaxy of beliefs,
desires, hopes, despairs, whatever’(2008, p. 87). But they cannot explain a subject’s
being epistemically so disposed, i.e., being disposed to draw inferences or to recognize
the satisfiability of certain desires. The subject will have made appropriate transitions,
given the a-posteriori organization of her mental economy, but will not have made those
transitions for the reasons that they were found appropriate from her perspective. We
might have an answer to the reason why a subject makes certain transitions in thought
and engages the world in certain ways by appeal to the concepts by which the world is
represented. But we, as of yet, do not have an explanation of the subject’s doing so in
light of reasons that the subject has.
Fodor seems to welcome some such result. At one point he says:
“For better or for worse, we’re committed to LOT [i.e., the Language of Thought]; and
LOT, though it is a system of representations, isn’t a system of representations that
anybody uses, correctly or otherwise. One doesn’t use thoughts, one just has them.
Having thoughts isn’t something that you do; it’s something that happens to you.”(2008,
p. 203)

The account of the mind that emerges is as of a brute causal system. This in itself is no
objection. On the contrary, it is central to the kind of naturalistic project Fodor is engaged
in to show how reasons are causes. The problem is, rather, that on the account proposed,
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there is no explanation of how the causes identified as relevant to the mind’s operations
can be reasons that the subject has. 140
Whatever features of a mental state account for its contributing to the reasons the subject
has (whether content or vehicle), for its contributing to the subject’s epistemic
orientation, those features must be individuated in a way that is, in some sense, available
to the subject. This constraint must be in place if there is sense to be made of there being
a difference from the subject’s perspective between having mental states with different
reason-giving features, i.e., differences that can make a difference to what the subject
finds reasonable to do and to think. If concepts are to be the reason-giving features of a
mental state, then this constraint is a constraint on concept individuation. The neoCartesian account of concepts fails to satisfy this constraint. As mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter, conceptual capacities as the neo-Cartesian has them are not
appropriate epistemic capacities.
In the following section I will argue that Pragmatist accounts of concepts, according to
which possessing a concept is understood as having certain knowledge (-that or -how),
are able to satisfy this central constraint. As a result, unlike the neo-Cartesian account,
they manage to do more than merely provide an account of how the contribution that a
given belief makes to the subject’s dispositions to engage the world depends on the
concepts exploited in that belief. They further manage to explain how having a certain
140

This would not be too problematic had it not been for the fact that Fodor too notes the
important difference between merely having dispositions to make certain mental transitions and
being so disposed in light of having reasons. Ironically, he is explicit that any proper theory of
mind must make sense of this distinction. And, as we shall presently see, he takes his own
position to be superior to the Pragmatist, who he argues fail in just this respect. Thus, the result of
this discussion of Fodor’s account is in crucial tension with the kind of objection he raises against
the Pragmatist.
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belief might contribute to the subject’s epistemic dispositions, as a function of the
particular concepts involved in that belief.

5.3.2.2 Peacocke on concepts and possession conditions
Peacocke’s notion of concept possession provides a seemingly straightforward account of
how the contribution Z that S’s having the belief that p is determined by, and most
importantly explained by appeal to, the concepts the belief exploits.
We have seen that according to Fodor possessing a concept entails only that one is able to
have thoughts involving that concept. Possessing a concept is both ontogenetically and
explanatorily prior to whatever other epistemic capacities the subject might have. This is
the central tenet of neo-Cartesianism. In strong contrast with Fodor’s account, according
to Peacocke it is constitutive of having a given concept that one has certain specific
epistemic capacities. These include recognizing the validity of certain transitions among
propositions involving the concept and recognizing the conditions of the concept’s
correct application. 141 It is for this reason that Fodor considers Peacocke’s to be a
Pragmatist account of concepts.

141

A useful articulation of such an inferential role account of concepts is given by Bermúdez &
Macpherson (1998): “Any acceptable account of what it is to possess a concept will have to
include certain specifications of circumstances in which it is appropriate to apply that concept.
But this is not all. Concepts form part of, and are individuated by their role in, the contents of
propositional attitudes. Part of what it is to possess a given concept is that one should be able to
recognize that certain circumstances give one good reasons to take particular attitudes to contents
containing that concept. Moreover, concept mastery is also evidenced in dispositions to make and
to accept as legitimate or justified certain inferential transitions between judgements.”
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S’s having the belief that p, involving a certain concept P, does imply that S has a certain
set of epistemic capacities, namely, those that are constitutive of P’s a-priori possession
conditions. Furthermore, and, again, in strong contrast with Fodor, according to Peacocke
the possession conditions for a given concept and the individuation conditions of that
concept converge. Peacocke’s ‘simple formulation’ of this principle reads: “Concept F is
that unique concept C to possess which a thinker must meet condition A(C).”(1992, p.
6) 142 Different concepts (including necessarily co-extensive ones) will, then, of necessity
involve different possession conditions. Possessing each of the concepts will entail the
possession of different sets of epistemic capacities.
More specifically, Peacocke argues that S’s possession of a concept C consists in part in
S’s finding certain transitions involving that concept ‘primitively compelling’.
“To say that the thinker finds such transitions primitively compelling is to say this: (1) he
finds them compelling; (2) he does not find them compelling because he has inferred
them from other premises and/or principles; and (3) for possession of the concept C in
question … he does not need to take the correctness of the transition as answerable to
anything else.”(Peacocke 1992, p. 6.)

In the case of an observational concept, its possession conditions will be given in part by
reference to transitions one must find primitively compelling from appropriate perceptual
experiences to judgments involving that observational concept (indeed, its being an
observational concept consists in this feature of its possession conditions). 143 I leave
142

In his (1998a; 1998b) Peacocke somewhat revises his account of possession conditions, but we
need not be concerned at this point with the details of his revision. See also most recently his
(2009).
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“Some conceptual contents are actually individuated in part by their relations to those
perceptual experiences that give good reasons for judging those contents” (Peacocke 1992, p. 66).
These will be those contents involving observational concepts.
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discussion of observational concepts to the next chapter in which their relation to the
nonconceptual contents of perception will be discussed further.
For the moment, consider as an illustration one of Peacocke’s most frequently cited
examples, the possession condition for conjunction, A(conjunction). An a-priori
condition on possessing the concept conjunction is that the subject finds primitively
compelling instances of the elimination and introduction rules of conjunction. That is, the
subject must find a transition from pCq to p (or to q) primitively compelling, and likewise
with respect to the transition from p and q to pCq. Finding such transitions primitively
compelling just is possessing the concept conjunction.
If this is the case, it follows immediately that the contribution that S’s having a given
belief makes to S’s epistemic dispositions is determined by the possession conditions of
the concepts that are the constituents of its content. This is so, as it is constitutive of
having a belief with a certain conceptual content that one finds primitively compelling
those transition that are mentioned in the possession conditions of the concepts involved
in its content. So, to follow with the conjunction example, S’s having the belief that Jack
and Jill went up a hill will contribute to S’s epistemic dispositions to recognize the
validity of the inference to Jack went up a hill (as well as many other inferences, as a
function of the possession conditions of the concepts involved in the belief).
Spelling out in detail the contribution that having a particular belief makes to a subject’s
epistemic dispositions will turn on our specifying the possession conditions for the
concepts that are the constituents of the belief (as well as their mode of composition e.g., the belief that John loves Mary and the belief that Mary loves John involve all and
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only the same concepts, yet they differ in the contribution they would make to a person
having them. The former would likely contribute to the person’s dispositions to judge that
someone loves Mary, whereas the latter to judge that someone loves John. This will have
to be accommodated in the possession conditions of love). Specifying these possession
conditions is a difficult project indeed, and Peacocke (e.g., in his 1992) provides various
sophisticated examples illustrating how it should be undertaken.
“It is virtually never a trivial matter to find the possession condition for a concept, not
even one which can be put in the A(C) form. To work out what the possession condition
is, one must take a sufficiently wide range of truths about which [Fregean] Thoughts
involving the concept are informative, and which Thoughts involving the concept are
uninformative, in various circumstances. A correct statement of the possession condition
for the concept must be capable of explaining this range of truths about informativeness
and uninformativeness.”(Peacocke, 1998b, p. 131)

However, for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to note that an account of
concepts, as Peacocke develops it, provides a straightforward (albeit, not easily
undertaken) derivation of a given belief’s unique contribution to S’s epistemic
dispositions as a function of the possession conditions of those concepts exploited in
having the belief. 144
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Bermúdez (1999) argues that any account that holds a constitutive relation between concept
possession and finding certain inferential transitions primitively compelling faces considerable
complications. Such accounts fail the test of both intuition and empirical plausibility. It appears
that one can possess a concept while nonetheless failing to find primitively compelling certain
transitions that are purportedly mentioned as part of the a-priori possession conditions of that
concept. As Bermúdez says, “no room is left [on Peacocke’s account] for the important
distinction between not possessing a concept and failing correctly to apply a concept which one
none the less does in fact possess” (1999, p. 83). As an example for the empirical plausibility of
this claim he points to the literature on the Wason selection task that suggests that though subjects
possess the concept of a conditional they fail to find primitively compelling transitions such as
modus tollens. Yet, part of the possession conditions for the concept of a conditional is that one
finds compelling a transition such as modus tollens. Peacocke acknowledges these difficulties
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Consider how Peacocke might account for the different contributions, Z1 and Z2, made to
a subject’s epistemic orientation when having different beliefs respectively involving the
co-extensive concepts triangle and trilateral. The different contributions would be
determined as a function of the different possession conditions of these two concepts.
Having a belief exploiting the one concept would involve one’s finding a certain set of
inferences primitively compelling. Given that these are different concepts, and given that
concepts are individuated in terms of their possession conditions, having a belief
exploiting the other concept would involve one’s finding a different set of inferences
primitively compelling. Which particular inferences these might be can be left to the side;
it is a matter of the detailed analysis of the possession conditions of the respective
concepts. By appeal to the possession conditions of the concepts composing the content
of the two beliefs we can specify each of their contributions Z1 and Z2 and be assured that
Z1 ≠ Z2.
Given the critical analysis of neo-Cartesianism in the previous section, stopping at this
point of our analysis of the Pragmatist position would be an injustice. Rather, we are
called upon to ask the same question that was asked of the neo-Cartesian. Though we can
see how the involvement of different concepts in a belief might account for the unique
contribution that having that belief makes to the subject’s dispositions, is this sufficient to
make sense of their being epistemic dispositions?
In particular, the appeal to a subject’s finding certain inferences primitively compelling in
specifying the possession conditions of a concept might raise a few eyebrows. It is not at
with his A(C) form conception of possession conditions for concepts, and provides a response, for
example, in his (2004a).
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all clear how the notion of finding some transition primitively compelling is to be
understood such that it is anything more than merely having a disposition to make that
transition. But, if we are to explain how the exploitation of a certain concept in a belief
contributes to the subject’s epistemic dispositions, we must make sense of how exploiting
that concept explains the subject’s having reasons in light of which the subject is so
disposed. After all, even on the neo-Cartesian account of concepts we have seen that an
explanation of the subject’s dispositions being as they are can be provided as a function
of which concepts are involved in the subject’s beliefs. 145
Indeed, one of Fodor’s central complaints against the Pragmatist position in general, 146
and against Peacocke’s in particular, 147 is that any account according to which possessing
a concept is understood in terms of having certain dispositions is bound for failure. It has
the order of explanation backwards. Dispositions to make transitions in thought or to
behave in certain ways are the right kind of dispositions only if they also have the right
kind of etiology. 148 Being disposed to make transitions manifesting the elimination and
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The question for Peacocke is analogous to the one asked of Fodor. In the latter case, I pointed
out that we require an explanation of S’s taking some proposition p to be an epistemic liaison of
such and such a set of propositions in terms of the concepts involved in representing p. The neoCartesian account was found unsatisfactory. In Peacocke’s case we are now called upon to
provide an explanation of S’s finding certain transitions primitively compelling in terms of the
concepts involved in the content of the reason-giving state.
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Fodor (2008).

147

For example, in Fodor (1995; 1998b; 2004a; 2004b).
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In discussing the Pragmatist account of rule-following (reacting specifically to Boghossian)
Fodor (2008) argues that such accounts are committed to the claim that following a rule, R,
consist in having a disposition to conform to R. But this cannot be correct, he argues, “…because
following R requires that one’s behavior have a certain etiology; roughly, that one’s intention that
one’s behavior should conform with R explains (or partially explains) why it does conform to R.
A fortiori, you aren’t following R unless R is the ‘intentional object’ of one of your mental states”
(pp. 36-37). To follow R we must have an opaque reading of R, otherwise the behavior will
merely be in conformity with R. You must intend to follow R, but this requires that R is somehow
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introduction rules of conjunction (e.g., from accepting p and accepting q to accepting p
and q), counts as evidence for one’s possession of conjunction only if one’s reason for
being so disposed includes one’s having an understanding of conjunction. But, one’s
having such an understanding presupposes that one possesses the concept conjunction. 149
Applied to Peacocke’s account, the objection is that it is one’s antecedent possession of
the concept C, and the exploitation of that concept in a belief that p, that is supposed to
explain one’s finding some transition or other primitively compelling, rather than one’s
merely being disposed to make that transition. Contrary to Fodor’s contentions, I have
argued (in the previous section) that the neo-Cartesian account of concepts cannot satisfy
this explanatory role. They are not the right kind of epistemic capacities. However, it
appears that neither can the Pragmatist; this time, on pain of circularity. We are in a bind.
Neo-Cartesians seem unable to get the subject’s epistemic engine going, as their notion of
concept possession is too minimal to explain how the subject is able to do anything with
the concepts he has. Whereas Pragmatists seem to start off with the subject’s epistemic
engine in full gear, as their notion of concept possession is identified with certain of the
subject’s ‘intelligent’ capacities. However, as a result, they are unable to explain the
intelligence of these capacities, since to do so they must appeal to the subject’s
antecedently possessing that concept purportedly constituted by these very same
capacities.

represented and implicated in the etiology of the behavior. As a result, you must already be able
to represent R if you are going to follow the rules that are constitutive of R. This, as Fodor likes
to say, is to walk in a very small circle.
149

“Prima facie, whether you have CONJUNCTION depends not just on what inferences you
accept, but also on your reasons for accepting them…”(Fodor 2004a, p. 45)
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This is a difficult problem and there is much more that can be said about it than I am able
to in the limited context of this chapter. Nonetheless, I believe that insofar as we are
concerned with elucidating the reason-giving status of belief, the Pragmatist has a
relatively straightforward response. To get a very general idea of this response, it is worth
looking at what Ryle (1949), who may be considered the paradigmatic Pragmatist, has to
say about what he calls, the Cartesian, or intellectualist, ‘legend’ (see also my fn. 106).
Ryle argues that at the core of the Cartesian legend is the thought that the intelligence of
an action is inherited from the intelligence of the planning that brings it about. 150
However, committing to this ‘legend’ seems to lead to infinite regress. This is so, as the
planning itself is an activity that can be carried out intelligently or not, and its intelligence
too must be explained by a prior act of intelligent activity. The explanatory challenge can
be reiterated indefinitely. Ryle’s strategy for blocking this regress is to insist that in
acting intelligently a person is not (in general) doing two things, considering how to act,
and acting. Rather, “[w]hat distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not their
parentage but their procedure, and this holds no less for intellectual activity than for
practical performances … My performance has a special procedure or manner, not
special antecedents” (Ryle, 1949, p. 32, emphasis added).
In mentioning Ryle, I am not suggesting we follow his particular Behaviorist alternative.
Rather, I am pointing to the fact that the Pragmatist sidesteps Fodor’s circularity
objection altogether. Pragmatists reject the Cartesian principle that the intelligence of an
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Fodor, we have seen, is explicit that it is this Cartesian commitment that he aims to revive –
hence, his focus on the etiology of a disposition or of a certain behavior (see, also, my fn. 148,
above).
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activity must be explained by appeal to an antecedent and independently specifiable
intelligence-bestowing activity.
To bring this thought back to Peacocke’s account, one’s finding certain transitions
primitively compelling should not be seen as the outcome of some prior understanding,
the possession conditions of which are independently specifiable. Rather, one’s finding
certain transitions primitively compelling constitutes one’s understanding. The
explanatory relation between concept possession and the transitions one is disposed to
make is not an etiological relation but a constitutive one. A concept C being exploited in
having a thought about the world is not that in light of which one finds certain transitions
rather than others primitively compelling, namely, those mentioned in C’s possession
conditions. Rather, its being exploited in a thought just is one’s finding compelling
certain transitions as are specified in the concept’s possession conditions. As a result,
there is no threat of circularity. 151
The neo-Cartesian might still object that such a response simply takes for granted the
notion of finding a transition compelling, without explaining what such finding consists
in that would mark it off from merely having de facto appropriate dispositions (given that
I have denied that possessing an appropriate concept is to explain this distinction). I have
required of the neo-Cartesian some account of how the exploitation of a given concept
explains the subject’s taking some proposition to be an epistemic liaison of some set of
propositions {pi}. The subject’s taking was to be distinguished from the subject’s merely
151

The only circularity that might threaten this kind of explanation is one that mentions concept C
in specifying the possession conditions of that very concept (C can be used, but not mentioned in
the possession conditions of C). It is this kind of circularity that Peacocke’s (1992) account is
designed to avoid.
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being disposed. If we are allowed to leave unanalyzed the notion of finding a transition
compelling, why are we not allowed the same with the notion of taking some proposition
to be an epistemic liaison of {pi}?
The reason for this seeming favoritism is that on the neo-Cartesian account, possessing a
concept is completely independent of whatever epistemic capacities the subject has. As a
result, it is unclear how possessing a concept is to explain the subject’s taking some
transition to be appropriate, rather than the subject’s merely being disposed to make a
transition that is de facto appropriate. I have argued that given that, on such accounts,
concepts are individuated independently of the subject’s understanding, 152 concepts
cannot be the reason-giving features of a mental state; they can, at most, account for the
structure of the subject’s de facto dispositions. The situation with the Pragmatist, and
with Peacocke’s position in particular, is inverted. Possessing a concept is dependent on
the subject’s epistemic capacities, on what a subject knows (-that or -how). This is,
ultimately, what makes sense of the personal-level nature of having reasons. Indeed,
unlike the neo-Cartesian, a concept is individuated by its possession conditions, where
these specify what mental states having contents involving that concept provides the
subject reason to think and to do. Such an account of concepts, then, makes it
unproblematic to see what it is about the exploitation of a concept in having a belief
about the world in virtue of which the subject is epistemically disposed to make certain
inferences and recognize the satisfiability of certain desires.
As Peacocke puts the relevant distinction:
152

Which is the sensible thing to do if you hold on to the Cartesian ‘legend’ that the intelligence
of an activity, i.e., the subject’s understanding, must be explained by appeal to an antecedent and
independently specifiable intelligence-bestowing activity, i.e., concepts.
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“What all Fregean IRS theories, of whatever stripe, agree upon is the central place of
reasons and rationality in the individuation of concepts. Reasons for making judgments
are central in any Fregean theory, since the informativeness criterion appeals to what can
be reasonably judged in given circumstances. The distinctive claim of the Fregean IRS
theorist is then that we can give a philosophical explanation of how reasons contribute to
the individuation of concepts by appealing to inferential or conceptual role. The notion of
a thinker’s reasons for making a judgment plays virtually no positive part in Fodor’s
account of concepts.”(Peacocke 2000, p. 332, my italics)

5.4 A general account of reason-giving
The two diametrically opposed positions considered both purport to show that S’s having
the belief that p makes a unique contribution Z to S’s epistemic orientation, a
contribution determined as a function of, and explained by appeal to, the concepts
possessed by S and exploited in S’s having the belief that p. However, given their very
different accounts of concepts, concept possession, and the relation between concepts and
the propositional attitudes, the way that such a claim is substantiated differs greatly. I
have argued that they are not both successful in this task. In particular, concepts as
understood by neo-Cartesians, and as exemplified by Fodor, are inadequate as the reasongiving features of belief. At bottom, this is so as their individuation is completely
independent of the subject’s understanding.
The Pragmatist account of concepts, on the other hand, considers them to be individuated
by appropriate epistemic, inferential and recognitional, capacities. As a result, a subject’s
possessing a concept just is that subject’s possessing such epistemic capacities. The claim
that concepts are the reason-giving features of belief – and hence, that the exploitation of
a concept in a given belief explains the contribution that having that belief makes to the
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subject’s epistemic dispositions – is unproblematic. This is constitutive explanation, rater
than reductive or etiological explanation.
According to Peacocke’s particular account, the contribution that S’s having a belief that
p makes to S’s epistemic dispositions, to the inferences S is disposed to draw and to the
satisfiability of desires S is disposed to recognize, is determined by the a-priori
possession conditions of the concepts that are constituents of p.
So, how are we to understand the core issue with which this chapter began – that of a
subject’s being in a position to treat the contents of a belief as a premise in reasoning?
How does the above amount to an analysis of the subject’s being in such a position? And,
how, for example, should we understand the fact that having the belief that Tungurahua is
erupting makes transparent to people in the area the significance of Tungurahua’s
eruption to their actions and deliberations?
The first step towards providing an answer is to emphasize that S’s having a belief is to
be distinguished from S’s being aware of that belief. Having a belief is an awareness of
whatever the belief is about. The beliefs that are of interest in the context of this
dissertation are empirical beliefs – beliefs about the world. When having such beliefs, it
is the world that one is aware of. Furthermore, S’s having the belief that p must also be
distinguished from S’s being aware of the content of the belief. If we follow Peacocke, p
is a Fregean Thought. To say that S has a belief with such content is not to say that S is
thereby aware of the Fregean Thought that is its content. Rather, S’s belief that p is a
particular awareness of the world in virtue of grasping the Fregean Thought that p.
Having beliefs with different Fregean Thoughts as contents does not necessarily amount
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to an awareness of different entities – indeed, the point of Frege cases is to illustrate that
often it is a different awareness of the same entities. 153
The importance of these distinctions is that the claim that the subject is in a position ‘to
treat the contents of the belief as a premise’ seems to invoke a suspiciously detached view
of the relation between the subject and the subject’s beliefs. It suggests that the subject’s
having the belief and treating its contents as a premise requires that she is in a position to
deliberate about the belief (or its content) and about the inferential relations that it stands
in towards other beliefs (or their contents). 154 It is as though having a belief and having
reasons in light of which to deliberate or act involves a two-step process, first having the
belief, and then reasoning about what having that belief makes reasonable for you to
think or to do. This is a suggestion that should be avoided. Though it is often the case that
having a belief is accompanied by a higher order belief about it, this is not required to
make sense of the subject’s being in a position to ‘treat the contents of belief as a premise
in reasoning’. Indeed, not only is it not required, but insisting on it brings forth the very
difficulties pointed out by Ryle (as discussed in the previous section). A subject’s having
a belief is not something the subject is necessarily aware of, it is what the subject is aware
with.
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Though I put the neo-Cartesian position to the side, it is worth noting that if we think of
content in Russellian terms, as Fodor does, then what the belief is about and the content of the
belief converge. Having an empirical belief with a certain content is having a belief about that
content. Nonetheless, importantly, in the Russellian case, too, having an empirical belief amounts
to having an awareness of the world (see also my fn. 123).
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According to Shoemaker (1995), it is a necessary condition on S’s having a belief that S is
able to have higher order beliefs, beliefs about beliefs. As I understand him, what underlies this
claim is the view I describe here about what is required for S to be in a position to treat the
contents of S’s beliefs as premises in reasoning. Though having a belief often is accompanied by
a higher order belief about it, the presence of such a higher order belief does not seem to be
necessary for S to be in a position to treat the contents of S’s beliefs as premises in reasoning.
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A subject’s ‘being in a position to treat the content of her belief as a premise’ should be
understood in terms of her awareness of the world being such as to contribute to her
epistemic dispositions to utilize the world – that of which she is aware – as a truth-maker
for certain appropriately related beliefs and as a potential satisfier for appropriately
related desires. Which beliefs and desires are ‘appropriately related’ is, as we have seen,
a function of the possession conditions of the concepts involved in the particular belief.
The subject’s actually ‘treating the content of the belief as a premise in reasoning’ is
simply the subject’s actualizing one or more of these dispositions, that is, it is the
subject’s actually utilizing the world in the service of satisfying certain of these desires
and forming (or modifying) certain of these beliefs. In so doing, the subject need not have
any understanding of the notion of truth-making, or of inference. Indeed, as anyone who
has taught even the most rudimentary logic course can attest, the majority of people are
quite able to draw inferences and satisfy their desires in light of their empirical beliefs,
yet they are at pains when it comes to articulating the principles governing their
reasoning.
When Sam, a normally functioning human being, has the belief that Jack and Jill went up
a hill he need not be aware of his belief for him to be in a position to form the belief that
Jill went up a hill. He need not recognize that the content of his belief contains a
conjunction and reason on the basis of his understanding of the truth functionality of
conjunction that conjunction-elimination supports the truth of each of the conjuncts.
Rather, having the belief is a way that Sam is aware of the world that contributes to
Sam’s epistemic dispositions in relation to the world – in relation to Jack, Jill, and
whatever hill they might have gone up. Given the possession conditions of conjunction,
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having the belief involves Sam’s finding primitively compelling each of the conjuncts.
Or, what amounts to the same thing, having the belief contributes to Sam’s epistemic
disposition to form beliefs the contents of which are each of its conjuncts. More
generally, there is no need for the subject to recognize the rational relations that hold
between his belief and his other possible propositional attitudes. Having the belief is itself
a recognition of the world’s bearing on certain of his other propositional attitudes; it just
is the subject’s finding primitively compelling certain transitions rather than others.
Similarly, we can understand what is meant by the claim that having the belief that
Tungurahua is erupting makes transparent to residents of Baños the detrimental
significance of the eruption to the satisfiability of their desires to remain alive and well
and to pursue their life long dreams. When a resident of Baños believes that Tungurahua
is erupting, his having this belief just is his having a particular awareness of the volcano.
It is an awareness of the volcano the having of which makes a particular contribution to
his epistemic dispositions in relation to the volcano. Again, he need not reflect on his
belief about Tungurahua and then take the belief to support certain inferences and to
satisfy, or frustrate, certain desires. The belief is a taking of Tungurahua itself. It is a way
of apprehending Tungurahua, where this apprehension can be understood in terms of its
impact on, or contribution to, his other propositional attitudes. The specific contribution
of the belief is a function of, and is explained by appeal to, the particular concepts that
are exploited in that belief.
Finally, and most importantly for the further purposes of this dissertation we can also
understand how the reason-giving status of a given mental state can be independent of
concept possession. When a concept is exploited in a mental state, say a belief, the state
181

makes a certain kind of contribution to the believer’s epistemic orientation. However, the
general notion of a reason-giving state is that of a state the having of which makes some
contribution to one’s epistemic orientation. For a mental state to make some such
contribution, we have seen, the reason-giving features of the mental state, that which
determines and explains its reason-giving character, cannot be individuated
independently of one’s understanding; they cannot be individuated independently of what
the subject knows (-that or -how). Rather, the reason-giving features of a mental state
should be individuated, as the Pragmatist would have it, in terms of certain epistemically
robust possession conditions.
Concepts comprise a particular family of epistemic capacities that are individuated by a
specific family of possession conditions, namely, ones specified in terms of transitions
among propositions that one must find primitively compelling. Having a mental state
involving conceptual content is, then, having a mental state that makes a certain kind of
contribution to the subject’s epistemic dispositions, a kind dictated by the appropriate
kind of possession conditions. It is a contribution to one’s epistemic dispositions to draw
certain inferences and recognize the satisfiability of certain desires.
A general formulation of reason-giving can be stated from which, in the next chapter, a
nonconceptual account of reason-giving, geared towards an explanation of the reasongiving role of perception, can be constructed:
1. S’s having a reason-giving state, R, makes a unique contribution, Z, to S’s
epistemic dispositions in relation to the world (it shapes S’s epistemic orientation
in a certain unique way)
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2. The contribution, Z, that having the reason-giving state, R, makes to S’s epistemic
dispositions is a particular function of, and is explained by appeal to, certain
epistemic capacities exploited in R (and, hence, possessed by S)
If perception is to be a reason-giving state we must account for the contribution that it
makes to S’s epistemic orientation. In the case of belief, this contribution was explained
in terms of the exploitation of conceptual capacities. As a result, the nature of the
contribution was of the sort discussed above. If perception is nonconceptual, we can
expect both that the nature of the unique contribution that having a particular perception
makes to the subject’s epistemic orientation will differ from that of belief, and that the
explanation of this contribution will not appeal to the conceptual capacities of the
perceiver. Nonetheless, an explanation of this contribution will have to appeal to some
appropriate epistemic capacities possessed by the perceiver; capacities individuated in
terms of appropriate possession conditions. As should be expected, one of the central
difficulties facing such an explanation will be carving out the right kind of possession
conditions for perceptual contents. On the one hand, we must avoid making them so thin
as to be of no use, and, on the other hand, avoid making them too robust so as to collapse
into the conceptualist position. It is to this set of challenges that I now turn in Chapter 6,
‘Nonconceptual Perceptual Apprehension.’
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Chapter 6: Nonconceptual Perceptual Apprehension

6.1 Introduction: Recap and strategy for an account of perceptual apprehension
In the previous chapter I explored the status of beliefs as paradigmatic reason-giving
states. I argued that having a belief makes a unique contribution to the epistemic
orientation of the believer, where this is understood in terms of the believer’s epistemic
dispositions to draw inferences and to recognize the satisfiability of desires that are
appropriately related to the belief in question. Which propositional attitudes are
appropriately related to a given belief is a function of the concepts exploited in that
belief. I further argued that in order for the exploitation of concepts in a belief to explain
this reason-giving character not any account of concepts will do. Rather, I argued in favor
of a substantive account of conceptual content according to which concepts are robust
epistemic capacities individuated by epistemically significant possession conditions.
Understood in this way, the kind of explanation we obtain is not a reductive explanation.
Rather, it is a constitutive explanation of the reason-giving status of beliefs in terms of
epistemic capacities of a particular kind.
Having explored the reason-giving status of belief, I abstracted a general notion of
reason-giving that is independent of concept possession. This general notion was
formulated as follows:
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1. S’s having a reason-giving state, R, makes a unique contribution, Z, to S’s
epistemic dispositions in relation to the world (it shapes S’s epistemic orientation
in a certain unique way)
2. The contribution, Z, that having the reason-giving state, R, makes to S’s epistemic
dispositions is a particular function of, and is explained by appeal to, certain
epistemic capacities exploited in R (and, hence, possessed by S)
Claim (1) merely articulates what being a reason-giving state in general amounts to. It
remains silent about the kind of contribution that having the state makes to a subject’s
epistemic dispositions (i.e., how it shapes the subject’s epistemic orientation to the
world). It also says nothing about what explains the state’s making such a contribution.
Claim (2) aims to fill these gaps.
With respect to beliefs, the epistemic capacities mentioned in (2) are conceptual
capacities. Following Peacocke’s (1992) account, extensively discussed in the previous
chapter, in saying that they are conceptual capacities we are indicating that they are
capacities individuated by a certain kind of possession condition, namely a kind that
involves one’s finding primitively compelling appropriate transitions among
propositional attitudes. 155 When R is the belief that p, the contribution Z that having R
makes to one’s epistemic orientation will be a function of, and be explained by, the
concepts exploited in R. The contribution Z will turn out to be of the kind expected given
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In the case of observational concepts, to which I return shortly, these transitions will also
mention appropriate perceptual experiences. Unless stated otherwise, I will omit this
qualification.
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the role that beliefs play in folk psychological explanation, namely, supplying that in
light of which the believer finds reasonable certain inferences and actions.
This formulation complements the discussion in earlier chapters regarding the attribution
and specification of mental content. In Chapter 3 I introduced the Perspectival constraint
on the specification of mental content. As a reminder, the constraint states that a
canonical specification of mental content is to articulate how one apprehends the world
in having (or undergoing) that mental state. How one apprehends the world is precisely
how having that mental state contributes to one’s epistemic orientation – to one’s finding
reasonable certain thoughts or actions (rather than others). The canonical specification of
the content of R, thus, aims to articulate this contribution. When R is the belief that p, the
canonical specification of its content, say ‘Fa’, will utilize exactly those concepts the
exploitation of which make the unique contribution Z to one’s epistemic orientation,
namely those concepts that are constitutive of p, i.e., the concepts F and a. As a result, in
the case of belief, we can clearly see how the Perspectival constraint is satisfied; the
concepts mentioned in the canonical specification of belief content just are those concepts
by which one apprehends the world when having that belief.
In the case of perception, however, I argued that a prima facie difficulty for
nonconceptualists was that it is not clear how a canonical specification of content does
articulate the contribution that having a perception makes to the subject’s epistemic
orientation. That is, if perceptual content is nonconceptual, it is not clear how the
Perspectival constraint is to be satisfied. How, for example, does specifying one’s
perception of the Mach Figure (introduced in Section 3.3.1) by appeal to the concept
square articulate the contribution that having the perception makes to the subject’s
186

epistemic orientation? On the face of it, such a specification suggests that having the
perception makes the contribution Zcsquare that having a mental state exploiting the
concept square would make to one’s epistemic orientation (where the subscript ‘c’ stands
for ‘conceptual’). But, this is a denial of nonconceptualism about perceptual content.
Given that concepts are individuated in terms of certain possession conditions, which, in
turn, constitutively explain the contribution that contents involving those concepts make
to one’s epistemic orientation, to say that some perception makes a contribution Zcsquare
just is to say that perception involves the exploitation of the concept square.
Alternatively, given that according to the nonconceptualist the subject can undergo a
perception thus specified without possessing this (or any) concept, it is clear that having
the perception does not make such a contribution Zcsquare. But then, what contribution
Zncsquare (where Zncsquare ≠ Zcsquare, and the subscript ‘nc’ stands for ‘nonconceptual’) does
the appeal to the concept square in the canonical specification of the content of
perception articulate? How does such a specification illuminate how the subject
perceptually apprehends the world?
By definition, Zncsquare will be that contribution made by a perception the canonical
specification of the contents of which appeals to the concept square; it will be that
contribution that having a perception of something as square, rather than as diamond or
as red, makes to one’s epistemic orientation. However, we have yet little idea how to
specify this contribution nontrivially. Furthermore, as it is not a conceptual capacity that
explains the contribution Zncsquare, we must supply some alternative, i.e., nonconceptual,
substantive account of the epistemic capacities exploited in perception that do explain its
making such a contribution.
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In order to develop an account of nonconceptual apprehension (applicable to perception)
I will follow a similar strategy as I have in the previous chapter when discussing the case
of conceptual apprehension.
Briefly, the previous chapter involved two main parts corresponding to claims (1) and (2)
above. The first part (Section 5.2) aimed to characterize the kind of contribution that
beliefs make to a believer’s epistemic orientation. It did so by considering their
paradigmatic role within folk psychological, intentional, explanation and prediction of
deliberation and action. The process of belief attribution is a holistic process, governed
by norms of rationality, sensitive to the inferences that the subject is disposed to draw and
to the desires that the subject is disposed to satisfy. Given a certain background of beliefs
and desires, the attribution of a belief explains the subject’s performing a certain class of
inferences and actions and predicts his performing certain others. The contribution, Z,
that having a given belief makes to one’s epistemic orientation was, thus, identified as its
unique contribution to the inferences that the subject is in a position to draw and to the
desires the satisfaction of which the subject is in a position to recognize.
The second part (Section 5.3 and on) aimed to provide an explanation of the reasongiving phenomena just characterized; an explanation of the kind (and grain) of
contributions that beliefs paradigmatically make. Such an account, I argued, should
appeal to certain recombinable reason-giving elements – concepts. I proceeded to
investigate the nature of these recombinable elements, and argued, following Peacocke,
in favor of a Pragmatist account of concepts according to which concepts are
individuated in terms of a certain kind of possession condition. The kind of possession
condition involved was specifically geared for the explanatory project characterized.
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Note that though the direction of analysis was from reflection on the practices of folk
psychological explanation and prediction to the nature of conceptual content, the nature
of such content does not depend on the vagaries of our explanatory practices. Rather, it is
the other way around. The success of these explanatory practices is the phenomenon an
explanation of which depends on the exploitation of epistemic capacities with a certain
nature. In particular, it depends on the exploitation of fine-grain recombinable capacities
individuated by possession conditions specified in terms of epistemic dispositions to
draw certain inferences and to recognize the satisfiability of certain desires. 156
This two-partite strategy can, and should, also be followed when thinking about the
reason-giving character of perception. We can begin by characterizing the kind of
contribution that perception paradigmatically makes to a perceiver’s epistemic
orientation, and then proceed to develop an explanation of this contribution in terms of
the exploitation of appropriate epistemic capacities.
Significant advances on these two stages have already been made in previous chapters.
With respect to the kind of contribution that perception makes to one’s epistemic
orientation I argued (in Chapters 3 and 4) that, at the very least, perception provides
reasons for certain kinds of discriminative behaviors. In particular, perception provides
our reasons for sorting objects (and engaging with them, more generally) according to
certain metrics of similarities and differences. A central aim of this chapter is to follow
on these results – to develop and elaborate this discriminative role that perception
156

Of course, as mentioned in the previous chapter, if, contrary to my assumption throughout this
dissertation, folk psychology turns out to be nothing more than a myth, then these epistemic
capacities, i.e., concepts, will turn out to be a very different kind of entity (indeed, there may not
be any).
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purportedly plays and to emphasize its centrality in thinking about the content of
perception over other alternatives. This will provide us a canonical specification of
perceptual content that accurately articulates the space of possible contributions that
perception makes to a perceiver’s epistemic orientation. I will then proceed to develop an
account of the epistemic capacities the exploitation of which constitutively explains the
different contributions thus specified.
Advances have also been made with respect to this further goal. With a substantive
account of conceptual content at hand, we can now say something substantive about the
essentially contrastive notion of nonconceptual content. Nonconceptual content is simply
content that is not individuated by possession conditions of the kind that we have seen
govern the individuation of concepts. It is for this reason that nonconceptual content is
commonly defined as content the canonical specification of which need not appeal to
concepts that the subject possesses – the subject can undergo states with such contents
without having satisfied the possession conditions that individuate the concepts utilized
in the canonical specification of their contents. 157
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We now can see more clearly why the claim to ambiguity in the notion of nonconceptual
content, which has received much recent attention, and as mentioned in my fn. 51, is
unmotivated. The ambiguity arises from the thought that the nature of a state’s content,
conceptual or nonconceptual, is independent of whether or not one must possess certain concepts
to undergo such a state. If the claim were true, then it would be possible to have a state with
conceptual contents without possessing the concepts that are utilized in specifying that content. It
would also be possible to have a state with nonconceptual content even though having such a
state depends on possessing the concepts specifying that content. Neither of these claims can be
sustained once we recognize the relation between the individuation conditions of a content, its
nature, and its possession conditions. If you do not satisfy the possession conditions of a concept,
you cannot undergo a state whose content is partially individuated by your satisfying those very
possession conditions. And if undergoing a state with a certain content necessitates that you
satisfy the possession condition of certain concepts an explanation of this modal fact would be
that the nature of that content is partially individuated by your satisfying these very possession
conditions, it is a content that involves the concepts thus individuated. Thus, the crucial mistake
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This negative characterization of nonconceptual content leaves much theoretical space
for the notion to inhabit. Nonetheless, the notion of nonconceptual content is highly
constrained. The negative lesson of our analysis of purely externalist accounts of content,
in Chapters 3 and 4, was that, insofar as content (whether conceptual or nonconceptual) is
to be the relevant reason-giving feature of a mental state, it cannot be individuated
independently of (at least some of) what the subject knows (-that or -how), as the
Pragmatist would put it (in contrast with the neo-Cartesian of the previous chapter). 158
Furthermore, the positive lesson of the previous chapter was that an adequate account of
nonconceptual content will appeal to the exploitation of robust epistemic capacities
individuated by a certain kind of possession conditions (specified in terms of what the
subject must know (-that or -how)), albeit not of the kind that individuates conceptual
capacities. 159 Indeed, it is precisely because the subject’s dispositions to make certain
transitions among mental states are dispositions sustained by the exploitation of such

of proponents of the state/content distinction, mentioned in my fn. 51, is that they fail to
recognize the relevant substantial notion of conceptual content with which the notion of
nonconceptual content must be contrasted (as Heck 2007 also argues in response to Byrne 2005).
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This I have argued followed from the Perspectival constraint on the specification of mental
content and its underlying commitment to a notion of content governed by Personal-level reason
explanation.
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These negative and positive conditions on an account of nonconceptual content resonate nicely
with Cussins’ (2002) remarks regarding the notion of mental content in general and of
nonconceptual mental content in particular. He says: “The point of a theory of content is to reveal
cognitive accessibility to the world, and therefore should be given in terms of elements of
subjects’ access to the world. For example, by means of concepts that the subjects possess. That’s
how a theory of conceptual content specifies contents. But that a theory of nonconceptual content
can make canonical use of concepts that are not possessed by the subjects of content does not
mean that a theory of nonconceptual content is not in the exclusive business of specifying forms
of cognitive access to the world. It does not therefore mean that a theory of nonconceptual
content can liberate itself from content specifications in terms of the elements of subjects’ access
to the world. What it does mean is that there are elements of subjects’ access to the world other
than concepts.”(p. 149)
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capacities that we can say that these dispositions are epistemic dispositions, and hence
that the state that explains the subject’s making these transitions is a reason-giving state.
At this point we already have the beginning of an answer to the question with which this
dissertation began: How can perception be nonconceptual and yet also provide us reasons
for deliberation and action? We can fully articulate what it would take for perception to
be both reason-giving and nonconceptual. Perception would have to make some
contribution to our epistemic dispositions to form particular beliefs and to engage in
certain actions. And its making such a contribution would have to be sustained by the
exploitation of epistemic capacities individuated by possession conditions of a different
kind than that which individuates concepts. Of course, the difficulty is in showing how
these two conditions can be simultaneously met. That is, the difficulty is to show that
epistemic capacities thus individuated can in fact explain the kind of contribution that
perception makes to one’s epistemic orientation.
In this chapter I will argue that the paradigmatic reason-giving role of perception is to be
characterized in terms of its making a contribution to our epistemic dispositions towards
certain appropriately related discriminative behaviors. I will further argue that, analogous
to the case of belief, we can explain perception’s particular contribution by appeal to the
exploitation of discriminative capacities individuated by appropriately specified
possession conditions. Finally, I will argue that the account of perceptual content
developed in this dissertation, which appeals to such discriminative capacities, can
explain how perception can both be nonconceptual and provide our reasons for belief and
action.

192

However, before turning to this positive suggestion as to the reason-giving role of
perception and the nature of the capacities that are to explain perception’s playing this
role, it is worth looking at an initially attractive and important alternative, yet one that I
shall argue is ultimately unsuccessful.

6.2 Perception and observational concepts
One of the central challenges with which this dissertation began (and which it aims to
resolve) was to explain how perception, as a state with nonconceptual content, can
provide one’s reasons in light of which one forms appropriate perceptual beliefs. Given
the newly developed characterization of a reason-giving state, we can analyze
perception’s providing such reasons in terms of its making a contribution to the
perceiver’s epistemic dispositions to form such perceptual beliefs. Seeing as an adequate
account of perceptual content is to accommodate the full range of perceptual beliefs for
which perception provides us reason, a straightforward suggestion as to the canonical
specification of perceptual content would be to utilize just those concepts that specify the
corresponding beliefs. The canonical specification of each perceptual state’s content will,
then, appeal to exactly those observational concepts that appear in the canonical
specification of the content of the perceptual beliefs to the formation of which that state
purportedly contributes.
The different perceptions of the Mach Figure, for example, make different contributions
to one’s epistemic orientation. One way of perceiving the figure contributes to one’s
dispositions to form perceptual beliefs exploiting the concept square, whereas another
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way of perceiving the figure contributes to one’s dispositions to form perceptual beliefs
exploiting the concept diamond. Specifying the content of the former perception by
appeal to the observational concept square and the latter by appeal to diamond precisely
articulates these differences between their respective contributions, Zncsquare and Zncdiamond.
Generally, the appeal to some observational concept, O, in the canonical specification of
perceptual content, articulates the contribution ZncO to a perceiver’s epistemic orientation,
where this can now be understood as a contribution to the perceiver’s epistemic
dispositions to apply that very concept, O, in thought.
Which perceptual beliefs one will be epistemically disposed to form, when undergoing a
perception, will be a straightforward function of the different contributions that it makes
to one’s applying particular observational concepts in thought (as expressed in its
canonical specification). For example, Samantha’s undergoing a perception the canonical
specification of the contents of which appeals to the concepts crimson and square
provides her reason to form the perceptual belief that there’s a crimson square (as well as
others). This is so, as the cumulative contribution of Znccrimson and Zncsquare just is a
contribution to her epistemic dispositions to employ in thought both concepts crimson
and square, an instance of which is the belief mentioned. 160
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This is, of course, a simplification in many respects. In particular, for a perception to provide
reason for the belief identified, it is not sufficient that it merely contribute to the perceiver’s
epistemic dispositions to apply the concepts square and crimson; correspondingly, it is not
sufficient that it is a perception the canonical specification of which mentions these concepts. The
canonical specification must also indicate the compresence of these properties (perhaps by each
being indexed to a location, or surface, in egocentric space). I put such complication to the side.
Though worthy of further investigation, it does not appear to invalidate the substance of the
current proposal.
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Finally, such a characterization of the reason-giving role of perception has the added
benefit that it complements the account of observational concepts, briefly discussed in the
previous chapter, along Peacocke’s (1992; 2004a; 2004b) lines.
As mentioned, according to Peacocke, observational concepts are concepts that are
partially individuated in terms of possession conditions having to do with one’s finding
primitively compelling transitions from appropriate perceptual experiences to contents
involving those concepts.
He says:
“A perceptual experience can make it rational, in certain circumstances, to judge that a
presented object falls under an observational concept, but not under a theoretical one. The
observational judgement can amount to knowledge, and does so because a willingness to
apply the concept in the given circumstances is mentioned in its possession condition.
Similarly, a perceptual experience can make it rational to judge that a presented object
falls under one but not under a second observational concept, precisely because the
experience is of a kind mentioned in the possession condition for the first, but not for the
second concept.” (Peacocke 2004a, p. 86, my italics)

The observational concept square is individuated in part by a possession condition that
mentions a perceiver’s willingness to apply the concept in response to experiences of a
particular type, whereas the observational concept diamond is individuated in part by a
possession condition that mentions experiences of a different type. How these perceptions
are to be typified is, of course, the most crucial question. Simply saying that the former is
a square-type perception and the latter a diamond-type perception is insufficient. Further
required is an adequate account of what being a perception of such a type consists in such
that it can ‘make it rational’ to form some perceptual judgment, or to apply some
observational concept, rather than another.
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One response, sufficient for establishing Peacocke’s epistemological claim above, is that
the different perceptions are typified by their correctness conditions (provided, e.g., in
terms of positioned scenarios or protopropositions). 161 In one sense of the phrase, the fact
that the perception has certain correctness conditions makes it rational to form a
judgment involving certain observational concepts. Appealing to such facts (specifying
these correctness conditions) can then make transparent the appropriateness of a
transition from a perceptual experience to contents involving certain observational
concepts. The appropriateness of the transition is guaranteed, as an observational concept
will truthfully apply to exactly those entities that satisfy the correctness conditions of the
perception type mentioned in the concept’s individuation conditions. Furthermore, one’s
possessing some observational concept, O, entails that one is willing to apply the concept
in circumstances in which it is, de facto, reasonable for one to apply it, i.e., those
circumstances in which one undergoes a perception that is correct when Os are about. In
this way Samantha’s perceptual belief that there’s a crimson square can amount to
knowledge. The concepts square and crimson are individuated in part by a willingness to
apply them when undergoing perceptions of the square- and crimson-type where these are
perceptions whose correctness conditions are satisfied when crimson squares are about.
Nonetheless, though appealing to a perception’s correctness conditions is sufficient to
account for the appropriateness of a transition from perception to a state involving some
observational concept, it is not sufficient as an account of perceptual content (just as an
161

As noted in my fn. 66, Peacocke (1992) presents the Mach Figure as an example that cannot
be accommodated by his account of nonconceptual content as positioned scenario contents.
Positioned scenario contents are insufficient to distinguish between the individuation conditions
of the observational concepts, square and diamond. Peacocke develops the notion of
protopropositional content as an additional layer of nonconceptual content, that manages to
overcome this difficulty.
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appeal to truth conditions in the case of beliefs is insufficient as an account of belief
content). 162 Rather, an adequate account of what a perception of the given type consist in
(the type appearing in the possession conditions of a given observational concept) must
explain the subject’s finding transparent the appropriateness of what might very well (but
need not) be an appropriate transition. Otherwise, we fail to account for the subject’s
making the transition because of thus finding it appropriate. An account of perceptual
content must explain its making rational the formation of a certain judgment from the
perspective of the perceiver. 163
Put differently, to say that a willingness to apply O in some condition C is part of the
possession condition of O, is just to establish a conditional: if one possesses O, then one
is willing to apply O in condition C. It is silent on what such willingness consists in and
on how it comes about. An account of perceptual content aims to explain what it is about
162

Indeed, I would say that for a theory of content the appeal to correctness conditions is also
unnecessary; a satisfactory account of perceptual content will ipso facto determine a perception’s
correctness conditions. As Cussins (2002) says in discussing the case of belief content: “…if you
get right the specification of the mode of presentation (the content) then something would have
gone wrong if, having done that, the theorist had to go on to specify the reference. A specification
of content is a specification of cognitive availability. … ordered pairs whose first member refers
to the ‘object’ of experience or thought, and whose second member refers to a mode or manner of
presentation have no place in a theory of content. The right specification of how is also a
specification of what is available in a cognition; and it is crucial to understanding the theory of
content to see that this is so.”(p. 149)
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In terms of a distinction drawn in previous chapters, and borrowed from McDowell (1994a),
correctness conditions can illuminate a transition’s reasonableness from the standpoint of
rationality, but not from the standpoint of the subject’s rationality. This same distinction is the
one that has plagued us from the very beginning. Recall, for example, the discussion of Vision
(2009) in Chapter 2. I argued that according to Vision objectual perception can show how a
transition from perception to thought is rational because there is some specification of the
objectual perception that make transparent the appropriateness of the transition. However, I
argued, an adequate account of perception must respect, what I called, the first person
transparency constraint according to which the specification that makes transparent the
appropriateness of the transition must, in some sense, be available to the perceiver. The same
considerations were later expressed in the Perspectival constraint, which I argued non-epistemic
accounts of perception fail to meet.
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condition C (undergoing a certain perception) in virtue of which one is willing to apply O
(rather than do nothing, or rather than apply some other observational concept).
It is this role of perception that the current proposal characterizes (though does not yet
explain). The relevant perception type, the type specified by appeal to some observational
concept O, encompasses those perceptual experiences that provide the perceiver reason to
apply O in thought. In other words, the type encompasses those perceptions that make the
contribution ZncO to a perceiver’s epistemic orientation – a contribution to the perceiver’s
epistemic dispositions to apply O in thought.

6.2.1 Explaining perceptual apprehension: Individuating epistemic capacities
Given this characterization of the reason-giving role of perception, the further question is
how to explain perception’s playing such a role. We must provide an account of the
epistemic capacities the exploitation of which in perception would explain its providing
the perceiver reasons to apply appropriate observational concepts in thought. Most
importantly, we must do so in a way that is consistent with the nonconceptual character
of perception.
In the case of belief, the epistemic capacities in question are conceptual capacities. The
exploitation of conceptual capacities explains the contribution that having a belief makes
to one’s epistemic orientation, as these capacities are individuated by possession
conditions specifying transitions among propositional attitudes that the subject finds
primitively compelling. The contribution that a belief makes is constitutively explained as
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a function of the possession conditions that individuate the concepts that are the
constituents of that belief.
A similar proposal can be developed in the case of perception. However, unlike
conceptual capacities, the capacities exploited in perception will be individuated by a
different kind of possession conditions. They will be individuated by possession
conditions geared toward the constitutive explanation of the contribution that perception
purportedly makes to the application of particular observational concepts, and,
correspondingly, to the formation of particular perceptual beliefs.
Focusing on a characterization of the reason-giving role of perception in terms of
epistemic dispositions to apply particular observational concepts elicits a straightforward
(yet unsuccessful) suggestion as to the nature of the epistemic capacities an exploitation
of which in perception would constitutively explain such contribution. These are
epistemic capacities individuated in terms of the observational concepts the application of
which in thought the subject must find primitively compelling. Just as having the concept
and, for example, consists in one’s finding instances of the elimination and introduction
of the concept primitively compelling, so we may consider the capacity to perceive
something as O as consisting in one’s finding the application of the observational concept
O in thought primitively compelling.
The fact that a perception of the Mach Figure as square, but not as diamond, makes a
contribution to one’s epistemic dispositions to apply the concept square in thought is
explained by the fact that having such a perception involves the exploitation of an
epistemic capacity individuated by a possession condition mentioning the subject’s
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finding primitively compelling the application of the concept square, rather than
diamond. The exploitation of this epistemic capacity constitutively explains the
contribution that having the perception makes to the subject’s epistemic orientation, i.e., a
contribution to the subject’s epistemic dispositions to apply the concept square in
thought.
Individuating the epistemic capacities exploited in perception in this way seems ideal for
the purposes of explaining the unique contribution that perception makes to one’s
epistemic dispositions to apply concepts in thought. For each observational concept there
will be some epistemic capacity the exploitation of which in perception accounts for
one’s being epistemically disposed to apply it in thought. And for each perceptual belief,
there will be some set of epistemic capacities the joint exploitation of which in perception
accounts for one’s being epistemically disposed to form it (namely, those capacities
individuated by possession conditions appealing to the observational concepts that are
constituents of the perceptual belief).
There is something correct about this suggested reason-giving role of perception. Having
a perception as of p commonly provides us reason to believe that p (where p is a
proposition composed of observational concepts). Similarly, there is something correct
about the thought that perception contributes to one’s epistemic dispositions to apply
particular observational concepts (as expressed in the possession conditions of these
concepts). An account of perceptual content is obligated to provide some explanation of
perception’s playing this role.
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Nonetheless, though the exploitation of some epistemic capacities must explain this range
of contributions that perception makes to our epistemic orientation, such capacities
cannot be individuated by the possession conditions just identified – in terms of a
creature’s finding the application of a given observational concept (rather than another)
primitively compelling. Epistemic capacities thus individuated are anathema to the notion
of nonconceptual content.
First, note that the exploitation of such epistemic capacities is too fit for the explanation
of the contribution that perception makes to one’s dispositions to apply observational
concepts in thought. It limits the reason-giving role of perception to whatever
contributions it makes to a creature’s conceptual life. 164 If perception’s reason-giving role
were in fact so limited, much of our motivation for the nonconceptual character of
perception would dissipate. Recall that the main motivation for nonconceptualism about
perception is the recognition that perceivers need not be conceivers and that a creature’s
perceptual acuity can transcend its conceptual acuity. 165 In other words, it is motivated by
the thought that the contribution that perception makes to a creature’s epistemic
orientation is independent of the creature’s conceptual capacities (if any).
Suppose that a nonconceptual creature, an Icelandic puffin, for example, is having a
perception canonically specified by appeal to certain observational concepts. According
to this suggestion, the creature is undergoing a state whose contribution to its epistemic
orientation is exhausted by its contribution to its dispositions to apply those observational
164

As perception’s contribution is constituted by the creature’s finding primitively compelling the
application of certain observational concepts.

165

That is, the creature can make many more perceptual discriminations than it can conceptual
discriminations (in the limit case, it can make no conceptual discriminations at all).
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concepts in thought. However, one can apply in thought only concepts that one
antecedently possesses, and the nonconceptual creature possesses none (nor can it
possess any). But, then, insofar as nonconceptual creatures, infants and others in the
animal kingdom, are concerned, such a contribution to their epistemic dispositions
remains inert, and insofar as we are concerned they remain undisclosed. As a result, it is a
mystery why we should think that perception makes any such contribution in the first
place. And more seriously, it is a mystery why we should think that such creatures have
contentful states at all.
A similar consideration holds with respect to the fine-grained contributions that
perception purportedly makes to the epistemic dispositions of adult human beings (who
possess a great deal of observational concepts). Such contributions, too, would remain
inert and undisclosed so long as perceivers fail to possess the fine-grained observational
concepts involved in the canonical specification of their perceptual content. So long as
Samantha does not possess the concept red27 her having a perception the canonical
specification of which appeals to the concept red27 might provide her a reason to apply
that very concept in thought, however, it is a reason that cannot be manifest. Samantha is
unable, even if merely contingently, to have such thoughts. The fine-grained specification
of perceptual content, which purportedly articulates fine-grained contributions to one’s
dispositions to apply fine-grained observational concepts, articulates principally invisible
contributions to one’s epistemic orientation. But if this is the case, we have similarly lost
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our motivation to think that perception makes such fine-grained contributions to our
epistemic orientation. 166
Note that even if the nature of perceptual content is as suggested, none of the above
entails that nonconceptual creatures are barred from having perceptions, neither does it
entail that their perceptions fail to provide them reason to apply particular observational
concepts in thought. Similarly, it does not entail that perception fails to provide a
perceiver reason to apply fine-grained observational concepts in thought, whether or not
the perceiver happens to possess those particular concepts. Rather, what it does entail is
that were perception’s reason-giving role a function of the exploitation of capacities
individuated as suggested, we would have no insight into the perceptual capacities of
nonconceptual creatures, and we would have no reason to think that the contribution
perception makes to a creature’s epistemic orientation is in fact independent of its
conceptual capacities.
This is an important point to recognize. Though the manifestation of such contributions
does depend on the antecedent conceptual capacities of the creature, perception’s making
these contributions need not depend on such capacities. To think otherwise, is to fail to
note the distinction (discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2) between one’s having certain
epistemic dispositions and one’s having a state that makes a certain contribution to one’s
epistemic dispositions. The notion of a reason-giving state is that of a state that makes
some contribution to a perceiver’s epistemic orientation. It does not follow that merely in
166

By definition, fine-grained content is content specified by concepts that we need not possess.
But as content specification is to articulate such contribution, it is a contribution that does not
depend on possessing concepts. But if all manifestation of such contribution depends on concept
possession, we have no evidence for such fine-grained contributions.
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virtue of having the reason-giving state the perceiver is thereby disposed to think or act in
certain ways. Just as being made of salt contributes to an object’s disposition to dissolve
in water even if the object is encased in an impermeable plastic shell and even if no water
existed, so is the case with one’s having a reason-giving state such as perception. 167
One’s having a perception the canonical specification of which appeals to the concept
crimson, for example, contributes to one’s epistemic disposition to apply that concept in
thought, even if one does not possess the concept crimson, or any other concept, for that
matter, and indeed, even if, like an Icelandic puffin, one cannot possess that (or any)
concept. One’s failing to possess the concept merely entail that this contribution will fail
to manifest.
Whether or not perception’s making such a contribution does depend on a creature’s
conceptual repertoire is a matter of whether or not it is possible for a creature to satisfy
the possession conditions of the epistemic capacities the exploitation of which in
perception constitutively explain this contribution, while failing to satisfy the possession
conditions of the concepts to the application of which the perception contributes. 168 The
difficulty above is not with the general claim that perception makes some contribution to
a creature’s conceptual life. On the contrary, its making such a contribution is part of the
167

Or, how having a mass of 50kg contributes to a round object’s disposition to make a
triangular impression in a sheet of wax, though the object is not thereby disposed to make such
an impression. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the case of belief is no different. One’s
having the belief that mount Tahurangua is erupting might contribute to the native’s dispositions
to flee, but that is not to say that the native is thereby disposed to flee. What the native is disposed
to think or to do is a function not only of his having this one belief, but of the constellation of
other beliefs and desires he might have. See also my fn. 115.
168

If a creature cannot satisfy these possession conditions nonconceptually, we will also find
ourselves with a circular account of observational concepts. Undergoing the kind of perceptions
that are mentioned in the possession conditions of the observational concept O, would require that
one antecedently possesses O, in which case, an appeal to that perception type in the possession
conditions of the concept will do nothing to illuminate the nature of that concept.
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phenomena that an appeal to the nonconceptual nature of perceptual content aims to
explain. Rather, the difficulty is that the epistemic capacities identified lead to an account
of perception whose contribution to a creature’s epistemic orientation can only be
manifest in a way that depends on the conceptual capacities of the creature. As a result, it
is unclear why we would think that the notion of nonconceptual apprehension has any
role to play in an account of perceptual content. 169
However, we now come to a more serious objection to the proposed nature of the
epistemic capacities that are to explain perception’s contribution to our applying
observational concepts in thought. Can we really make sense of a creature’s satisfying the
possession conditions individuating these epistemic capacities without possessing, or
even being able to possess, any concepts whatsoever? How can a creature incapable of
possessing the concept square, for example, find primitively compelling its application
and, hence, satisfy the possession conditions individuating its capacity to perceive some
object as square?
Insofar as a nonconceptual creature is concerned, there is no difference between its
satisfying a possession condition specified in terms of its finding the concept square
primitively compelling rather than the concept diamond, or for that matter, rather than the
concept red. The creature finds the application of none of these concepts compelling.
There is clearly something different, insofar as the creature is concerned, between its
perception of an object as square, rather than as diamond, and rather than as red. It is that
169

To continue with the analogy to the contribution that properties make to the objects that have
them, the suggested identification of the epistemic capacities exploited in perception is analogous
to identifying the mass of an object by appeal to the contribution that it makes to the object’s
disposition to make a triangular impression in a sheet of wax, rather than by appeal to its
contribution to the object’s disposition to resist an applied external force.
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something in virtue of which the former perception makes a contribution to its epistemic
disposition to apply the concept square in thought, rather than diamond or red (a
contribution that, as noted above, does not depend on the creature’s possessing or being
able to possess the concept). However, if the creature can possess none of these concepts,
this difference cannot be captured in terms of concepts the application of which the
creature finds primitively compelling.
The same consideration holds with respect to the fine-grained contents of perception that
purportedly exploit epistemic capacities individuated by possession conditions
mentioning observational concepts that we do not possess. How can Samantha, who does
not possess the concept red27, undergo a perception exploiting an epistemic capacity to
perceive some object as red27, if a condition on her undergoing such a perception is that
she finds primitively compelling the application of that very concept she lacks?
Alternatively, what possession condition does Samantha satisfy, what is it that she knows
(-that or -how), when she perceives something as red27 rather than as red28? It seems that
if Samantha finds any concept primitively compelling, it is, rather, one and the same
concept on both occasions, the concept red, which she does possess.
A possible response might be that the capacities exploited in perception are to be
identified in terms of the observational concepts the application of which one would find
primitively compelling were one to posses those concepts. In discussing observational
judgments, Heck says that “[t]he perceptual state can not have the content that p, strictly
speaking, since its content is nonconceptual; rather, it appears to me as if p just in case I
am in a state on whose basis I would judge that p, were I to judge solely on that basis”
(2000, p. 517). And in a footnote, he says: “It seems to me that one can truly say that it
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appears to me as if p, even if I lack the concepts required if I am to form that judgment,
so long as I would so judge, if I did have those concepts...”(Ibid, fn. 37)
Such a response allows us truthfully to say that even Sam the Icelandic puffin undergoes
a perception of some object as square. This is so as it is a perception-type such that were
he to possess the concept square he would find the application of that very concept
primitively compelling. Similarly, it allows us truthfully to say that Samantha undergoes
a perception of some object as red27, because were she to possess the concept red27 she
would find primitively compelling its application in such circumstances. Though true, it
does not provide us any insight into the nature of the epistemic capacities the exploitation
of which in perception makes it true. Rather, what makes the counterfactual claim true is
the fact that the perception is of a kind mentioned in the a-priori possession condition of
the observational concept square, or red27. Possessing the concept entails that one finds
its application in such circumstances primitively compelling. We can see why one would
find the application of a concept primitively compelling were one to possess the concept
from the analysis of the possession conditions of observational concepts. But this tells us
nothing about the reasons that perception provides a perceiver in light of which were one
to possess the appropriate concept one would find its application primitively compelling.
Before moving to the next and final section, it is worth providing a brief summary of
some of the central points above. Importantly, we need not doubt that perception makes a
contribution to a perceiver’s epistemic dispositions to apply a given concept in thought
(and consequentially, to the formation of perceptual beliefs). Nor should we doubt that it
can make such a contribution independently of the perceiver’s conceptual capacities. This
is so even though the manifestation of such a contribution does depend on the perceiver’s
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conceptual repertoire. What is needed is a substantive account of perceptual content the
canonical specification of which utilizes those observational concepts to the application
of which the perception contributes. Such a substantive account of perceptual content will
appeal to the exploitation of epistemic capacities individuated in terms of possession
conditions that a creature must be able to satisfy independently of its having any
conceptual capacities. To explain perception’s making such contributions, we cannot
appeal to epistemic capacities individuated in terms of the observational concepts one
must find primitively compelling; the possession conditions individuating these epistemic
capacities must be specified without mentioning the possibility of any conceptual
deployment. 170
So, how are we to individuate these epistemic capacities? To this I now turn.

6.3 Perception and the nonconceptual individuation of discriminative capacities
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the positive suggestion that I advance
here is that we understand the paradigmatic reason-giving role of perception in terms of
its making a unique contribution to our epistemic dispositions to carry out certain
appropriate discriminative engagements with our environment.
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In other words, no concepts can be mentioned in the possession conditions of these epistemic
capacities. In particular, the observational concept whose application in thought is to be explained
by appeal to the exploitation of some epistemic capacity in perception cannot be mentioned in the
possession conditions of that very epistemic capacity. See also my fn. 168 above in relation to the
circularity worry in the individuation conditions of observational concepts. Once mention of
observational concepts enter into the possession conditions of these capacities, it is clear that one
cannot possess these capacities, and hence, cannot undergo perceptions without also having
satisfied the possession conditions of the concepts mentioned.
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Perceiving some object as red, for example, makes the unique contribution Zncred to one’s
epistemic orientation, where this is understood as a contribution to one’s epistemic
dispositions to engage the object perceived (or the environment more generally) in what
might be termed, conveniently, as red-appropriate ways. The crucial challenges that this
section aims to overcome is to identify the relevant red-appropriate engagements by
which to characterize the range of unique contributions that perception paradigmatically
makes. And, further, it aims to provide a nonconceptual account of the discriminative
capacities exploited in perception that would constitutively explain its making the
contributions thus characterized. 171
The previous section has already dealt with one suggestion as to these relevant
engagements. The application of an appropriate observational concept is, after all, also a
kind of discriminative response for which perception provides us reason. Furthermore, it
is a particularly apt kind of response for the purposes of characterizing the unique
contribution that perceiving some object as P makes to one’s epistemic orientation.
Perceiving some object as P uniquely contributes to the perceiver’s epistemic
dispositions to apply the concept P in thought. The relevant red-appropriate engagement
with a perceived object is then the formation of thoughts about the object involving the
observational concept red. Such discriminative responses seem perfectly tailored for the
purpose of characterizing the full range of different contributions that perception makes
to our epistemic orientation.
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In much the same manner as I have investigated the engagements appropriate to the belief that
p by looking to its role within folk psychology as a first step in characterizing the reason-giving
role of belief. An explanation of the reason-giving role characterized was then sought in terms of
the exploitation of conceptual capacities.
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Though perception does contribute to our having such epistemic dispositions, and
different perception types will make different such contributions, I have argued that this
suggestion will not work. Characterizing perception’s reason-giving role in these terms
cannot serve to guide the individuation of the nonconceptual epistemic capacities the
exploitation of which in perception would constitutively explain such contributions.
An additional and less intellectually demanding suggestion – one that does not appeal to a
creature’s dispositions to apply any concepts in thought – appeals to a creature’s sorting
behaviors. 172 At the very least, perception provides us reasons in light of which we sort
squares with squares, diamonds with diamonds, crimson objects with other crimson
objects, etc. Perhaps, then, perceiving something as red can be understood in such terms
– as making a contribution to our epistemic dispositions to differentially engage with red
objects.
Though initially more promising, merely to characterize the paradigmatic reason-giving
role of perception in terms of such sorting behaviors, to sort red objects with other red
objects, for example, does not yet capture the unique contribution that perceiving
something as red makes to one’s epistemic orientation. Such sorting behavior does not
constitute a uniquely red-appropriate engagement with the world. As a result, it is not a
172

In discussing the notion of discriminatory capacities in perception, Millar (2000) also makes
room for a concept-independent account of discriminative capacities. He argues that “[a] creature
can be said to discriminate Fs by sense M when it has the capacity to respond in a distinctive way
to Fs which it perceives via M. … The important point is that a capacity to discriminate Fs is not
necessarily a capacity to bring Fs under the concept of an F.”(p. 85) Thus, Millar points out that
the application of an appropriate concept is the manifestation of the exploitation of some
discriminative capacity. But, crucially, other ‘distinctive ways’ of responding to what is perceived
are equally adequate as manifestations of the exploitation of such a capacity. The aim of this
section can be seen as supplying some substance to the relevant ‘distinctive ways’ of responding.
What, I ask, are the distinctive ways of engaging our environment that would uniquely indicate a
subject’s exploiting a capacity to perceive objects as red?
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good candidate for characterizing the kind of engagements for which perception (in
particular, perceiving something as red) paradigmatically provides us reason.
To see why this is the case, consider as an example an infant who, when confronted with
several blocks, one red and the others green, consistently chooses the red block among
them. We can imagine that the infant picks the red block to play with while pushing away
the other green ones.
The fact that the infant manifests systematic differential patterns of engagement with the
differently colored blocks (in effect, sorting the reds from the greens) is prima facie
reason to think that the infant is undergoing a perception that represents the red block as
red and the green blocks as green. The perception of the blocks provides the infant
reason to engage differentially with the differently colored blocks. That is certainly how
we would be tempted to describe the situation. Perhaps it is even true.
However, this temptation can also be resisted. Such differential responses only indicate
the infant’s capacity to discriminate between the blocks. Of course, if the infant could not
so discriminate between the blocks, i.e., could not produce differential responses in
relation to the differently colored blocks, we would have good reason to think that it does
not perceive the one as red, and the others as green. But, to conclude that he does so
perceive the blocks, from his ability to engage in such differential behavior, is simply to
negate the antecedent. 173
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This example is adapted from Armstrong (1968), where he provides a similar response. He
says that “…the differentiated behaviour towards the blocks does provide good reasons for saying
that it can perceive a difference between the blocks…”(p. 247). But, he continues to argue, such
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In fact, the same pattern of differential responses to the differently colored blocks can
equally be the manifestation of the infant’s perceiving a host of other properties that
happen to characterize the red block but not the green ones; perhaps it is the brightness of
the blocks the perception of which provides the infant reason to engage them differently,
or perhaps it is the particular shade of the red block, rather than its redness tout court.
Seeing as these are open possibilities, it follows that differential engagement with red
objects is not indicative of a creature’s undergoing a perception of the object as red. 174
It might, of course, be replied that experimental psychology has advanced greatly in the
last century, and has in fact devised sophisticated methods by which to tease apart these
different possible explanations. Surely, with enough experimental ingenuity, we can
make it so that all variables other than the color of the blocks are fixed (that is, the
possible interference of any accidentally co-instantiated properties can be removed). We
can thus eliminate competing explanations. The only explanation remaining is that the
infant is responding differentially to the colors of the different blocks.
Plausibly, the infant is responsive to the different colors of the blocks. By experimenting
in the aforementioned way, we can narrow down the properties that the creature under
investigation is sensitive to; the properties that the creature represents. It is in this way

behavior is not yet sufficient evidence to the effect that the infant discriminate redness. At most, it
manifests an ability to discriminate the red block from the other green ones.
174

In fact, as Bermudez (2007) points out, there are cases in which one manifests such
discriminative responses without perceptually representing the objects discriminated at all. See
his fn. 7 (on pp. 71-72) and the text to which it relates (p. 59). One good example comes from
blindsight patients who report not to have any perceptual awareness of portions of their visual
field, yet manage to respond well above chance when guessing the identity of stimuli presented to
that same portion of their visual field (as discussed briefly in my Chapter 3, Section 3.2, above).
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that we can ascertain that bats are blind to colors, though they are particularly sensitive to
shapes.
However, the most crucial point is still left untouched. Such differential behavior can
indicate which properties the infant represents, but it remains silent on how it represents
these properties. Any co-extensive specification of content provides us exactly the same
range of such contributions (including Sam’s arbitrary notation from Chapter 3), and
would be an equally adequate candidate for the explanation of the infant’s consistently
selecting the red block rather than the green ones. After all, differentially responding to
red objects (e.g., sorting them in one pile while excluding others) just is differentially
responding to objects disposed to cause in normal observers red-type experiences (or, in
terms of Sam’s notation, 5439-type objects). Yet, it is not as disposed to cause in normal
observers red-type experiences (or as 5439) that the infant perceives these objects.
The problem with the current suggestion is that mere differential response to
appropriately characterized objects is too unconstrained. It characterizes the
appropriateness of the response extensionally in terms of the properties to which it is a
response. What makes the response appropriate is that it is a systematic differential
response to objects characterized by a certain property. As such, it is equally appropriate
irrespective of how the property is specified. 175
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It is precisely this problem that we have seen haunts non-epistemic accounts of perception in
Chapters 3 and 4. Similarly, it is the same problem that confronts truth-conditional accounts of
belief content. Oedipus’ consistently bringing flowers to Jocasta but not to Tiresias, is the
manifestation of Oedipus’ thinking about Jocasta in some distinctive way that is not a way he
thinks about Tiresias. However, such discriminative response to Jocasta is in no way sufficient to
distinguish between Oedipus’ thinking about her as Jocasta and his thinking about her as his
mother (as well as an indefinitely many other possibilities).
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It is for this reason that mentioning perception’s making a contribution to one’s epistemic
dispositions to engage differentially with a certain class of objects (those having some
property P) is not useful for characterizing perception’s paradigmatic reason-giving role.
Though it is a necessary condition on perceiving something as P that it makes such a
contribution to one’s engagements with the object perceived, such sorting behavior is not
yet sufficient to characterize the unique contribution ZncP that perceiving something as P
makes to one’s epistemic orientation.
So, if mere differential response to red objects is insufficient as a uniquely redappropriate engagement, what is?
When perceiving something as red, the relevant differential responses must be, to put it
somewhat trivially, of a red-appropriate sort, rather than of a sort appropriate to
something’s being red. 176 Of course, if all goes well, providing an account of these redappropriate responses will also show why they are responses that are appropriate to
something’s being red. 177
To illustrate, note that the appeal of the suggestion from the previous section was
precisely that it characterizes the contribution that perception makes to one’s epistemic
176

A similar point that has proved especially inspiring in the process of developing this
dissertation is expressed by Dennett (1969) who in discussing the behavior of a rat in a maze
claims that perceiving a food pellet as a left turn signal is to be disposed to turn left upon
perceiving the food pellet, whereas to perceive it as a food pellet is to try and eat it (circa p. 75).
The point is that the attribution of content is not merely sensitive to considerations having to do
with that which stimulates some reaction, but a sensitivity to the appropriateness of the reaction.
“No afferent can be said to have the significance ‘A’ until it is ‘taken’ to have significance ‘A’ by
the efferent side of the brain, which means, unmetaphorically, until the efferent side of the brain
has produced a response … the unimpeded function of which would be appropriate to having
been stimulated by an A” (Ibid p. 74). It is this ‘appropriateness’ relation that we are investigating
here.
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See my fn. 162 in this regard.
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orientation in terms of responses that are uniquely appropriate for the particular content
as specified. Perceiving some object as red is distinguished from all other co-extensive
specification of perceptual content, e.g., from perceiving the object as disposed to cause
in normal observers red-type experiences. The former in a state that contributes to the
application of the observational concept red, whereas the latter is a state that contributes
to the application of a very different concept. The application of the concept red is a
uniquely red-appropriate response. Furthermore, the red-appropriate response, the
response characteristic of perceptions as red, is also an appropriate response to an
object’s being red. Red objects are exactly those objects to which it is appropriate – true –
to apply the concept red. 178 This suggestion, however, is no longer under consideration.
A different suggestion, however, is still on the table – one that was touched upon briefly
in Chapter 4. In that chapter I appealed to different kinds of sorting behaviors in order to
defend the position that our common sense color concepts, red, green, etc., rather than
other co-extensive concepts, provide the canonical specification of perceptual content.
As noted, we can specify our color perceptions by appeal to concepts relating to those
microfeatures of the surfaces of objects in virtue of which perceiving such objects
produce in us certain color experiences. We can also specify these same perceptions by
appeal to concepts pertaining to the different wavelengths that such surfaces are disposed
to reflect. There are indefinitely many specifications of our color perceptions that would
be equally adequate for the sake of providing appropriate correctness conditions; that is,
178

Notably, the contribution that perceiving the object as disposed to cause in normal observers
red-type experiences makes to the perceiver’s epistemic orientation is also equally an appropriate
response to something being red, since an objects being red just is that object’s being disposed to
cause in normal observers red-type experiences.
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adequate for picking out those properties the presence of which would make our
perceptions correct. 179 However, each such specification articulates different
contributions made by a mental state for which the specification is canonical. In
particular, the different specifications of content articulate contributions to one’s
epistemic dispositions to undertake different kinds of sorting behaviors. And, I suggested,
our common sense color concepts fully articulate the particular kind of sorting behavior
to which our color perception contributes.
The kind of sorting behavior appropriate for characterizing the reason-giving role of our
color perception, as discussed in Chapter 4, is essentially relational, or holistic. It is not
an atomic kind of sorting, by which is meant that for each color property there is some
response that is specifiable independently of any other color property and of the response
for which perception of that other color property provides us reasons. For example,
respond “Red!” iff red things are about; respond “Green15!” iff green15 things are about;
respond “Blue!” iff blue things are about; etc. 180 Rather, the responses appropriate for
each color property and for which perception provides us reason are essentially specified
by reference to other color properties and the responses for which our perceiving them
provides us reason.
This is illustrated most clearly by the fact that perception provides us reason to sort (or
otherwise engage with) differently colored objects according to a certain metric of
179

And, as we have seen, one such specification in particular will be uniquely adequate, as it will
make transparent the fact that the perception is of a type that makes rational the application of
particular observational concepts. It will be that specification that utilizes those very
observational concepts that are partially individuated by possession conditions mentioning
perceptions with the correctness conditions specified.
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Such independent specifiability fails precisely for the reasons we have seen above.
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similarity and difference. Not only does perception provide our reasons to sort samewith-same, e.g., red27 objects with other red27 objects (or to engage each instantiation of
red27 in the same particular manner), a fact that would be compatible with any of an
indefinitely many co-extensive specifications of perceptual content. But, crucially, it
provides our reason to sort like-with-like, i.e., to engage with red27 objects similarly as we
would with red28 and red29 objects and differently than we would with green15, and
orange14 objects. When organizing differently colored objects, this like-with-like
engagement is manifested most explicitly, for example, by our placing a red27 object in
proximity to a red28 object and both at approximately the same distance from a green15
object and at approximately the same (but shorter) distance from an orange14 object, and
so forth with respect to all other color properties.
Of course, it should be emphasized that nothing about the color property red27 or about
the particular location in which we have reason to place an object having that property
makes placing it in that location a uniquely appropriate response to the object’s having
this property. Rather, what makes it the uniquely appropriate response to the object on
some occasion is the location’s relation to other locations at which we have reason to
place other colored objects. 181
Considered more abstractly, we see that sorting the colored object appropriately in
relation to other colored objects is but a manifestation of the unique contribution that
perceiving that color property makes to our epistemic orientation. The unique
181

Of course, insofar as the reasons that our color perception provides us are concerned, the
placement of (up to) the initial n+1 differently colored objects will be arbitrary, where n is the
number of orthogonal dimensions of similarity and difference characteristic of our color
perceptions.
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contribution is characterized more abstractly than any particular set of engagements with
colored objects, but in terms of our epistemic dispositions to engage the colored object in
accordance (or conformity) with the property’s relative location within a specific
characteristic space of similarity and difference that holds among the different color
properties. 182 Perceiving a red27 object, for example, makes the unique contribution
Zncred27 to our epistemic dispositions to engage the object in ways that accord with the
property’s relative location within the relevant space of similarity and difference that
holds among color properties.
Unsurprisingly, when specifying the content of our color awareness by appeal to our
common sense color concepts (irrespective of whether it is perceptions or beliefs by
which we come to be aware of the colors) we are articulating contributions to our
epistemic dispositions to engage perceived objects in ways that stand in exactly the same
relations of similarity and difference as above. Each fine-grained color concept articulates
a particular contribution that corresponds to a point within this space, and each coarsegrained color concept can be seen as corresponding to a region.
For example, when we specify the content of our awareness by use of the (coarsegrained) concept red we are articulating a contribution to our epistemic disposition to
engage with objects in ways that are identical to the intersection of engagements for
which we have reason when undergoing an awareness canonically specified by appeal to
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And even more generally, it is a location within a space of similarity and difference that holds
among the different perceptible properties. However, all other dimensions of similarity and
difference comprising this space will be orthogonal to the specification of the location of the
color property. (So our color perception provides us reason to locate the red27 object in the same
position in relation to other colored objects irrespective of their non-color, yet perceptible,
properties, such as shape, texture, or orientation).
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the concept red27, or red28, but not green15, or blue13, etc. Representing an object as red
just is undergoing a state the contribution of which is indifferent to which shade of red
the object could be represented as having. If you wish to purchase red flowers, your
awareness of the flowers as having whichever shade of red will do equally well as
contributing to your epistemic dispositions to satisfy your wish, but representing them as
having any other color will not do at all. Similarly, when specifying the content of our
color awareness by appeal to the concept red28 we articulate a contribution to our
epistemic dispositions to engage the object in ways more similar to those for which we
have reasons when undergoing an awareness specified by appeal to the concept red27, or
red29, than those related to an awareness specified by appeal to the concept green15. E.g.,
the former three will contribute to our recognizing the satisfiability of all of our red
related desires, whereas the latter will not, though they will all contribute to our
recognizing the satisfiability of various other desires (perhaps, as in an example from
Chapter 4, they will all contribute to our recognizing the satisfiabiliy of our desire to hit a
solid with the cue ball).
Paradigmatically, our awareness of color properties canonically specified in terms of our
common sense color concepts provides our reasons for forming judgments regarding the
appropriate relations of similarity and difference that hold among the different color
properties – that is, it provides our reason in light of which to articulate the totality of the
space of contributions relevant to our color awareness. Of course, we will not, as a matter
of fact, be in a position to form judgments regarding such relations when we do not
possess the concepts that enter into these judgments (such as fine-grained color
concepts). But, we have seen, this does not prevent an awareness specified by appeal to
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such concepts from contributing to our epistemic dispositions to apply those concepts in
thought.
The space of contributions that our color perception makes to our epistemic dispositions,
just is the space of contributions articulated by appeal to our common sense color
concepts (rather than co-extensive others), whether we possess these concept or not. As a
result, a canonical specification of the content of our color perception that aims to
articulate the full range of contributions that perception makes to our epistemic
orientation will appeal to precisely these common sense color concepts.
Now, is there any difficulty for a subject to satisfy the possession conditions of the
epistemic capacities the exploitation of which would constitutively explain the
contribution thus characterized, while failing to satisfy the possession conditions of any
concept? There seems to be no such difficulty. Surely, possessing the concept red27 is
necessary for one to form the judgment that red27 is more similar to red28 than to red44, but
that is reason to reject the suggestion that the paradigmatic reason-giving role of
perception is to be understood as supplying reasons for such judgments. And, of course, it
is reason to avoid utilizing such a characterization for the sake of individuating the
relevant epistemic capacities exploited in perception. However, we can capture the full
range of contributions that perception makes to our epistemic awareness, by appeal to
capacities to engage in nonconceptual sorting behaviors of the kind illustrated above.
Thus, a straightforward suggestion as to the epistemic capacities the exploitation of
which in perception would explain color perception’s making the range of contributions
thus specified is readily available. Such epistemic capacities are to be individuated by
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possession conditions specified in terms of the unique kind of sorting behaviors that one
must find primitively compelling. These are discriminative capacities of a particular kind.
In the case of perceiving some object as red, the discriminative capacity exploited in
perception is individuated by one’s finding primitively compelling engagements with the
object that conform to the property’s relative location within the space of similarity and
difference that is characteristic of our color perceptions. For example, one must find
primitively compelling an engagement with the object that places it in the appropriate
location in relation to other colored objects. A perception of some object as blue, would
exploit a discriminative capacity individuated in terms of one’s finding primitively
compelling engagements with the object perceived that conform to its location within the
relevant space of similarity and difference.
Granted that the discussion here is rather preliminary, and much more remains to be said,
for example about how one comes to possess these different discriminatory capacities (as
well as other questions which I raise below), there are already many things that can be
learnt.
First, note that the unique contribution that perceiving some color property makes to
one’s epistemic disposition cannot be specified independently of the contributions made
by the perception of other color properties. As a result, satisfying the possession
conditions for a discriminative capacity that would constitutively explain the contribution
that perceiving some color property makes to one’s epistemic dispositions, demands that
one satisfies the possession conditions of other related capacities. Thus, the possession
conditions individuating a discriminative capacity that is to explain the unique
contribution made by a perception of some object as P, where P is some color concept,
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will mention various other discriminative capacities (those which would constitutively
explain contributions made by the perception of other color properties). However, the
possession conditions for a given discriminative capacity does not mention any
conceptual capacities, and thus satisfying the possession condition for a given
discriminative capacity does not depend on one’s satisfying the possession conditions of
any concept. Perceiving something as red depends on one’s possibly perceiving
something as green, and as blue, etc., but does not depend on the possibility of having
thoughts involving the concepts red, green, blue, etc. 183 Nonetheless, color perception,
like thought, is a holistic achievement.
Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, we now have a substantive account
of perceptual content that can explain one’s having reasons for the application of
particular concepts in thought, independently of whether or not the subject possesses any
concepts. We can see what it is about perceiving something as red27, for example, in
virtue of which it makes a unique contribution to one’s epistemic dispositions to apply
the observational concept red27 (rather than any other observational concept) in thought.
The concept red27 applies truthfully to exactly those entities an awareness of which
makes a unique contribution to one’s epistemic orientation in relation to the object, and,
crucially, this very same contribution can be fully specified by appeal to nonconceptual
epistemic dispositions to engage these entities in ways that conform to their location
within the particular space of similarity and difference. In other words, when perceiving
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Plausibly, one need not satisfy the possession conditions for all other epistemic capacities, but
only a sufficient many that would be jointly sufficient for defining the relevant space of
contributions that color perception makes to our epistemic orientation. However, this is a topic in
need of much further exploration.
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something as red27 one is already locating the entity within the relevant space of
contributions that our different color perceptions make. One already finds primitively
compelling certain engagements with the entity, and unsurprisingly, the concept red27
applies truthfully to exactly those entities in relation to which such engagements are
appropriate.

Many further questions are still left open. First, I have focused in this section on color
perception. Possibly the strategy I have followed here will not be generalizable to the
case of perception in general. Can the strategy developed here be extended to the
perception of all perceptible properties? Can we account for perception’s providing
nonconceptual reasons to the application of other observational concepts corresponding
to different perceptible properties? What, for example, are the discriminative capacities
the exploitation of which in perception would constitutively explain our having reason to
apply shape concepts, such as square and diamond, in thought?
Developing a nonconceptual account of perceptual content that would constitutively
explain our having reasons for the application of all kinds of observational concepts is
too great a project for this dissertation. However, I believe that the difficulty is not
principled. In the previous chapter, when discussing the Pragmatist construal of concepts,
we saw that providing the individuation conditions for a concept, i.e., specifying its
possession conditions, was no trivial task. I believe that the case is similar with respect to
the individuation conditions of the various discriminative capacities exploited in
perception. Each case is to be developed, to a certain degree, independently (to a certain
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degree since the different perceptible properties form families that we can anticipate, as
in the case of color perception, will not be independently analyzable). But this is no
reason to be discouraged. On the contrary, the strategy pursued in this section provides us
an outline for developing an account of these discriminative capacities, and it is a strategy
consistent with their nonconceptual nature.
A related question that is worthy of close attention relates to the scope of the reasons that
perception provide us for the application of particular concepts in thought and for
engaging the world appropriately. Indeed, observational concepts just are concepts the
possession conditions of which appeal to one’s finding primitively compelling transitions
from appropriately related perceptions to thoughts involving that concept. The scope of
perceptual reason-giving just is the scope of observational concepts. So, is the concept of
a positron an observational concept?
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